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1. Introduction
Is this a dagger which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee:
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
I see thee yet, in form as palpable
As this which now I draw.
—Macbeth, Act II Scene 1
“I see people who are not there. I see people in the street with clipboards,
sometimes it’s the same person turning up, little fat chap, looks like
Mickey Rooney.”
—M.D. (A person with visual hallucinations
associated with schizophrenia)
More than one million adults in Britain, while awake, re-
peatedly see people, animals, or objects that appear real but
are not visible to others. Perhaps half as many again have
similar experiences on the borders of sleep. Few, though,
express their experiences quite so eloquently, or indeed
publicly, as Shakespeare’s Macbeth. For many, hallucina-
tions are emotionally neutral or even comforting experi-
ences (e.g., Diederich et al. 2000; Grimby 1993; 1998; Paul-
son 1997; Risser & Powell 1993; Tien 1991). For others,
they are distressing and disabling symptoms of major ill-
nesses (e.g., Goetz 1999; O’Reilly & Chamberlaine 1996).
A general functional model may aid our understanding of
these phenomena and ultimately lead to better help for
these latter groups (e.g., Collerton & Dudley 2004).
Single experiences of visual hallucinations are so com-
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tion of impaired attentional binding and poor sensory activation of a correct proto-object, in conjunction with a relatively intact scene
representation, bias perception to allow the intrusion of a hallucinatory proto-object into a scene perception. Incorporation of this im-
age into a context-specific hallucinatory scene representation accounts for repetitive hallucinations. We suggest that these impairments
are underpinned by disturbances in a lateral frontal cortex–ventral visual stream system. We show how the frequency of RCVH in dif-
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it generates.
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mon as to be considered normal. McKellar (1957) reports
single hypnagogic hallucinations in 63% of students, and
Ohayon (2000) reports that “almost everybody” has experi-
enced at least one hypnopompic or hypnagogic hallucina-
tion. In this target article, we will be focusing on those peo-
ple who have recurrent and potentially pathological
hallucinations. Recurrent complex visual hallucinations
(RCVH) are uncommon in non-pathological populations,
with estimates in the 0.3% range for one or more per month
(Ohayon 2000). Increasing frequency is associated with
greater pathology (Ohayon 2000), as is longer persistence.
Holroyd and Rabins (1996) and Gauntlett-Gilbert and
Kuipers (2003) describe how they may persist in eye disease
and schizophrenia over many years.
We will also primarily deal with complex, or formed, hal-
lucinations of people, animals, and objects. Classically,
these are differentiated from simple hallucinations of dots,
lines, flashes, and amorphous shapes, as well as from
panoramic hallucinations of landscapes (Cutting 1997,
p. 84). Since these latter may result from different mecha-
nisms (see, e.g., Cole 1999; Manford & Andermann 1998;
and sect. 3.1 here), we will address them only in passing.
Recognition of hallucinations as potentially pathological
biological phenomena dates from at least the medieval pe-
riod. There are ninth-century Persian descriptions of
shaqhiqheh, a headache associated with visual hallucina-
tions (Gorji & Ghadiri 2002). In Europe, Charles Bonnet
described them in the eponymous eye disease in 1769
(Schultz & Melzack 1991).1 In recent times, several distinct
models of visual hallucinations have been developed from
the perspectives provided by mechanistic understandings
of different disorders such as eye disease (e.g., ffytche &
Howard 1999; Menon et al. 2003; Santhouse et al. 2000;
Schultz & Melzack 1991), epilepsy (e.g., Kolmel 1993;
Levine & Finklestein 1982; Rabins et al. 1991), sleep dis-
orders (e.g., Arnulf et al. 2000; Manni & Mazzarello 2001;
Manni et al. 2002; Nomura et al. 2003; Risser & Powell
1993), psychosis (e.g., Flynn 1962; Horowitz 1975; Slade &
Bentall 1988), and Parkinson’s disease (Barnes et al. 2003).
These have been largely successful in accounting for hallu-
cinations in specific disorders but struggle to generalise
outside of the areas where they were developed.
We have generated a new Perception and Attention
Deficit (PAD) model, initially to account for hallucinations
in a recently recognised disorder, dementia with Lewy bod-
ies (McKeith et al. 2003), in which RCVH are exceptionally
common. We will show how this model cannot only be suc-
cessfully generalised to RCVH in other neurodegenerative
disorders, but also how it has the potential to account for
consistencies in the experience of RCVH in non-degenera-
tive disorders and for non-pathological RCVH occurring
during the transition between sleep and waking.
In doing this, we accept that active, ceaseless, complex, dy-
namic interactions between the visual systems and other
brain areas lead to subjective perception. Many dysfunctions,
either relative or absolute, in one or more areas might lead
to consequent effects in others that are experienced as dif-
ferent types of hallucinations. Hence, perhaps, the great vari-
ability in type, content, frequency, and associated phenom-
ena of RCVH (Brasic 1998; Kolmel 1993; Schultz et al. 1996).
Like others (e.g., Behrendt & Young 2004; Manford & An-
dermann 1998), we do not see that it is the role of a general
model to account for all this limitless variety. If we believe
that visual dreams, hallucinations, volitional images, and per-
ception reflect the activity of the same system operating un-
der different constraints, then the role of a general model (if
such can be found) is to identify the constraints that produce
hallucinations. Thus, it should explain consistencies between
different experiences. To this end, our strategy has been to
draw out the similarities between different experiences in
different disorders, averaging data wherever possible.
Though this runs the risk of creating apparent commonali-
ties where none truly exist, and obscuring as much as it illu-
minates, we feel that this is justified in an attempt to bring
greater order to what has been a fragmented field of enquiry.
2. Defining and assessing recurrent complex
visual hallucinations
Investigating normal visual imagery is challenging (Reis-
berg et al. 2003; Schwitzgebel 2002). Investigating halluci-
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natory visual imagery is perhaps even more so (Taylor et al.
1986), not least because there is no consensus definition or
classification (Cutting 1997). Hallucinations are generally
defined as perceptions without stimuli (Asaad & Shapiro
1986; Brasic 1998; Kolmel 1993). In contrast, illusions or
misperceptions are incorrect perceptions of stimuli (Brasic
1998; Kolmel 1993). Horowitz (1975) takes an intermedi-
ate position and defines a hallucination as an “image ex-
perience in which there is a discrepancy between subjec-
tive experience and actual reality.” As definitions, these do
not formally distinguish between self-generated imagery,
dreams, and hallucinations. They are also at odds with con-
structive models of subjective perception (e.g., Behrendt &
Young 2004; Friston 2002a; 2002b; Rees 2001). These see
a loose relationship between stimuli and perception, with
many aspects of normal perception occurring in the ab-
sence of current sensory input. Indeed, an argument can be
made, albeit not entirely convincingly (Clark 2002), for nor-
mal perception being mostly hallucinatory. For the pur-
poses of this article, we will therefore sidestep these defini-
tional problems and operationally define recurrent complex
visual hallucinations (RCVH) as repetitive involuntary im-
ages of people, animals, or objects that are experienced as
real during the waking state but for which there is no ob-
jective reality.
Between 75% and 90% of hallucinators do not sponta-
neously reveal their experiences (Nesher et al. 2001; Scott
et al. 2001; Teunisse et al. 1996), with a good proportion not
identified during routine assessments (Bracha et al. 1989).
When hallucinations are identified, there is a lack of vali-
dated tools for the subjective or objective assessment and
classification of hallucinatory experiences.
Differentiating between hallucinations and illusions or
misperceptions is also challenging. Thus, there are in-
stances where misinterpretations seem very unlikely, for ex-
ample, hallucinating a person sitting on a chair; and there
are those where misperception appears likely, for instance,
mistaking one person for another. However, there can be
significant difficulties in a grey zone of intermediate ex-
periences in which patterns on walls or cushions, for exam-
ple, metamorphose into faces. Additionally, many patient
groups with high rates of apparent hallucinations, such as
psychosis or dementing illnesses, also have high rates of
other visual or communication problems (see sect. 3.1; Bal-
lard et al. 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000). For example, Horowitz
(1964) describes how patients with schizophrenia can at-
tach meaning to simple visual hallucinations and hence re-
port them as if they were complex; as instances, reporting
lines as “vicious snakes” or dots as “two armies struggling
over my soul.” Compounding these problems are the great
variations between studies in the methods used to identify,
assess, classify, and report hallucinations.
Despite these caveats, we believe that there is enough
epidemiological, phenomenological, pathological, psycho-
logical, and imaging evidence to allow us to develop and test
general models of RCVH. We will now review that evi-
dence.
3. People who see things
Many, many diseases, brain lesions, pharmacological
agents, and psychological states are reportedly associated
with RCVH (for qualitative reviews, see Anderson & Rizzo
1994; Asaad & Shapiro 1986; Brasic 1998; Kolmel 1993;
Manford & Andermann 1998).
3.1. Associated states and diseases
The prevalence of hallucinations shows distinct variation
between conditions (Fig. 1). Some of this will reflect ran-
dom or systematic biases. For example, reported rates of
RCVH in eye disease range from below 1% to above 10%
depending partially on selection and exclusion criteria (Shi-
raishi et al. 2004); and some disorders with particularly high
rates (i.e., dementia with Lewy bodies, see McKeith et al.
2003; and narcolepsy, see Aldrich 1996) have visual hallu-
cinations as one possible diagnostic criteria. There is a need
for direct, within-study comparisons between different dis-
orders. Even so, it is striking that acquired eye disease, oc-
cipital stroke, and sensory deprivation, all causes of re-
stricted visual input, have similar low rates of RCVH (3–
18%). Disorders with more distributed dysfunction, for ex-
ample, those associated with disturbed consciousness (e.g.,
narcolepsy and delirium), some dementing illnesses (de-
mentia with Lewy bodies, Parkinson’s disease with demen-
tia, and vascular dementia), and schizophrenia have high
rates (30–59%). Table 1 shows that, where data exist, fre-
quencies are in some cases reversed for simple hallucina-
tions. Thus, simple hallucinations are relatively frequent in
sensory deprivation and eye disease, but infrequent in de-
mentia, delirium, and Parkinson’s disease. This double dis-
sociation between simple and complex hallucinations sug-
gests two things to us. First, that each type of hallucination
has a single primary cause, and second, that these causes
are separable within the visual system.
These estimates of frequency within categories can be
combined with estimates of the frequencies of these cate-
gories in, for example, the UK adult population to give an
admittedly crude indication of associations with RCVH in
the general population (Fig. 2). Normal hypnopompic (on
waking) and, especially, hypnagogic (on falling asleep) hal-
lucinations are, overall, the most frequent types. Broadly
speaking, four groups of disorders – delirium, age-related
dementia, schizophrenia, and acquired eye disease – stand
out as being most frequently associated with RCVH. In
contrast, some disorders that have been used to support
general models (thalamic and pedunculopontine halluci-
nosis; see Noda et al. 1993; Risser & Powell 1993); stimu-
lation of the subthalamic nucleus (Diederich et al. 2000);
and fatal familial insomnia (Gallassi et al. 1996; Tabernero
et al. 2000) are much rarer.
A number of risk factors for RCVH within specific disor-
ders have been reported (Table 2), though there have been
no cross-category comparisons and there are some contra-
dictions (e.g., whether depression in Parkinson’s disease is
or is not associated with hallucinations). Increasing intel-
lectual impairment is a consistent risk factor as is poor vi-
sion, though significantly, hallucinations cease in eye dis-
ease when all vision is lost (Menon et al. 2003). Impaired
alertness or sleep abnormalities are also a recurring theme,
even aside from delirium and narcolepsy. This suggests ei-
ther that these categories overlap, or as others have also
suggested (e.g., Cole 1992; Menon et al. 2003; Pappert et
al. 1999), there may be a consistent set of features that pre-
dispose an individual patient to developing RCVH –
namely, intellectual impairment, poor vision, and disturbed
alertness.
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3.2. Pharmacologically induced hallucinations
Evidence that the phenomenology of RCVH is more con-
sistent with hallucinations induced by anticholinergic drugs
than by drugs acting on 5-HT, noradrenergic, glutamate, or
GABA systems has been reviewed previously (Perry 2002;
Perry & Perry 1995), although one notable difference is
that drug-induced hallucinations occur with both eyes open
and with eyes closed.
Antimuscarinic drugs used in ophthalmology, anaesthe-
sia, heart disease, or motion sickness, and also used ritual-
istically or recreationally, most frequently induce hallucina-
tions of people and animals in normal individuals (reviewed
Perry & Perry 1995; see also Balikova 2002; Cheng et al.
2002; Gopel et al. 2002; Han et al. 2001; Tune 2000; Tune
& Egeli 1999; Winawer 2001), especially in the young and
elderly (in whom cortical cholinergic activity is lower than
in adults; Perry et al. 1992). Nicotinic, as well as muscarinic,
receptors may be involved since toxic quantities of tobacco
can induce hallucinations (Thomas 2002).
In Parkinson’s disease, antimuscarinic agents such as at-
ropine can induce hallucinations (Cummings 1991; Hyson
et al. 2002). There is also a limited amount of evidence that
patients with dementia with Lewy bodies are vulnerable to
potentially hallucinogenic effects of neuroleptic medica-
tion with anticholinergic side effects (Scheepmaker et al.
2003). There is consistent evidence that antimuscarinic
drugs induce delirium with hallucinations, especially in the
elderly (Han et al. 2001; Tune 2000). Endogenous anti-
muscarinic activity in plasma has been reported in elderly
medical patients with acute illness – a population at risk for
delirium. This activity, which was not identified chemically,
was detected using a broad spectrum anti-muscarinic re-
ceptor assay (Flacker & Wei 2001; Mussi et al. 1999). Delir-
ium has also been reported as a result of nicotine with-
drawal in heavy smokers (Mayer et al. 2001). Recent reports
that the anticholinergic side effects of neuroleptic medica-
tion contribute to the cognitive deficits of schizophrenia
(Minzenberg et al. 2004) raise the possibility that RCVH in
this disorder are at least partially iatrogenic.
The case for a dysfunctional cholinergic basis for RCVH
is strengthened by their symptomatic reduction in de-
mentia with Lewy bodies, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s
disease, and delirium by drugs which increase synaptic ace-
tylcholine (physostigmine, donepezil, rivastigmine, galant-
amine; see McKeith et al. 2000; Bullock & Cameron 2002;
Fabbrini et al. 2002; Maclean et al. 2001; Reading et al.
2001; Rosler et al. 1998; Zesiewicz et al. 2001).
In contrast to anticholinergic drugs, those (such as LSD)
that target 5HT2 receptors induce phenomenologically dif-
ferent visual hallucinations that involve distorted images
and synesthesia (blending of sensory modulators; Abraham
et al. 1996; Perry 2002), though mianserin and ondansetron
(5HT2 receptor antagonists) are reported to reduce visual
hallucinations in Parkinson’s disease (Ikeguchi & Kuroda
1995; Zolden et al. 1995). GABA may also be implicated
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Figure 1. Reported frequencies of RCVH within different normal and pathological states. Values are averaged proportions (weighted
by sample size) plus or minus 95% CI. Disparate methodologies and subject groups will account for some of the variation between groups.
Both random and systematic biases cannot be excluded at present. Sources: dementia with Lewy bodies (Aarsland et al. 2001a; Ballard
et al. 1995b; 1999, including six reviewed studies; 2001); Parkinson’s disease (Aarsland et al. 2001a; 2001b; Barnes & David 2001; Cum-
mings 1991; Fenelon et al. 2000; Goetz 1999; Holroyd et al. 2001; Sanchez-Ramos et al. 1996); Parkinson’s disease plus dementia (Aars-
land et al. 2001b; Neimark et al. 1996); progressive supranuclear palsy (Aarsland et al. 2001b); eye disease (Brown & Murphy 1992; Hol-
royd et al. 1992; Kolmel 1993; Lepore 1990; Scott et al. 2001; Soros et al. 2003); Alzheimer’s disease (Ballard et al. 1995b; 1999; 2001;
Bathgate et al. 2001; Cummings et al. 1987; Holroyd & Sheldon-Keller 1995); vascular dementia (Ballard et al. 1995b; Bathgate et al.
2001; Cummings et al. 1987); delirium (Cutting 1997; Webster & Holroyd 2000); sensory deprivation (McKellar 1957; Schulman et al.
1967); general population (Lindal et al. 1994; Ohayon et al. 1996; 2000); occipital stroke (Anderson & Rizzo 1994; Kolmel 1993; Vaphi-
ades et al. 1996); people over 85 (Ostling & Skoog 2002); schizophrenia, including paraphrenia (Bracha et al. 1989; Cutting 1997; Howard
et al. 1994; Ndetei & Singhe 1983; Zarroug 1975); narcolepsy and essential hypersomnias (Aldrich 1996); frontotemporal dementia (Bath-
gate et al. 2001); bereavement (Grimby 1993).
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Table 1. Content of recurrent complex visual hallucinations
Simple hallucina
Complex hallucinations
PATIENT Familiar Unfamiliar Inanimate Multiple 
GROUP people adults Children Animals objects images
Dementia 663 83 353 113 83
with Lewy 
bodies
Parkinson’s 15 (69 of all hallucinations  71, 102, 74, 81, 44, 62, 254, 42,
disease unfamiliar)1 8 (PDD)3 3 (PDD)3 3 (PDD)3
114, 12 134, 112 32, 6 
(PDD)3
40 (PDD)3
Dementia 75 205 175, 58 135, 68 95 05
(mixed 258
diagnoses)
Eye disease 26, 2 610, 116 512, 313, 610, 912, 413, 1324, 622, 216, 312,316,
(figures)10, 415, 116 115, 113 716, 1212 217, 18– 622
8 (distorted 2010, 5112,
faces)10 1719
1 (1 faces)16
21 (7 faces and body parts)12, 1113
619, 1322
Unselected 211 611 111 111
population 
sample
Delirium 279 179 119 19
Schizophrenia 209, 2318, 5821 69, 318, 69, 318 6018 6414, 69,
(including 1811 2511 321, 611 3111, 820, 
paraphrenia)
6414, 3320 5014, 718
Stroke in 2217 2517
visual 
pathways
Alcohol abuse 79 (predominantly people)14 6114
Sensory 
deprivation 623 4223
Figures are reported percentages of people who have hallucinations of each type out of all people who have that disorder. Because peo-
ple may experience more than one type of hallucination, percentages may total more than 100%. Some sources (6, 7, 10, 15) reported
rates only within those who hallucinated. In these cases, overall rates of 15% of people with eye disease having complex hallucinations
and 25% with simple hallucinations were derived from other studies and used to calculate comparable figures.
Sources: (1) Holroyd et al. (2001); (2) Barnes & David (2001); (3) Aarsland et al. (2001a); (4) Fenelon et al. (2000); (5) Murgatroyd &
Prettyman (2001); (6) ffytche & Howard (1999); (7) Brown & Murphy (1992); (8) Ballard et al. (2001); (9) Cutting (1997); (10) Sant-
house et al. (2000); (11) Lindal et al. (1994); (12) Lepore (1990); (13) Nesher et al. (2001); (14) Deiker & Chambers (1978); (15) Pliskin
et al. (1996); (16) Teunisse et al. (1996); (17) Vaphiades et al. (1996); (18) Gauntlett-Gilbert & Kuipers (2003); (19) Soros et al. (2003);
(20) Howard et al. (1994); (21) Zarroug (1975); (22) Scott et al. (2001); (23) Schulman et al. (1967); (24) Needham & Taylor (2000).
PDD, Parkinson’s disease with dementia.
Panoram
ic
hallucinations
Sim
ple
hallucinations
based on limited evidence of zolpidem induced visual hal-
lucinations (Markowitz & Brewerton 1996), baclofen with-
drawal (Harrison & Wood 1985), and delirium tremens
(Brailowsky & Garcia 1999).
Agents such as mescaline that affect catecholaminergic
systems, promoting the release of dopamine, are said to re-
sult in multi-coloured images of fantasy. The dopaminergic
system is frequently implicated in disease-related visual
hallucinations, especially in Parkinson’s disease, on the ba-
sis of symptomatic treatment with neuroleptics such as
clozapine (Devanand & Levy 1995; Molho & Factor 2001),
which commonly target the D2 receptor subtype (although
other pharmacological actions may be implicated), and on
the basis of the induction of hallucinations by levodopa (L-
dopa) (Cannas et al. 2001; Goetz et al. 2001a; 2001b; Hol-
royd et al. 2001). However, in Parkinson’s disease, evidence
that L-dopa is the principal contributing factor to halluci-
nations is not consistent, since increasing L-dopa medica-
tion does not increase hallucination prevalence (Goetz et al.
1997; 1998a). Among neuroleptics, olanzapine is reported
to be superior in reducing hallucinations in Parkinson’s dis-
ease, compared to haloperidol or risperidone (Edell & Tu-
nis 2001) which could be related to the promotion of acetyl-
choline release associated with this type of drug (Ichikawa
et al. 2002). In contrast to degenerative dementia, neu-
roleptics are not consistently effective in treating RCVH in
the Charles Bonnet syndrome (Batra et al. 1997), and it re-
mains to be determined if cholinergic agents are effective.
In conclusion, pharmacological data so far available indi-
cate a primary role for cholinergic and secondary role for
dopaminergic dysfunction in the aetiology of RCVH.
Cholinergic hypoactivity alone, or dopaminergic hyperac-
tivity if (and only if ) cholinergic hypoactivity is already pre-
sent, as underlying mechanisms are both consistent with
the psychopharmacological evidence (above) and patholog-
ical data (sect. 7.6.2.2). In relation to the potential dual
transmitter role, combined cholinergic and neuroleptic
treatment is reported to be effective in reducing hallucina-
tions in Alzheimer’s disease (Bergman et al. 2003).
4. The character of recurrent complex visual
hallucinations
4.1. Phenomenology
The content of RCVH is summarised in Table 1; and their
phenomenology, in Table 3. As with estimates of the fre-
quency of RCVH, there are contradictions and gaps in the
data. Given the differences in methodology between stud-
ies and in the reporting abilities of different groups and the
absence of direct comparisons of RCVH across disorders, it
is unclear exactly how phenomenologically similar RCVH
are in, say, eye disease, schizophrenia, and dementia. How-
ever, like previous reviewers (e.g., Behrendt & Young 2004;
Brasic 1998; Cutting 1997; Horowitz 1975; Horowitz et al.
1968; Kolmel 1993; Manford & Andermann 1998; Siegel &
Jarvik 1975), we consider that, in contrast to the variations
in frequency of RCVH across disorders, the phenomenol-
ogy of RCVH is more consistent. Together with the double
dissociation between simple and complex hallucinations,
this suggests to us that the wide range of factors associated
with RCVH converge on a common target system.
4.1.1. Content. As we noted earlier in section 2, a distinc-
tion needs to be drawn between what is actually seen, which
may be prosaic, and what is reported, which may be any-
thing but. Many single case reports have emphasised the
bizarre or incongruous nature of hallucinations (e.g., Need-
ham & Taylor 2000; Silbersweig et al. 1995), but in our ex-
perience, within dementing illnesses (Mosimann et al., in
press) and in systematic surveys (Cole 1992; Pliskin et al.
1996; Teunisse et al. 1996; Zarroug 1975), these are less
common than rather commonplace images – a man sitting
on a chair or a dog in the corner of the room, for example.
Hallucinations of people tend to be more common than
are those of animals. Images of objects such as tables or cars
are the least frequent. Unrecognised images are halluci-
nated as frequently as or more so than familiar ones (Table
1; Cole 1992). There is often a stereotyped or repetitive
quality to the images. Commonly, the same image repeats
itself on different occasions, though over time, many pa-
tients will experience a range of hallucinatory images.
There is generally movement, although this is often stereo-
typed and restricted. The images rarely interact with or re-
spond to the environment. The image is usually whole and
sharply focused. It is normal sized or unusually small with
a normal or unusually vivid colour. If there is distortion, this
is usually of the face with a consistent exaggeration of the
mouth and eye areas (ffytche & Howard 1999; Frucht &
Bernsohn 2002).
RCVH are often associated with hallucinations in other
sensory modalities at other times (Ballard et al. 1999;
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Figure 2. Estimated relative associations of RCVH in the adult
population derived from reported frequencies within categories
and prevalences of those categories. Data were calculated by mul-
tiplying the weighted average frequency of RCVH within each cat-
egory (from Fig. 1) by estimates of prevalence of that category
within the UK adult population (45.8 million; www.statistics.
gov.uk). Estimates for the prevalence of specific categories are: de-
mentia with Lewy bodies (150,000), vascular dementia (112,500),
and Alzheimer’s disease (412,500) (calculated from rates in Stevens
et al. 2002); schizophrenia (1% of adult population; www.nelh.
nhs.uk); delirium (22% [www.psych.org] of 9.6 million hospital in-
patients, prorated from England figures; www.doh.gov.uk); repeated
non-pathological day time (0.57% of population), hypnagogic
(1.7%) and hypnopompic (0.5%) (Ohayon 2000; Ohayon et al.
1996); eye disease (1 million; www.rnib.org.uk); Parkinson’s disease
(120,000; parkinsons.org.uk); and bereavement (1% of the adult
population; www.statistics.gov.uk). Others include rare disorders
(under 0.5% of the population), or unsystematic series, or single
case reports, for example, epilepsy, stroke, narcolepsy, pedunculo-
pontine hallucinosis, fatal familial insomnia, and progressive
supranuclear palsy. Because of variations between studies and dis-
orders in definitions of RCVH, the data indicate approximate asso-
ciations with RCVH rather than exact ratios. Estimating an average
overlap among categories of a third gives a crude estimate of around
2 million adults with RCVH.
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Table 2. Risk factors for recurrent complex visual hallucinations
PATIENT Sleep Cognitive Poor Other risk factors
GROUP disorders impairment vision Nonrisk factors
Parkinson’s Daytime Cognitive Visual acuity1,2, Depression1,2,3, 
disease somnolence4,  impairment1,2,3,4, poor colour, disease severity1,2,3,4, 
sleep disturbance4 subsequent dementia and contrast  disease duration2,4, age4, 
with Lewy bodies, or discrimination18 previous psychiatric 
Alzheimer disease11 disease11, history of 
psychiatric disease1, dose 
of anti-Parkinsonian 
treatment1,2,3,4, duration 
of treatment1, duration 
of disease1, depression3
Alzheimer’s More rapid decline5, Relative occipital 
disease  cognitive impairment7,8, atrophy6, visual 
visual agnosia19 acuity7,19
Dementia with Cognitive impairment8, Occipital hypometabo- Absence of occipital white 
Lewy bodies overlapping figure lism and preserved matter hyperintensities9,
identification16, vari- posterior temporal/ age3, age at onset3,
ability in attentional parietal metabolism10 anti-Parkinsonian 
reaction time17, cog- medication3, depression3
nitive impairment3
Dementia Nighttime disturbance12, Clock drawing12, Near and far visual Age15,27, female27 age12,
(mixed CAMCOG object acuity12,15,27, sex12, illness duration12
diagnoses) recognition12, diagnosis ambient illumination12
with or of DLB12,15, diagnosis 
without of not AD12, MMSE12, 
hallucinations total CDR12
Eye disease Fatigue26 Cognitive impairment14,23, Bilateral sequelae13,30, Living alone14, loneli-
stroke14 bilateral visual im- ness12, low extraver-
pairment14,31, acute sion29, high shyness29,
onset of visual loss14 female28,30, level of dis-
ability30, emotional dis-
tress30, age31, history 
of psychiatric disorder14,
personality14
General Sleep disorders21 Neurological disorders21, Poor vision21,22 Use of recreational drugs21, 
population dementia22 anxiety21, psychosis21, 
daytime depression22, vivid day
hallucinations dreams25, bipolar disor-
der21, alcohol use21, hyp-
notics21, depression21, 
adjustment disorder21
General Sleep disorders20 Anxiety20, depression20, 
population psychosis20
hypnagogic 
and hypno-
pompic hallu-
cinations
Schizophrenia Poor vision24
including 
paraphrenia
Italics indicate a nonsignificant relationship. Sources: (1) Holroyd et al. (2001); (2) Barnes & David (2001); (3) Aarsland et al. (2001a);
(4) Fenelon et al. (2000); (5) Wilson et al. (2000); (6) Holroyd et al. (2000); (7) Chapman et al. (1999); (8) Ballard et al. (1999); (9) Bar-
ber et al. (1999); (10) Imamura et al. (1999); (11) Goetz et al. (1998a; 1998b); (12) Murgatroyd & Prettyman (2001); (13) Brown & Mur-
phy (1992); (14) Holroyd et al. (1992); (15) Ballard et al. 1995a; (16) Mori et al. (2000); (17) Wesnes et al. (2001); (18) Diederich et al.
(1998); (19) Holroyd & Sheldon-Keller (1995); (20) Ohayon et al. (1996); (21) Ohayon (2000); (22) Ostling & Skoog (2002); (23) Pliskin
et al. (1996); (24) Howard et al. (1994); (25) Morrison et al. (2002); (26) Menon et al. (2003); (27) O’Reilly & Chamberlaine (1996); (28)
Shiraishi et al. (2004); (29) Teunisse et al. (1998, 1999); (30) Scott et al. (2001); (31) Teunisse et al. (1995).
DWB, dementia with Lewy bodies; AD, Alzheimer’s disease; MMSE, Mini Mental Status Examination; CDR, cognitive drug research.
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Disappears with eye movement
Image moves with eyes 
Inage moves around
Intrinsic movement 
Mainly open eyes
Fits in with Context 
Not associated with sleep
Associated with inactivity 
No immediate trigger
Poor light 
Common in evening 
Occurs in specific place
Occurs at specific time 
Complete image 
Part of visual field 
Sharply formed 
Normal or small  
Coloured 
Insight 
No interaction with patient 
Neutral or positive emotion
Lasts minutes 
Deiker & Chambers 1978; Fenelon et al. 2000; Gauntlett-
Gilbert & Kuipers 2003; Goetz 1999; Holroyd et al. 2001;
Howard et al. 1994; Needham & Taylor 2000; Noda et al.
1993; Ohayon 2000; Simard et al. 2003; Zarroug 1975).
Thus, people with visual hallucinations may have auditory
hallucinations of voices, but it is very rare to hallucinate a
figure that talks (Gauntlett-Gilbert & Kuipers 2003).
4.1.2. Time and place. Episodes of RCVH tend to be of the
order of minutes, rather than seconds or hours, with an
abrupt onset with no apparent trigger. Offset is equally sud-
den. Sometimes they disappear on changes in the visual en-
vironment, though often again there is no apparent cause.
They more rarely occur with eyes closed (Barnes & David
2001; Melzack 1991; Menon et al. 2003; Schultz & Schultz
et al. 1996; Shiraishi et al. 2004; Teunisse et al. 1996).
By definition, the commonest hallucinations of normal
life, hypnopompic and hypnagogic, are associated with
falling asleep or waking. Similar associations with times of
low arousal (sitting or otherwise resting) have been re-
ported in Parkinson’s disease (Fenelon et al. 2000), schizo-
phrenia (Delespaul et al. 2002), and eye disease (Lalla &
Primeau 1993), though in schizophrenia as in delirium, hal-
lucinations have also been reported to be accompanied by
over-arousal (Manford & Andermann 1998). Associations
with times of low (as opposed to bright or absent) illumina-
tion have been reported in dementia (Murgatroyd & Pret-
tyman 2001) and eye disease (Lalla & Primeau 1993; Teu-
nisse et al. 1996), and it seems plausible that hypnagogic
and hypnopompic hallucinations may also be occurring at
times of low illumination.
The time of day of hallucination may be consistent within
the individual, though most often it is not. In contrast,
RCVH tend to occur in the same location, mostly in the
house or looking out of the house. As an example, patients
with dementia often report visitors who only appear in their
living room. Although this may partially be a function of the
amount of time spent in each location, it is striking that once
the patient moves to a new environment, the hallucinations
disappear (Cole 1992). The image usually appears in a con-
textually correct location – a person who is sitting in a chair
rather than floating on the ceiling – and with the correct
orientation – an upright rather than inverted face, for ex-
ample.
Hallucinatory images occur in the focus of the visual field
and do not generally disappear when attended to (Kolmel
1993; Manford & Andermann 1998; Santhouse et al. 2000).
The hallucinatory image is seen against the background of
the existing visual scene more often than is an image of a
person and background filling the whole visual field
(Barnes & David 2001; Manford & Andermann 1998; Scott
et al. 2001). Although these latter, panoramic, hallucina-
tions are described in eye disease (ffytche & Howard 1999;
Scott et al. 2001; Teunisse et al. 1995; 1996), they are in the
minority. It may be that in a person with no effective vision,
there will be no existing visual scene to act as the back-
ground to a nonpanoramic hallucination.
5. Requirements for a general model
A good general model should account for who hallucinates,
what they see, and when and where they see it. Thus, at a
minimum, a general model of RCVH has, in our view, to be
applicable to the pathological states of dementia, delirium,
schizophrenia, and eye disease. It should also account for
the induction and treatment of RCVH by pharmacological
manipulations. It needs to predict why nonpathological hal-
lucinations occur on the borders of sleep. It has to explain
the associations within disorders with poor vision, disturbed
alertness, and intellectual impairment. Finally, it needs to
account for the phenomenology of RCVH; for the fre-
quency of hallucinations of people and animals; for their
abrupt onset and offset, and their movement; for temporal
and situational regularities where they exist; and last, for
their extinction with eye closure.
6. Existing models
A number of candidate models have been put forward
based upon the pathology in particular disorders in which
hallucinations occur. These have mostly been developed in
parallel, with the result that there is a degree of overlap. For
example, cortical irritation and more modern versions of
cortical release both suggest hyperexcitability in visual cor-
tex as a causative mechanism.
Despite each model’s undoubted strengths, we feel that
each faces considerable challenges when measured against
the aforementioned requirements. Because none were de-
veloped with these requirements in mind, at the least all
would require extension. However, beyond this, we feel
that each faces the major hurdles outlined next.
6.1. Illusionary misperceptions and misidentifications
This intuitive explanation suggests that the hallucination is
simply the failure to see something correctly – and hence
to mistake it for something else. It is not widely supported,
even by patients (Nesher et al. 2001). Two areas of evidence
count against it. Misperceptions would seem most likely if
objects were not at the focus of attention. However, many
RCVH occur in the very centre as opposed to the periph-
ery of the visual field (Kolmel 1993; Manford & Ander-
mann 1998; Santhouse et al. 2000). Misperception would
also suggest that rather than the experience of an image be-
ing superimposed on a background, it should take the place
of another perception. The hallucination would not be of a
person sitting on a chair, but of a chair turning into a per-
son and back again. This has been reported in eye disease
(ffytche & Howard 1999). In these cases, however, it ap-
pears to be a separate phenomenon that accompanies
RCVH rather explains it. Thus, patients with these experi-
ences also have more purely hallucinatory images.
6.2. Cortical irritation
This model suggests that hallucinations result from intrin-
sic electrical overactivity in the brain areas that contain spe-
cific image memories or representations (Levine & Fin-
klestein 1982; Noda et al. 1993). It was developed initially
to account for visual hallucinations in temporal lobe
epilepsy and drew on Penfield’s work on the effects of stim-
ulation of that area (e.g., Penfield & Perot 1963). As previ-
ous reviewers have concluded, however, it has a range of
limitations as a general model (Brasic 1998; Manford & An-
dermann 1998; Schultz & Melzack 1991). Penfield’s initial
formulation of experiential hallucinations as reactivated
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memories is at odds with the unfamiliarity of many halluci-
nations. Though Horowitz et al.’s later stimulation work ac-
tivated a wider range of images (Horowitz et al. 1968), many
of which are reminiscent of those described by people who
hallucinate, this still leaves the problem of the lack of evi-
dence for focal cortical irritation in the majority of people
with RCVH (e.g., from stroke; see Anderson & Rizzo 1994;
Vaphiades et al. 1996).
6.3. Cortical release and hyperexcitability 
or unbalanced top-down activation
Au Eong et al. (2001), Anderson and Rizzo (1994), Asaad
and Shapiro (1986), Brasic 1998, Burke (2002), Cogan
(1973), Fernandez et al. (1997), ffytche and Howard
(1999), ffytche et al. (1998), Howard et al. (1997), Lepore
(1990), Santhouse et al. (2000), Schultz and Melzack
(1991), and West (1962) suggest that, in several disorders,
hallucinations result from a lack of sensory input. They sug-
gest that this results in the release of stored images. This
initially drew upon what was then thought to be the in-
hibitory nature of stimulus-driven, bottom-up visual pro-
cessing with a lack of inhibition-releasing spontaneous ac-
tivity. More recent conceptualisations (e.g., Burke 2002)
suggest that a lack of input leads to chronic hyperexcitabil-
ity. In a development of these ideas, Manford and Ander-
mann (1998) and Stoerig (2001) brought together a wide
range of different causes of visual hallucinations by sug-
gesting that they perturbed diverse aspects of the visual 
system, although, as with other models in this class, the
common result was a hyperexcitability or disinhibition of
image-containing cortex.
Approaching this from the other end of visual processing,
Grossberg (2000) suggests that, within adaptive resonance
theory (ART), hallucinations are caused not by a lack of bot-
tom-up inhibition but by an excess of excitation from top-
down attentional processes. In general, these top-down ex-
citations are not enough to spontaneously activate images,
unless the person wills it. However, Grossberg argues that,
on occasions, they become tonically hyperactive with in-
correctly activated images (hallucinations) as the result.
There are strengths in these models that invoke cortical
release. They are able to account for the content of RCVH
by the cortical areas that are released (ffytche et al. 1998;
ffytche & Howard 1999; Santhouse et al. 2000). ART may
be able to explain the recurrent features of hallucinations
by linking activation of the hallucinatory image to the con-
text in which the prototype image was learnt. However, this
class of models struggles particularly in predicting who has
complex hallucinations. Dysfunction of visual input (eye
disease, occipital lesions, or sensory deprivation) alone (Fig.
1), and isolated failures of attentional regulation due to
stroke (Chemerinski & Robinson 2000; Rabins et al. 1991)
or frontotemporal dementia (Bathgate et al. 2001) are as-
sociated with rates of RCVH in, at most, the 10–15% range.
This is well below that seen in some forms of dementia or
delirium. As we will show, it may be that both sensory re-
lease and top-down activation are necessary, but neither in
itself is sufficient to cause high rates of RCVH. Returning
to the double dissociation between simple and complex hal-
lucinations and the relatively high rates of simple halluci-
nations in eye disease and sensory deprivation, it may be
that the disinhibitory effect of lack of sensory input more
successfully accounts for simple hallucinations.
6.4. Dream intrusion
Dream intrusion suggests that hallucinations are the intru-
sions of dream images into waking or semi-waking states
(Arnulf et al. 2000; Asaad & Shapiro 1986; Manni & Maz-
zarello 2001; Manni et al. 2002; Nomura et al. 2003; Onofrj
et al. 2002; Pappert et al. 1999). It has a long history as an
explanation, dating back to L’Hermitte’s initial descriptions
of peduncular hallucinosis, though there is almost an
equally long history of disagreement (for discussions, see
Asaad & Shapiro 1986; Risser & Powell 1993).
In support of this as a general explanation, RCVH in de-
mentia and Parkinson’s disease have been reported to be as-
sociated with periods of sleep or disturbed alertness; fatal
familial insomnia, delirium, and narcolepsy are all charac-
terised by primary impairments in alertness or sleep; and
virtually all non-pathological hallucinations occur between
sleep and full wakefulness.
We see three major challenges to dream intrusion as a gen-
eral explanation. First, RCVH are less common in some dis-
orders with primary impairments of alertness (narcolepsy
without cataplexy and delirium) than in other illnesses in
which disordered alertness, though common, is not an in-
variable feature (dementia with Lewy bodies and vascular
dementia; Fig. 1). Second, within specific disorders, there is
not an invariable relationship between sleep disturbance and
RCVH. Thus, RCVH in narcolepsy is associated more with
cataplexy than sleep disorder per se (Aldrich 1996); and
within peduncular hallucinosis, a significant minority of pa-
tients do not have sleep abnormalities (Risser & Powell
1993). In Parkinson’s disease, although sleep disorder and
RCVH both occur, they do not necessarily occur in the same
patient or at the same point in the illness (Arnulf et al. 2000;
Manni et al. 2002; Nomura et al. 2003; Onofrj et al. 2002).
Third, dreams and RCVH are phenomenologically distinct.
Dreams fill the whole visual field, with the dreamer being a
participant in the action. In contrast, visual hallucinations oc-
cupy only the centre of the visual field, with the hallucinator
being an observer. Even when content is similar (Nomura et
al. 2003), people who experience both are well able to tell
them apart (Arnulf et al. 2000; Cole 1999).
6.5. Interactive and information-processing models
Asaad and Shapiro (1986), Brasic (1988), Gold and Rabins
(1989), and Schultz and Melzack (1991) describe a number
of solely psychological theories to account for RCVH.
Causal theories are mainly, though not exclusively, psycho-
dynamic and sociological. They argue that visual hallucina-
tions arise from trauma-induced breakdowns in ego bound-
aries, or a culturally influenced exaggeration of the normal
human propensity to hallucinate. On the positive side, their
dependence on internally generated images is supported by
evidence that spontaneous and volitional images are a nor-
mal feature of many people’s lives (Horowitz 1967; Mc-
Kelvie 1994). The emphasis on the role of expectancies and
past experience is consistent with evidence that childhood
and adult trauma is a risk factor for RCVH (Read et al.
2003) and that vivid daydreaming is associated with visual
hallucinations in non-patients (Aleman et al. 1999; 2000;
Morrison et al. 2002). Furthermore, flashbacks incorporat-
ing visual experiences are characteristic of posttraumatic
stress disorder (American Psychiatric Association 1994).
Bereavement may be followed by visual hallucinations of
the deceased, though more commonly in other modalities
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and perhaps not more frequently in the general popula-
tion of a similarly old age (Grimby 1993; 1998; Rees 1971;
Schneck 1990; Wells 1983), and there is some evidence that
hallucinations interpreted as hauntings are associated with
expectancies congruent with this (Lange et al. 1996). There
are also reports of emotionally significant experiences in-
fluencing the content or interpretation of, and hence emo-
tional reaction to, some hallucinations (Needham & Taylor
2000; Schultz & Melzack 1993). This is not the case for the
majority of hallucinations (Teunisse et al. 1996).
Overall, given the preponderant associations of RCVH
with organic disease (Figs. 1 and 2), and that it is so rare in
psychologically normal, or clinically anxious or depressed
people (outside of sleep-wake transitions), it seems im-
probable that purely psychological factors cause more than
a minority of hallucinations, though they may affect the in-
terpretation and emotional reaction to them (Collerton &
Dudley 2004).
In psychosis, difficulties with explanations that rely on a
single cause have led to the development of models in
which several factors can interact. In a well-developed in-
formation-processing model, Bentall and coworkers (Ben-
tall 1990; Slade & Bentall 1988) suggest that visual halluci-
nations result from mistaking an internally generated image
for one based on an external reality as a consequence of an
impaired reality monitoring: a model analogous to models
of auditory hallucinations that suggest these are misidenti-
fied internal speech (e.g., McGuire et al. 1996). This image
may be generated without awareness and appear to intrude
into consciousness. They suggest this becomes more likely
if there is high arousal, a predisposition to confuse reality
with imagination, a poor environmental signal-to-noise ra-
tio, a context that encourages hallucinations, and reinforc-
ing changes in arousal associated with the hallucination.
Morrison and colleagues (Morrison 2001; Morrison et al.
2002; 2003) have elaborated on this to account for the rela-
tionship between with traumatic experience and hallucina-
tions. Extending this to Parkinson’s disease, Barnes et al.
(2003) suggest that these mistakenly identified images re-
sult from a combination of impaired object perception and
poor source monitoring in episodic memory.
The suggestion that the primary cognitive error is in the
misidentification of an internal image seems to us to con-
flict with the evidence that about half of the people are
aware that they are hallucinating. Granted that the misiden-
tification might be nonconscious, it needs to be demon-
strated how it has little apparent relationship to conscious
awareness of unreality, especially when volitional images
and dreams are readily identified as such, and when there
is no other apparent differences between hallucinators with
and without awareness. Additionally, although subjective
visual vividness is related to reported hallucination prone-
ness, imagery performance is not (Aleman et al. 1999;
2000).
Horowitz’s perceptual nidus theory (Horowitz 1975)
does not depend upon this mistaken identification. It sug-
gests (as we later do ourselves) that the primary pathology
lies in the generation of images rather than their tagging as
internal or external. He suggests that hallucinations occur
when there is a combination of an ambiguous relationship
between an internal image and reality (the perceptual
nidus), in combination with a template of expectancy (de-
rived from psychoanalytic drives and other wishes), and an
active memory or fantasy image. This shares several central
features with our PAD model, though it was only after we
developed it that we became aware of Horowitz’s work.
Perhaps the greatest problem for these models as they
stand at present is in accounting for the variations in the fre-
quency of RCVH across disorders. There seems no a priori
reason why images should be generated or mistaken less
frequently in, for example, eye disease than in dementia
with Lewy bodies, or that the perceptual nidus would sys-
tematically vary across disorders.
Recent biological models of psychosis have focussed 
on the role of the thalamus in coordinating the multiple
brain areas that subserve attention and perception (e.g.,
Behrendt & Young 2004; Lee et al. 2003; Pelaez 2000).
They suggest that thalamic dysfunction creates a stable per-
ception that incorporates incorrect elements. Though at-
tractive in that they can reconcile the need for multiple fac-
tors interacting, these models are at odds with the lack of
relationship between thalamic dysfunction and rates of
RCVH across different disorders (Collerton & Perry 2004).
Thus, massive but restricted thalamic damage due to in-
farcts (del Mar Saez de Ocariz et al. 1996) or fatal familial
insomnia (Gallassi et al. 1996; Tabernero et al. 2000) is not
generally associated with RCVH, though isolated cases
have been reported (Noda et al. 1993). Conversely, we show
later how thalamic dysfunction need not be present in dis-
orders with high rates of RCVH.
7. The  Perception and Attention Deficit
(PAD) model
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the ex-
isting models of RCVH have specific strengths, but all have
limitations as general models. This led us to develop a new
model. We were guided by two features of RCVH: (1) the
occurrence of the hallucination at the focus of visual atten-
tion in an otherwise unchanged scene, and (2) the cognitive
and pathological characteristics of the disorder with the
most consistent evidence for the highest levels of RCVH –
dementia with Lewy bodies. (The finding that narcolepsy
with cataplexy has equally high rates rests upon a single re-
port from Aldrich 1996.) Exploring these led us to propose
that most cases of RCVH are a result of combined atten-
tional and visual perceptual impairments interacting with
scene representations to produce the activation of incorrect
but environmentally expected perceptual proto-objects.
7.1. Normal scene perception
Cognitive psychology models of scene perception (e.g., Bie-
derman 1972; Biederman et al. 1973; 1974; 1982; 1983;
Henderson & Hollingworth 1999; 2003a; 2003b; Rensink
2000a; 2000b; 2002) propose that the subjective experience
of a consistent, whole visual world is a construction based
upon interactions between abstracted top-down atten-
tional, perceptual, and mnemonic processes and bottom-up
sensory processes, with the former generally the more in-
fluential in subjective perception (Fig. 3). In parallel, neu-
ropsychological models of selective visual attention and
frontal lobe function (e.g., Desimone & Duncan 1995;
Miller & Cohen 2001), and of the ventral visual stream and
object perception (e.g., Grill-Spector 2003; Vecera 2000),
have developed similar divisions. They also require ab-
stract, top-down representations – attentional, feature, or
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object templates. These are activated by, but also act to bias
processing of, sensory and mnemonic information towards
specific subjective perceptions. Thus, subjective percep-
tion is the result of dynamic reciprocal interactions among
external sensory input, internal object and scene represen-
tations, and goal-directed attention (Driver et al. 2001;
Frith 2001; Scholl 2001; Vecera & Behrmann 2001; Wolfe
et al. 2003).
As external sensory input changes, it either activates a
number of new, potentially “seen” proto-objects, or modi-
fies those already activated. These proto-objects are not in
conscious awareness. They are holistic (Farah et al. 1998)
or part-based abstracted object representations (Peterson
& Rhodes 2003; Tarr 2003) that are segmented from visual
information and act as candidate objects for further pro-
cessing (Driver et al. 2001; Wolfe et al. 2002). They are
equivalent to templates in Desimone and Duncan’s biased
competition account (Desimone & Duncan 1995; Miller &
Cohen 2001; Vecera 2000; Vecera & Behrmann 2001).
These proto-objects are in mutual competition for fur-
ther processing. Top-down or bottom-up biasing informa-
tion will influence this competition to allow one to enter
conscious awareness and be seen. Thus, highly salient phys-
ical properties of the visual stimulus created by the object
– colour, brightness, contrast, for example – can produce a
bottom-up bias that allows unattended objects to enter
awareness (Rensink’s low level visual System I; Frith 2001;
Tarr 2003). Similarly, top-down biasing information from
familiarity of the object, individual goals and expectancies,
and spatial attention will influence the speed and accuracy
of object awareness (reviewed in Vecera 2000).
Top-down activation of a number of proto-objects may
come from a mnemonic representation of the visual scene
(Biederman’s scene schema, Rensink’s nonattentional set-
ting System III, Henderson & Hollingworth’s Scene Rep-
resentation). Though exact conceptualisations differ, this is
an abstract, relatively stable, relatively sparse, noniconic,
nonsensory representation reflecting a specific environ-
ment. Elements of this are built up in long-term memory
over successive attended perceptions of scenes (Chun &
Nakayama 2000; Henderson & Hollingworth 2003a; 2003b;
Irwin & Zelinski 2002; Shinoda et al. 2001). It contains gist
and semantic information about the scene as a whole, as
well as details on object shape and layout (Henderson &
Hollingworth 2003a; 2003b; Rensink 2000a; 2000b; 2002).
It also has the properties of a template in the sense that it
biases sensory processing, though different conceptualisa-
tions locate this pre- and post-object recognition: Hender-
son and Hollingworth suggest there is little influence on ob-
ject recognition per se, whereas Biederman assigns a direct,
and Rensink, a more indirect, role in this.
This scene representation, together with ongoing goals
and intentions, also influences dynamic top-down atten-
tional processes (Chun & Nakayama 2000; Clark 2002;
Humphreys & Riddoch 2001/2002; O’Regan et al. 2000).
Attention is the primary mechanism for biasing competi-
tion among proto-objects via an increase in signal to inter-
nal noise (Lu & Dosher 1998). This induces further seg-
mentation and attentional binding of object features and a
relatively stable “seen” object (Rensink’s attentional object
binding System II; Delvenne & Bruyer 2004; Driver et al.
2001; Treisman & Gelade 2001; Wheeler & Treisman
2002). Thus, seen objects are behaviourally relevant but
temporally limited (Beck & Levin 2003). Once active, ob-
ject representations both bias lower-level sensory pro-
cessing (Peterson 1999; Vecera & Behrmann 2001) and are
incorporated into the higher level scene representation.
The interplay of these processes is closely, but not exactly,
related to visual working memory (de Fockert et al. 2001;
Delvenne & Bruyer 2004; Henderson & Hollingworth
2003b; Irwin & Zelinski 2002; Scholl 2001; Wheeler &
Treisman 2002).
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Figure 3. A model of scene perception. This model is the integration of several aspects of the perception of scenes and of objects within
those scenes. It draws heavily on Rensink’s triadic architecture (Rensink 2000a; 2000b; 2002), Henderson and Hollingworth’s visual mem-
ory theory (Henderson & Hollingworth 2003a; 2003b), and Desimone and Duncan’s biased competition account (Desimone & Duncan
1995; Miller & Cohen 2001; Vecera 2000; Vecera & Behrmann 2001). It is described as if these processes are separable, though this may
be more conceptual than real (Peterson & Rhodes 2003; Tarr 2003).
7.2. The characteristics of dementia with Lewy bodies
In a meta-analysis of the cognitive impairments found in
dementia with Lewy bodies (Collerton et al. 2003), we
identified a cognitive profile characterised by uniquely se-
vere impairments in both attentional/executive perfor-
mance and visual object perception. Thus, the disorder
with the highest rates of RCVH also has the most severe
combination of impairments in two key functions that must
interact to produce normal scene perception. Combining
this neuropsychological finding with evidence from the
pathology of dementia with Lewy bodies and the induction
of RCVH by cholinergic manipulations, we formulated a
general model for RCVH.
7.3. Summary of the PAD model
We suggest that, within scene perception, a hallucination is
experienced when an incorrect proto-object is bound in the
attentional focus of a scene. This is generally when the vi-
sual system is constrained by a combination of impaired at-
tentional binding and poor sensory activation of the correct
proto-object, in conjunction with a relatively intact scene
representation that biases perception towards an incorrect
image. Either impaired attention or impaired sensory acti-
vation alone will rarely produce hallucinations. The rela-
tionship between the correct and the incorrect proto-object
distinguishes a hallucination from an illusion or a misper-
ception; the more distant the relationship, the more hallu-
cinatory the experience.
From this, we suggest that:
1. The frequency of RCVH varies with the frequency of
the coexistence of attentional dysfunction and object per-
ception impairments.2
2. The phenomenology of RCVH – what is hallucinated,
and where and when – primarily reflects the nature of
scene perception, in particular, the role of scene-based ex-
pectations in influencing the attentional focus (what), and
environmental and temporal cues in triggering a scene rep-
resentation that biases processing towards a hallucination
(where and when).
3. Object-based attention depends primarily upon the
function of lateral frontal cortex, and object perception de-
pends primarily upon the ventral visual stream. Thus, dis-
orders associated with high levels of RCVH will have a com-
mon end stage of both lateral frontal cortex and ventral
stream dysfunction. This may be due to intrinsic or extrin-
sic pathology.
Sections 7.4 to 7.6 demonstrate how the PAD model is
consistent with the evidence that highlights the limitations
of previous models.
7.4. The relationship between the frequency of RCVH
and the coexistence of attentional and perceptual
impairments
7.4.1. Associations of RCVH with disease and other
states. If the PAD model is correct, there should be a con-
sistent relationship between the severity of attentional and
perceptual impairments and the frequency of RCVH across
relevant disorders. Neither attentional nor perceptual im-
pairments alone should be associated with high levels of
RCVH.
The strongest test of this postulated relationship would
be to directly relate attentional and perceptive impairments
within scene perception to the occurrence of RCVH. How-
ever, such data are not yet available. As an interim measure,
we set out to test whether lower rates of RCVH were re-
lated to lesser impairments in broad attentional and per-
ceptual function. We plotted rates of RCVH against the
severity of attentional and visual perceptual impairment
across those disorders for which we could locate data (Fig.
4). We first did this for the disorders included in our de-
mentia with Lewy bodies meta-analysis, then extended it to
include other disorders on which we could find comparable
data – vascular dementia and Parkinson’s disease dementia.
Across these disorders, there is the strong correlation that
the PAD model requires. At least two potential objections
arise to this finding. It is clear that within this data set, at-
tentional and visual perceptual impairments closely covary
in severity as a consequence of averaging data from tasks
which are both attentional and visual-perceptual. It could
be argued therefore that either alone could be sufficient,
with the relationship with the other being correlational
rather than causal, or that both are reflections of another
shared factor. However, as we noted in section 6.3, neither
attentional nor visual impairments alone are associated with
high levels of RCVH. Nor are RCHV strongly related to
other factors (general verbal as opposed to nonverbal im-
pairment, or overall severity of impairment), suggesting a
degree of specificity in these cognitive domains. It might
also be that the unusually strong relationship is an artefact
of the meta-analysis. For example, dementia with Lewy
bodies is diagnosed by both the presence of visual halluci-
nations and attentional fluctuation. Hence, they might ap-
pear to coexist as a reflection of patient selection bias. This
cannot be rejected as a partial explanation, but if this bias
were to account for the findings in other disorders, this
would need to systematically vary across other neurode-
generative disorders. We do not consider this likely, but it
needs to be tested by direct assessments of hallucinations
and cognitive performance across disorders.
In support of evidence relating the general severity of at-
tentional and visual perceptual impairments to the risk of
RCVH across disorders, are the relationships within differ-
ent neurodegenerative disorders. In dementia with Lewy
bodies, RCVH has been separately related to the severity of
attentional impairment (McKeith et al. 2004; Wesnes et al.
2001) and the severity of visual perceptual difficulties (Mori
et al. 2000; Simard et al. 2003). Furthermore, the charac-
teristic intellectual impairments of this disorder may pre-
date the occurrence of hallucinations (Ferman et al. 2002).
Barnes et al. (2003) showed a combination of impaired 
object perception and poor source monitoring in halluci-
nating patients with Parkinson’s disease. To maintain con-
sistency with the PAD model, this difficulty in source mon-
itoring could result from dysfunctional attentional processes
(Henkel et al. 1998).
In relation to the other disorders to which a general
model of RCVH has to apply, the evidence, albeit even less
direct, is not against PAD as a potential model.
Although the evidence is less systematic, poor perfor-
mance on tests of attention and visual perception are also
the norm in delirium (Hart et al. 1997; Mach et al. 1996;
O’Keeffe & Gosney 1997) and in schizophrenia (Bozikas et
al. 2002; Cuesta et al. 1998; Davidson et al. 1996; Gabrovska
et al. 2002; Gold et al. 1999; Hoff et al. 1996; 1999; Park et
al. 2002; Sanfilipo et al. 2002). In direct comparisons be-
tween patients with Alzheimer’s disease and schizophrenia,
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the patients with schizophrenia had equal attentional and
greater visual perceptual impairments (Davidson et al.
1996) consistent with the higher rates of visual hallucina-
tions in the latter illness. The hallucinations that result from
deep brain stimulation are also associated with impaired at-
tentional and visual perceptual performances (Saint-Cyr et
al. 2000; Trepanier et al. 2000). However, comparisons
within these disorders between hallucinators and non-hal-
lucinators need to be made to directly test the model.
In acquired eye disease, poor performance on cognitive
tests and the occurrence of stroke disease, both of which
might be expected to increase the risk of attentional im-
pairments, are risk factors for RCVH (Table 3). As a corol-
lary, low illumination levels or poor vision (both of which
will impair visual recognition) are risk factors for RCVH in
dementia. The association with disturbed alertness may re-
flect the close relationship between this and attention.
The PAD model needs to account for the association of
hallucinations with the borders of sleep. The dream intru-
sion model suggests that some of the features of sleep ac-
count for the presence of hallucinations just before or after
sleep. However, other possibilities exist that would be con-
sistent with the PAD model. First, it is likely that the tran-
sition from sleeping to waking dysregulates the attentional
system. Second, sleeping tends to take place at the same
time and in the same place each day, often in low illumina-
tion. These factors would not only provide the consistent
context that we suggest leads to hallucinatory scene repre-
sentation activation but also impair visual function.
Post-bereavement and other psychologically induced
hallucinations may reflect the goal-directed nature of active
attentional perception. It may be that difficulties in accept-
ing the loss may potentiate expectations from specific scene
representations to engender a purely top-down activation
of an image (Schneck 1990). In support of this, the preva-
lence of post-bereavement hallucinations rises with the
length of the relationship with the deceased (Rees 1971),
and a better quality of the lost relationship and present
loneliness predict hallucinations (Grimby 1993; 1998).
These may be some of the uncommon top-down hallucina-
tions. However, given that there is no evidence on risk fac-
tors for post-bereavement and other experience-engen-
dered hallucinations, we cannot rule out impairments in
sensory or object-perception processes.
7.4.2. Effects of cholinergic manipulations on attention
and object perception. There is an extensive literature on
the cognitive effects of anticholinergic drugs summarised by
Everitt and Robbins (1997) and Ebert and Kirch (1998). Im-
paired performance on virtually all tests of alertness and at-
tention following reduced cholinergic function is well es-
tablished (reviewed by Beelke & Sannita 2002; Collerton
1986). Effects of cholinergic antagonism in many aspects of
vision have been reported, including visual acuity, tracking
performance, stereopsis, and spatial localisation (Caldwell
et al. 1992; Fisher 1991; Kobrick et al. 1990; Meador et al.
1993; Mentis et al. 2000; Nobili & Sannita 1997; Penetar et
al. 1988). In addition, cholinergic antagonists impair perfor-
mance on simple and complex visual recognition and visual
spatial tasks (Bentley et al. 2004; Dalley et al. 2004; Flicker
et al. 1990; Meador et al. 1993; Obonsawin et al. 1998).
Cholinergic projections modulate the signal to noise ratio
in cerebral cortex, with the effects of this depending upon
the function of specific cortical areas (Everitt & Robbins
1997). In Yu and Dayan’s (2002) computational model of
cholinergic function, it has a specific role in modulating the
interaction between top-down and bottom-up processing.
Inhibition of cholinergic input gives a greater chance of in-
correct pattern matching (a failure to select the correct
proto-object in the PAD model) and allows the intrusion of
an incorrect representation. In a similar manner to acetyl-
choline, dopamine is also considered to mediate a net in-
crease in signal-to-noise ratio in select neuronal assemblies
to maintain attentional focus (Dreher & Burnod 2002;
Durstewitz & Seamans 2002; O’Donnell 2003). However,
given that dopamine receptors are not prevalent in visual
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Figure 4. Relationship between frequency of visual hallucinations and severity of (A) visual perceptual and (B) attentional impairments
in neurodegenerative and dementing illnesses. The frequency of RCVH for each disorder is taken from Figure 1. Factor analysis of over
160 tasks used in different neuropsychological studies of these diseases identified four factors: general verbal/nonverbal impairment, at-
tentional/executive impairment, visual perceptual impairment, and verbal memory impairment. The severity of impairment is an inverse
variance weighted average of effect sizes on a factor. Full details of the methodology are in Collerton et al. (2003; erratum Collerton et
al. 2004). Visual perceptual impairment, r2  0.92, p  0.01, and attentional impairment, r2  0.88, p  0.01, are both reliably related
to the frequency of visual hallucinations. However, overall severity of impairment, r2  0.52, p  0.1, general verbal/nonverbal impair-
ment, r2  0.15, p  0.4, or severity of verbal memory impairment, r2  0.63, p  0.05, were not reliably related to the frequency of
hallucinations in this data set. Data for Parkinson’s disease (PD, averaged from three studies) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD, 10 studies),
and dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB, 10 studies) are from Collerton et al. (2003). Data for vascular dementia (VaD) were calculated
from five studies referenced in Looi and Sachdev’s (1999) systematic review of the cognitive profile of vascular dementia. Data for Parkin-
son’s disease plus dementia were calculated from seven studies identified through Medline and PsycInfo (Ballard et al. 2002; Goldman
et al. 1998; Huber et al. 1986; McFadden et al. 1996; Piatt et al. 1999; Soininen et al. 1992, Starkstein et al. 1996).
processing areas (whereas muscarinic cholinergic receptors
are), and dopaminergic agonists induce RCVH only in con-
junction with cholinergic deficits (sect. 3.2), dopamine dys-
function may only be significant when there is existing
cholinergically induced dysfunction in perceptual systems.
7.5. The phenomenology of recurrent complex visual
hallucinations
7.5.1. Content and phenomenology of hallucinations. We
agree with others (Behrendt & Young 2004; ffytche &
Howard 1999; ffytche et al. 1998) that the content and char-
acter of RCVH primarily reflects the nature of visual pro-
cessing. However, we particularly stress the interaction of
multiple processes within scene perception rather than the
activation or release of specific visual areas.
The separation of proto-objects from sensory input
(Behrmann et al. 1995; Jankowiak et al. 1992; Servos &
Goodale 1995) allows the possibility that top-down biasing
can activate a hallucinatory image in the absence of that in-
put in the same manner as Grossberg’s (2000) adaptive res-
onance theory network account suggests. Rensink’s pro-
posal that top-down processes create a seen object from a
proto-object can account for why hallucinatory images are
generally sharply focused and vividly coloured even in pa-
tients with poor visual ability (Menon et al. 2003). Because
the PAD model suggests the intrusion of an incorrect proto-
object into subjective awareness only when the correct ob-
ject is not attentionally bound, this would account for the
rareness of doppelgangers – duplicate but different images
of a person who is present. Attentional binding of the cor-
rect proto-object would take primacy over that of an incor-
rect one. Polyopia, seeing multiple instances of the same
image of a non-hallucinatory object, is a different phenom-
enon (Cutting 1997, p. 106).
Selective visual attention within scenes operates at the
whole object level, with separations between the represen-
tations for, amongst others, living and nonliving objects
(Humphreys & Forde 2001). This can account for why
whole as opposed to partial objects are generally halluci-
nated – people, rather than arms or feet, for example – and
why these tend to be within a restricted range of categories.
It is interesting to note that the only frequently reported
hallucinations of separated body parts are of heads (Sant-
house et al. 2000), consistent with evidence that faces are
perceived as objects in their own right with specific cortical
areas specialised for their processing (Farah 2000; Farah et
al. 1998; Kanwisher et al. 1997). The focus on activation of
individual proto-object may account for why single, as op-
posed to multiple, images are the commonest hallucination.
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Figure 5. Illustration of eye movements indicating attention being given to animals and people in inspection of a scene. Yarbus (1967,
pp. 172–79; reproduced with the permission of Plenum Press).
The immediate behavioural relevance of attentional bi-
asing deriving from scene templates can account for why
the content of the hallucination is generally consistent with
expectations from the setting in which it is seen. Studies of
eye movements in scene perception (e.g., Fig. 5) suggest
that attention in complex scenes is more often given to peo-
ple or animals than to inanimate objects, suggesting a sys-
tematic bias towards those stimuli. In addition, specific ex-
pectancies may bias subjective perception within scenes
(Henderson & Hollingworth 1999). Taken together, these
may account for why people and domestic animals are the
most common hallucinatory images (Menon et al. 2003),
given that most hallucinations occur in the home.
A failure of attentional binding may also account for the
nature of hallucinatory distortions when they occur. Those
features in faces which are exaggerated are those which are
normally most attended to (Fig. 6; Henderson et al. 2001).
A face object is also made up of eye, nose, mouth, cheek,
forehead, and other objects (Scholl 2001). If these are not
bound into a whole face perception, familiarity effects (Ve-
cera 2000) would give greater salience to those objects usu-
ally most attended to. Hence, eyes and mouths tend to be
exaggerated. We would suggest that distortion might be
particularly likely when proto-objects are relatively non-
holistic as a consequence of being relatively unfamiliar. This
might account for why, to our knowledge, distorted features
are not seen on recognised faces.
Abnormally small hallucinations may be a result of the hal-
lucinated image being unintegrated into the scene represen-
tation. Thus, as ffytche and Howard (1999) suggested, it may
be perceived against an unusually close background – in the
same way that a close-up projector gives a small image.
The qualities of proto-objects are not well characterised.
There is the danger that we might imbue them with the
qualities that are consistent with hallucinated images –
though conversely, the qualities of hallucinated images may
illuminate those of proto-objects. For example, one of our
patients with eye disease remarked that hallucinated build-
ings remained in the correct perspective as he moved
around their exteriors, suggesting that activated image rep-
resentations are orientation independent. Proto-objects do
appear to be highly variable. Generation of an image by ac-
tivation of a proto-object might explain the mixture of fa-
miliar and unfamiliar images, given that it does not suggest
the necessary release of specific, pre-existing, visual mem-
ories. However, further development of the distinctions
within proto-objects and their relationship with episodic
memory is needed before we can say this with any confi-
dence.
Once an image is hallucinated, it may become associated
with a specific hallucinatory scene representation. This in-
creases the probability of the same image being triggered
again and may account for the repetition of specific images.
As particular images become part of the scene representa-
tion, they will bias perception towards themselves and away
from other proto-objects. This may provide a mechanism
for the reduction in the range of images with time (Holroyd
& Rabins 1996). Finally, the lack of an iconic scene repre-
sentation may explain why panoramic hallucinations are
rare, though it does beg the question as to why they occur
at all.
7.5.2. Time and place. Dynamic attentional binding is de-
pendent upon the prefrontal representations (templates,
rules, or goals) of Miller and Cohen (2001; see also Vecera
2000). Templates must both be responsive to relevant 
information in the environment, and resistant to irrelevant
information. Thus, a dysfunctional template may fail to re-
spond to relevant environmental information, hence allow-
ing the abrupt activation of the hallucinatory proto-object
since the correct proto-object is not bound. Attention is
then captured by the hallucination, continuing the exclu-
sion of correcting information – hence the hallucination’s
persistence over a matter of minutes. This can also relate to
how cholinergic function can modulate signal to noise in the
cortex, as discussed in section 7.4.2. If this ratio decreases,
attentional focus on the correct proto-object will become
more difficult.
The necessity for an environmental trigger for a scene
representation (a hallucinatory scene template as it were)
can account for an otherwise puzzling feature of hallucina-
tions – that they disappear on eye closure or on complete
visual loss. Volitional images are as easily evoked with open
as with closed eyes (McKelvie 1995). Cortical release and
dream-intrusion models would both suggest that hallucina-
tions ought, if anything, to become more pronounced,
when sensory input is further reduced. The PAD model
suggests that some sensory input is necessary to activate the
scene representation that biases perception and attention
towards the hallucinatory image. Without a scene repre-
sentation, there is insufficient top-down bias to activate a
perception even with a lack of sensory activation or atten-
tional binding of the correct proto-object.
Hallucinations may be most common in dim light since
bright light improves the perception of correct proto-ob-
jects, while no light removes the cues that activate the scene
representation. The extinction of complex visual hallucina-
tions by occipital transcranial magnetic stimulation (Mer-
abet et al. 2003), suggests that strong bottom-up influences
can bias perception towards non-hallucinatory images. The
reactivation of a hallucinatory template by specific envi-
ronmental cues may also account for those occasions when
there is consistent location or timing of hallucinations.
Since we suggest that attentional processes drive the per-
ception (sect. 7.1), this accounts for the image being at that
attentional focus. That the image is perceived within a
scene representation, can account for why it does not move
with eye movements. Along with Howard et al. (1997), we
have located the primary visual dysfunction in the ventral
(what) visual stream, allowing the possibility that the dorsal
(where) stream functions relatively normally. Thus, halluci-
nations are generally correctly located in space.
The intrinsic movement of hallucinated images suggests
that either proto-objects contain movement information or
that, once activated, a perceived image activates other sys-
tems for perceiving motion. We cannot distinguish between
these possibilities at present.
7.6. Relationship with specific cortical pathologies
7.6.1. Evidence that normal scene perception depends
upon the interaction between lateral frontal cortex and
the ventral visual stream. There is long-established neu-
ropsychological evidence that locates executive and atten-
tional function in the frontal lobes (Passingham 1995) and
object recognition in the ventral visual stream (Farah 2000;
Grill-Spector 2003). These are linked by direct and indirect
projections (Fig. 7), and functional imaging suggests that
Collerton et al.: A novel Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucinations
752 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6
Collerton et al.: A novel Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucinations
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6 753
Figure 6. Effects of distorting images to reflect attentional focus. Figures show the effects of distorting the original picture (Fig. 6A)
using eye movements as an index of attention (Fig. 6B) to emphasize attended features (nose, eyes, and mouth, Fig. 6C) or unattended
features (cheeks, chin, and forehead, Fig. 6D) (Yarbus 1967; reproduced with the permission of Plenum Press, New York). Figure 6C
best matches descriptions of visual hallucinations. “You have stretched lips, a thick nose, and you are grinning . . . your eyes are stretched
and you have big circles under them” (Santhouse et al. 2000). See also the central face (6E) from an artist’s montage of his own visual
hallucinations in Parkinson’s disease (Frucht & Bernsohn 2002; reproduced by permission of Lippincott Williams & Wilkins).
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the working memory and semantic abilities thought to un-
derlie image perception and retrieval and scene perception
depend upon interactions between these frontal and poste-
rior visual areas (e.g., Courtney et al. 1997; Fletcher & Hen-
son 2001; Haxby et al. 2000; Ishai et al. 2000; 2002; Lumer
& Rees 1999; Rowe et al. 2000; Vandenberghe et al. 1996;
Wilson et al. 1993). More specifically, change blindness in
scene perception, the phenomena in which a top-down
scene representation overrides a bottom-up perception
(Beck et al. 2001), and recognition of repeated real-world
objects (Vuilleumier et al. 2002) are both associated with
lateral frontal and ventral stream coactivation – among
other areas.
As the PAD model demands, top-down attentional fac-
tors can bias perceptual processing in the absence of visual
stimulation (Kastner & Ungerleider 2001). If frontal atten-
tional systems are stressed by multiple tasks, there is greater
activation of inferior temporal cortex and greater intrusions
of incorrect information in working memory tasks (de Fock-
ert et al. 2001). Manipulation of cholinergic function by
physostigmine in normal people both improves perfor-
mance on a facial recognition working memory task and de-
creases blood flow in prefrontal cortex and areas of the ven-
tral visual stream (Furey et al. 2000).
7.6.2. Evidence for simultaneous dysfunction in frontal
cortex and ventral visual stream in patients with recur-
rent complex visual hallucinations
7.6.2.1. Evidence from functional imaging. There is consis-
tent evidence for activation in ventral visual areas in pa-
tients who are hallucinating and some, less consistent, evi-
dence of abnormal frontal and ventral stream activation in
patients who are prone to hallucinations.
Wunderlich et al. (2000) reported a case of hallucinations
following occipital stroke. Among other areas, dorsolateral
frontal and inferior temporal cortices were activated during
active hallucinations. Another case reported by Kishi et al.
(2000) had occipital cortex hypoactivity. ffytche et al. (1998)
showed in patients with eye disease that ventral stream ac-
tivation was a consistent feature of hallucinators, but frontal
Collerton et al.: A novel Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucinations
754 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6
Uncinate
fascicleVentral 
Stream
Occipital 
cortex
Reticular nucleus
Eye
Thalamus
LGN
Lateral frontal
 cortex
MD
Attentional Templates
Activated scene 
representations
Attentional binding
Ch 5
Ch 6
nbM/Ch 4
Inferior
temporal cortex
Object Perception
Sensory input
Proto-objects
Perceived object
Figure 7. Illustration of the multiple information transfer and regulatory links between cholinergic and thalamic projections and the
lateral frontal cortex and ventral stream. Specific thalamic nuclei are intimately involved with visual processing; the lateral geniculate nu-
cleus (LGN) forms the major relay for information from the eye to occipital cortex and thence to the ventral visual stream for object
recognition (Sillito & Jones 2002), while the mediodorsal nucleus (MD) maintains active corticothalamocortical loops with the ventral
visual stream and, particularly, the frontal cortex (Sherman & Guillery 2002). Basal forebrain cholinergic cells in the nucleus basalis of
Meynert (nbM/Ch 4) project to both frontal cortex and the ventral visual stream as well as directly to thalamic nuclei including the retic-
ular, lateral geniculate, and mediodorsal nuclei (Mesulam 1995). Basal forebrain projections to the thalamic reticular formation have an
additional regulating role on the transfer of corticothalamocortical information (Guillery et al. 1998). Frontal and inferior temporal cor-
tices are linked by the uncinate fascicle (Ungerleider et al. 1989) and, with other indirect links and nbM cholinergic projections, form a
functional visual information processing system (Dudkin et al. 1994; Gaffan et al. 2002; Masuda et al. 1997). Brainstem cholinergic pro-
jections from the pedunculopontine nucleus (Ch 5) and laterodorsal tegmental nucleus (Ch 6) also modulate the reticular formation and
the mediodorsal nucleus, and, in addition, project to the lateral geniculate and other thalamic nuclei (Mesulam 1995), as well as the oc-
cipital cortex (Higo et al. 1996).
activation was more variable. Silbersweig et al. (1995)
showed an association with combined active visual and au-
ditory hallucinations in schizophrenia and increased activ-
ity in temporal and frontal cortices, among others. Imamura
et al. (1999) showed an association with reduced ventral
stream activation and relatively preserved temperoparietal
activation in patients with dementia with Lewy bodies who
were prone to hallucinations. Okada et al. (1999) showed
that in Parkinson’s disease, propensity to medication-in-
duced hallucinations was associated with lower resting ac-
tivation in left temporal and temporo-occipital areas, and,
less reliably, right temporal and temporo-occipital areas.
Adachi et al. (2000) demonstrated hyperperfusion in the
lateral temporal cortex, striatum, and thalamus in halluci-
nating patients with Charles Bonnet syndrome. Howard et
al. (1997) demonstrated that, in dementia with Lewy bod-
ies, active hallucinations lead to a decrease in the respon-
siveness of striate cortex, suggesting a route for synergy in
that hallucinations may in themselves reduce visual func-
tion.
In the dreaming state, there are changes in both frontal
and inferior temporal cortices (reviewed in Braun et al.
1998; Schwartz & Maquet 2002), among others. However,
in dreaming, there is underactivity of frontal cortex, sug-
gesting a lack of attentional and scene-based influences.
This may account for the different phenomenology of
dreaming and argues further against dream intrusion as an
explanation for RCVH.
7.6.2.2. Distribution of pathology in patients with high levels
of recurrent complex visual hallucinations. With respect to
cholinergic neuropathology, it has consistently been ob-
served that there is a more extensive neocortical choliner-
gic deficit in dementia with Lewy bodies than in Alzhei-
mer’s disease (Perry et al. 1993; Tiraboschi et al. 2000;
2002). This raises the question of whether the higher preva-
lence of RCVH in dementia with Lewy bodies is related to
more extensive cholinergic pathology, consistent with the
psychopharmacological evidence reviewed in section 3.2.
Based on neurochemical findings in autopsy brain tissue
from prospectively assessed cohorts of patients with de-
mentia with Lewy bodies, lower levels of choline acetyl-
transferase and of the nicotinic receptor subtype 7 are as-
sociated with visual hallucinations (Ballard et al. 2000;
Court et al. 2001). No such relationships have been estab-
lished for dopaminergic parameters in the cortex (Piggott
et al., submitted), nor for cholinergic activities in the thala-
mus (Ziabreva et al., in preparation). Furthermore, exten-
sive loss of cholinergic innervation of the thalamus in pro-
gressive supranuclear palsy (Javoy-Agid 1994; Kish et al.
1985; Shinotoh et al. 1999) as a result of brainstem cholin-
ergic cell loss is not associated with high rates of hallucina-
tions.
There is a striking relationship between levels of choline
acetyltransferase in lateral frontal and temporal cortical ar-
eas and rates of visual hallucinations within the major de-
menting disorders (Fig. 8). In contrast, there is no such re-
lationship with levels in the hippocampus, consistent with
the lack of a relationship between verbal memory measures
and RCVH (see Fig. 4 legend). This would suggest that lo-
calised rather than generalised cerebral dysfunction is crit-
ical. In vascular dementia, the relatively high prevalence of
RCVH is not paralleled by particularly severe cholinergic
deficits. Although hallucinations are rare in stroke, Rabins
et al. (1991) showed a combination of intrinsic frontal and
ventral stream pathology in hallucinators. This suggests that
hallucinations in vascular dementia, and perhaps other dis-
orders (e.g., in dementia with Lewy bodies; see Harding et
al. 2002), may result from a combination of cholinergic and
other pathologies.
Direct or indirect cholinergic modulation of the neocor-
tical areas implicated in our model can also account for the
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Figure 8. Relationship between cholinergic function and rates of visual hallucinations in dementing and neurodegenerative illnesses
in (A) inferior temporal cortex (Brodmann Area 20), r2  0.78, p  0.01 and (B) lateral frontal cortex (Brodmann area 9), r2  0.65, p
 0.05. Rates of visual hallucinations are taken from Figure 1. Cholinergic function is an averaged percentage of choline acetyltrans-
ferase activity of control values. Sources: progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) (Javoy-Agid 1994; Kish et al. 1985; Shinotoh et al. 1999);
Parkinson’s disease without dementia (PD) (Perry et al. 1985; Ruberg et al. 1990); Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Bierer et al. 1995; Perry et
al. 1977; 1985; 1990; Shaibani & Sabbagh 1998; Tiraboschi et al. 2000; 2002); Parkinson’s disease with dementia (PDD) (Perry et al. 1985;
Ruberg et al. 1990); dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) (Perry et al. 1990; Ruberg et al. 1982; Tiraboschi et al. 2002); vascular demen-
tia (VaD) (Perry et al. 1977; Reikkinen et al. 1987; Sakurada et al. 1990; Wallin et al. 1989). Cholinergic function in the hippocampus is
not reliably associated with rates of visual hallucinations r2  0.46, p  0.05. Sources: AD (Beal et al. 1988; Ikeda et al. 1991; Kuhl et
al. 1996; Perry et al. 1977; 1986; 1987; 1992; Sakurada et al. 1990; Smith et al. 1988; Tiraboschi et al. 2000); VaD (Perry et al. 1977; Saku-
rada et al. 1990); PD (Kuhl et al. 1996; Perry et al. 1986; 1987; Smith et al. 1988); PDD (Beal et al. 1988; Kuhl et al. 1996; Mattila et al.
2001; Perry et al. 1986; 1987; Smith et al. 1988); DLB (Tiraboschi et al. 2000).
induction of visual hallucinations by pharmacologically in-
duced decreases in cholinergic function and their treat-
ment by drugs that counter reduced function (sect. 3.2).
In the context of the PAD model, cholinergic dysfunction
in these cortical areas induced by intrinsic anticholinergic
factors in delirium could account for RCVH in this disor-
der. The reduction in function in both brainstem and basal
forebrain cholinergic projections as a concomitant of slow-
wave sleep (Jones 1993; 2003; Szymusiak et al. 2000;
Vazquez & Baghdoyan 2001) may provide a physiological
explanation of hypnopompic and hypnagogic hallucina-
tions, with cholinergic hypoactivity occurring on the edges
of sleep and loss of consciousness. As hypnagogic/
hypnopompic hallucinations (independent of narcolepsy)
have been identified as one of the commonest types of
RCVH in the population as a whole (Fig. 1), it is clear that
understanding the basis of these phenomena would provide
insights into RCVH in disease. In narcolepsy, the major
deficit of hypocretins (orexins; reviewed in Taheri et al.
2002) that, inter alia, stimulate basal forebrain cholinergic
neurons (Eggermann et al. 2001), indicates that RCVH may
arise in this disorder as a result of indirect dysfunction of
this cholinergic pathway. Although associations between
sleep disorder and hallucinations have frequently led to the
implication of brainstem cholinergic mechanisms in hallu-
cinations, it is equally plausible that the link between these
two phenomena is pathology of the basal forebrain cholin-
ergic system, which plays as important a role in transitions
from wakefulness to slow-wave sleep or from non-REM to
REM sleep. The hypothesis that hallucinations relate to
REM sleep is not consistent with the evidence summarized
earlier that hallucinations are associated with decreased
cholinergic activity in the cortex, since REM sleep is asso-
ciated with activity of both brainstem and basal forebrain
pathways (in the latter, activity is even higher during REM
than during waking; see Vazquez & Baghdoyan 2001).
Eye disease and schizophrenia pose greater challenges to
our model, given the lack of established cerebral patholo-
gies in these disorders. Eye disease will clearly result in im-
paired function in the ventral visual stream, whereas the re-
lationship with cognitive impairment leaves open the
question of disruption in frontal attentional function. De-
spite established neuropsychological impairments (sect.
7.2.1), pathological findings in schizophrenia are highly
variable. Recent evidence for thalamic pathology (Jones
1997), together with known corticothalamocortical loops to
frontal and ventral steam cortex, suggests one possible bio-
logical mechanism (Behrendt & Young 2004). Additional
evidence of possible neocortical cholinergic dysfunction is
that anticholinergic drugs impair prepulse inhibition of the
startle response in schizophrenia (Kumari et al. 2003). Re-
duced muscarinic receptors have been detected in the cor-
tex and thalamus in unmedicated schizophrenic patients
(Raedler et al. 2003), confirming previous autopsy based
findings (German et al. 1999; Karson et al. 1993; Powchik
et al. 1998). Sherr et al. (2002) have demonstrated that
nicotine improves eye tracking in schizophrenic patients,
consistent with the long-standing implication of nicotinic
receptors in this disease. Very recent reports (Minzenberg
et al. 2004) draw attention to the role of the anticholinergic
side effects of antipsychotic medication in schizophrenia in
inducing cognitive impairment. This suggests a further
method by which cholinergic function in schizophrenia
may be disturbed.
The clear-cut thalamic dysfunction in deep brain stimu-
lation, thalamic hallucinosis, and fatal familial insomnia
can, in contrast, be incorporated in the PAD model, given
the strong indirect regulatory pathways via the thalamus to
our cortical areas of interest. Unlike other authors, however
(Behrendt & Young 2004; Manford & Andermann 1998),
we do not assign a central role to thalamic dysfunction in
the majority of hallucinations, suggesting instead that this
is only one of a number of causative factors.
8. Predictions from the PAD model
As with any multifactor model, falsification can be a chal-
lenge. The key concept in PAD is that a hallucination oc-
curs when an incorrect proto-object takes the place of a cor-
rect proto-object. We would therefore say that it could be
falsified if this were shown not to be so, that is, if an active
hallucination could coexist with active perception of a cor-
rect image. This might be tested by, for example, combin-
ing perceptual tasks with imaging of visual cortex during
and outside active hallucinations. Beyond this, we believe
that the constraints that the PAD model suggests within vi-
sual processing can be tested at several levels.
The PAD model predicts that RCVH will be accompa-
nied by psychological evidence of impaired attention and
object perception, resulting in poor scene perception, and
by imaging and pathological evidence of frontal and ventral
stream dysfunction. The relationships that we have identi-
fied among hallucinations, cognitive function, and pathol-
ogy by averaging disparate data need to be directly tested
across at least the major conditions associated with RCVH
– dementia, delirium, eye disease, schizophrenia, and the
sleep–wake cycle. We would suggest that isolated lesions or
impairments only rarely produce RCVH, although other
forms of hallucinations or transitory hallucinations may oc-
cur. Comparisons across patient groups would allow the ne-
cessity for combined impairments to be examined. Thus,
we would predict that the 10–20% of blind people who
have RCVH also have attentional impairments and pathol-
ogy that lead to impairments in frontal function.
Beyond these direct tests of existing indirect data, the
model makes specific predictions. Thus, scopolamine chal-
lenge in normal individuals will induce the same attentional
and visual perceptual impairments as seen in patients who
hallucinate. The threshold for inducing these will be lower
in patient groups prone to hallucinations. Cholinesterase
inhibitors will have the opposite effects to those of an-
timuscarinic drugs. It also suggests that visual hallucina-
tions in schizophrenia will correlate with the antimuscarinic
effects of prescribed neuroleptics.
Manipulating the dopaminergic or other systems could
assess the specificity of cholinergic dysfunction. We would
predict this would only induce visual hallucinations in the
context of pre-existing cholinergic dysfunction. Combina-
tion of these experiments with in vivo imaging of choliner-
gic and dopaminergic function in the ventral stream, frontal
cortex, and areas thought not to be relevant, would further
develop the model. We would predict that neuroimaging of
dopaminergic indices such as FPCIT (the dopamine trans-
porter) or D1/D2 receptors will show a weaker relationship
with RCVH than would imaging of cholinergic dysfunction
by, for example, IBVM.
The model would predict that individuals susceptible to
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hypnagogia or hypnopompia have lower cortical choliner-
gic activity than those unaffected, and tend towards poorer
attentional and perceptual performance, particularly when
fatigued.
The relationship between scene perception and halluci-
nations can be investigated. For example, if hallucinatory
scene representations are significant, we would predict an
interaction between the frequency of repetition of specific
images and the range of locations in which they occur –
fewer images should be associated with fewer locations.
Our suggestion of relative preservation of scene represen-
tations in the context of poor visual attention and percep-
tion can be assessed across patient and other groups by, for
example, investigating change blindness. We predict that
hallucinations should be more closely related to attentional
and perceptual impairments than to problems in scene rep-
resentations per se. Hence, change blindness should be rel-
atively preserved. As the properties of proto-objects are de-
fined, we would suggest that hallucinations should map
onto these. The relationship we suggest between distorted
and holistic perceptions can be tested.
The PAD model also accounts for existing effective treat-
ments and predicts a range of new possibilities. For exam-
ple, interventions that improve either attentional or per-
ceptual function should reduce the incidence of RCVH.
Thus, on the perceptual side, treatment of impaired vision
reduces RCVH (Eperjesi & Akbarali 2004; Menon et al.
2003), as should bright lights or removing the cues that trig-
ger the hallucinatory template by changing the environ-
ment (Diederich et al. 2003). Pharmacological improve-
ment of alertness (Wesnes et al. 2001) is effective, as should
be modifying the hallucinatory scene representation by as-
sociating another image with the environment. Attending
to a correct image, for example, a photograph of a halluci-
nated person, should extinguish the hallucination.
9. Conclusions
We have combined and developed earlier models to ac-
count for why some people have recurrent visual hallucina-
tions of a particular character, by relating hallucinations to
a specific combination of cognitive impairments and par-
ticular patterns of brain dysfunction. At present, we have
neuropsychological evidence in about a third of cases of
RCVH (those in dementia and neurodegenerative disease,
and to a lesser extent delirium, and schizophrenia), with ev-
idence of regional cholinergic underactivity in about three-
quarters (dementia and neurodegenerative disease, delir-
ium, and hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations). We
look forward to the gathering of further evidence to test
PAD and other models of hallucinations.
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NOTES
1. The term Charles Bonnet syndrome has been variously used
to describe isolated complex visual hallucinations and visual hal-
lucinations accompanied by a range of other phenomena (Menon
et al. 2003). Because of this range of uses and because there is no
evidence that either definition describes a different subjective ex-
perience, we will not use it ourselves.
2. We use the term object perception in this context to include
not only the perception of inanimate and animate objects but also
people, faces, and animals.
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Abstract: The dual-deficit model of visual hallucinations (Collerton et al.
target article) is compared with the dual-deficit model of auditory halluci-
nations (Waters et al., in press). Differences in cognitive mechanisms de-
scribed may be superficial. Similarities between these models may provide
the basis for a general model of complex hallucinations extended across dis-
orders and modalities, involving shared (overlapping) cognitive processes.
The Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model of Collerton
et al. proposes that a combination of deficits in attentional bind-
ing and object perception is essential to the occurrence of recur-
rent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH). We recently de-
scribed a model of auditory hallucinations (AH) based on a
different combination of deficits, specifically, deficits in inten-
tional inhibition and context binding (Badcock et al. 2005; Waters
et al., in press). Our model, herein designated the HEAR model
(Hallucinatory Experience of Auditory Representations), was de-
veloped and tested in patients with schizophrenia and has not
been explicitly applied to other disorders or modalities. Aside
from the obvious focus on hallucinations in different sensory
modalities, these two models also appear to focus on substantially
different cognitive processing abnormalities. However, our com-
mentary draws out similarities between the two models, as this
may highlight fundamental constraints that produce hallucina-
tions across all modalities and disorders. Overlapping cognitive
mechanisms seem likely, for, as Collerton et al. note, individuals
with RCVH often experience hallucinations in other sensory
modalities.
Accounting for the wide phenomenological variation of halluci-
nations is a challenge noted by both Collerton et al. in the target ar-
ticle and Waters et al. (in press). According to the HEAR model,
AH in schizophrenia arise at least in part from the intrusion of rep-
resentations in memory for which specific contextual details have
been lost. Consistent with this proposal, Waters et al. (2004) showed
that patients with schizophrenia exhibit a more fragmentary recol-
lection of contextual details. The key features of AH (including the
compelling sense of reality and omnipotence, involuntariness, non-
self-attribution, richness of voice features, and non-vocal experi-
ences) can be accounted for by this subtle interplay between inhi-
bition and memory (Badcock et al. 2005; Waters et al., in press).
Commentary/Collerton et al.: A novel  Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucination
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6 757
Both models suggest a critical role of executive dysfunction.
This is consistent with evidence of impairments of prefrontal cor-
tex in disorders with high rates of visual (e.g., dementia with Lewy
bodies) and auditory (e.g., schizophrenia) hallucinations. Whereas
the PAD model suggests that this is an impairment of dynamic at-
tentional binding, the HEAR model has focused on a deficit of in-
tentional inhibition. Each hinges on the executive control of at-
tention; that is, the selection of correct/incorrect proto-objects or
relevant/irrelevant representations. According to Collerton and
colleagues, hallucinatory experiences generally arise when there
is impaired attentional binding together with a poor sensory re-
sponse to the correct proto-object. Our model, however, empha-
sizes the heightened activation of an irrelevant, internal repre-
sentation (incorrect proto-object); that is, hallucinations are
related to a failure to inhibit currently irrelevant memory traces.
This difference may simply be a matter of relative emphasis, given
that dynamic attentional binding also involves resistance to irrel-
evant information. Indeed, we have suggested that the salience of
currently relevant events depends critically on the ability to sup-
press memories of previous (now irrelevant) events (Badcock et
al. 2005). Consequently, despite the difference in terminology, the
mechanism of dynamic attentional binding appears to correspond
closely to the process of intentional inhibition.
While the HEAR model links executive dysfunction to impaired
memory, the PAD model combines attentional dysfunction with
object perception impairments. Nevertheless, both are consistent
with disturbed connectivity between frontal and temporal cortical
circuits, and both attempt to describe sources of bias favoring the
activation of the incorrect proto-object/irrelevant memory. For
example, Collerton and colleagues suggest that current scene in-
put/expectations are assumed to bias perception of an incorrect
image. In contrast, in the HEAR model, the salience of irrelevant
representations may derive from previous presentations and asso-
ciated reward value. In sum, a perception/memory distinction ap-
pears to be a major difference between the two models. However,
in studies of schizophrenia, a deficit emerges more consistently on
higher-level object perception tasks closely related to memory
(Gabrovska et al. 2002). Therefore, the overlap between these two
models may be greater than it appears.
Collerton et al. stressed that an adequate model should account
for the variation in frequency of hallucinations, yet support for the
PAD model rests essentially on indirect observation of the over-
lap of cognitive and pathological impairments in disorders with
high rates of RCVH. By contrast, our investigations have provided
direct tests at the individual case level of the role of intentional in-
hibition and context memory in AH. For instance, we have shown
that AH frequency in schizophrenia (but not the frequency of
other symptoms) is correlated with degree of inhibitory dysfunc-
tion (Waters et al. 2003). We argued that this deficit underpins the
intrusive nature of AH, a feature not directly addressed by the
PAD model. In addition, we have also shown that intrusiveness is
a key component of hallucinatory-like experiences in normal indi-
viduals (Paulik et al., submitted; Waters et al. 2003), raising the in-
teresting possibility that inhibitory dysfunction may accompany
other hallucinatory experiences in healthy individuals (e.g., across
the sleep-wake cycle).
Because the HEAR model incorporates a context-binding
deficit as well as an inhibitory control deficit, Waters et al. (in
press) examined the percentage of patients with schizophrenia
who were impaired on both cognitive processes. Almost 90% of
schizophrenia patients currently experiencing AH showed the
predicted combination of deficits, compared to only 33% of pa-
tients without hallucinations, representing approximately a six-
fold increase in risk of having AH compared to patients without.
Such findings provide compelling, direct support for the notion
that these two deficits are significantly associated with the hallu-
cinatory process.
Both models predict that isolated impairments would rarely
produce hallucinations. Specifically, the HEAR model predicts
that non-hallucinating individuals may exhibit deficits on either
intentional inhibition or context memory, but not both. In direct
confirmation of this prediction, patients with obsessive compul-
sive disorder (who, like schizophrenia patients with hallucinations,
experience intrusive cognitions, but unlike hallucinators recog-
nize them as self-generated) showed deficits in intentional inhibi-
tion but intact context memory (Badcock et al., submitted).
In sum, the possibility that deficient inhibitory control of at-
tention, coupled with impaired memory (including context bind-
ing), could underpin both visual and auditory hallucinations mer-
its direct test, though the sufficiency of two deficits in accounting
for these complex phenomena deserves scrutiny (see Waters et al.,
in press).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Portions of the research reviewed were submitted as part of the require-
ments of the Ph.D. for Flavie Waters at the University of Western Aus-
tralia. A portion of this work was supported by the Neuroscience Institute
of Schizophrenia and Allied Disorders (NISAD), utilising funding from
the Ron and Peggy Bell Foundation. We also acknowledge the contribu-
tions of Professor Pat Michie.
Attentional deficit versus impaired reality
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hallucinations?
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Abstract: A “multifactorial” model should accommodate a psychological
perspective, aiming to relate the phenomenology of complex visual hallu-
cinations not only to neurobiological findings but also an understanding of
the patient’s psychological problems and situation in life. Greater atten-
tion needs to be paid to the role of the “lack of insight” patients may have
into their hallucinations and its relationship to cognitive impairment.
We may . . . define an instinct as an innate disposition which
determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to)
any object of a certain class, and to experience in its
presence a certain emotional excitement and an
impulse to action which find expression in a specific
mode of action in relation to that object.
—William McDougall (1924, p. 110)
Perception is not a passive reflection of “things that are there” but
an active process of unconsciously operating instinctive forces
continuously creating a subjective, though usually adaptive, expe-
rience of seemingly external things and events (McDougall 1924;
Schopenhauer 1844). Animals or people commonly feature in
complex visual hallucinations because they meet unconscious af-
filiative impulses, and therefore it is not surprising that such hal-
lucinations are associated with social isolation (Holroyd et al.
1992; Teunisse et al. 1994). For the same reason, and in response
to unconscious social anxieties, patients with schizophrenia tend
to hallucinate people’s voices (see Behrendt & Young 2004).
Perceptual expectancies, which can be elicited by contextual or
situational cues, or one’s interests in certain kinds of objects, ulti-
mately reflect, according to McDougall (1924), the working of in-
stinctive impulses. Expectations or interests, which may not be ex-
plicitly conscious, are attentional mechanisms that crucially shape
the content of subjective experience, although the possibilities are
normally restricted by external sensory input. We hallucinate per-
sons in their proper composition and place, rather than “floating
on the ceiling” or with an “inverted face,” because this is how we
expect to see them. Insofar as hallucinations satisfy drives, the
content of hallucinations should not surprise the hallucinator.
One is often struck in clinical practice to see how patients in
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early stages of dementia are not puzzled by the impossibility of
their observations of children or deceased relatives regularly vis-
iting their home. Patients may repeatedly set the table for such
hallucinated visitors without ever seriously questioning their ac-
tions. Less cognitively impaired patients who can show “insight”
when describing their hallucinations may not necessarily be aware
of the pathological nature of their experiences during the halluci-
natory episode. We need to distinguish between insight on subse-
quent reflection and insight during actual experience. Despite
demonstrating the former, patients with complex visual hallucina-
tions may lack the latter, whereas patients with schizophrenia or
paraphrenia, in whom hallucinatory experiences are entangled
with delusions and persecutory fears, tend to lack both.
Of course, patients with Charles Bonnet syndrome, who have
prominent peripheral visual impairment, see bizarre and appar-
ently unexpected things, but in this condition, attentional mecha-
nisms are much less restricted by peripheral sensory input in their
effect on perception than is usually the case in dementia or schiz-
ophrenia. The question arises, how unexpected or bizarre do com-
plex visual hallucinations really seem to patients with Charles
Bonnet syndrome? How much of their insight is gained retro-
spectively, like the insight we gain into the implausible content of
a dream only upon awakening? Indeed, during a dream we are not
usually surprised to observe events that completely defy logic and
past experience, as they would have been shaped at the time by
attentional mechanisms reflecting unconscious desires or simply
natural impulses of fear or curiosity.
By default, we accept externalised conscious experience as real,
whether it occurs in wakefulness or as part of a dream. The dream
intrusion hypothesis of complex visual hallucinations should not
be discarded lightly on the basis of a lack of association with sleep
disturbance. What should be of interest is that wakeful perception
and dreaming are in a fundamental sense functionally equivalent
states (Llinas & Pare 1991; Llinas & Ribary 1993) and, indeed,
perception in wakefulness may be but an adaptive state of dream-
ing. Therefore, we could argue that reality testing is not something
given to us by default; it relies on intact intellectual functioning
accessible only in wakefulness.
It appears that inconsistencies in the perceived world prompt
questioning of reality only if the perceiver has sufficient deductive
or reflective cognitive capacity. One has to be able to note that an
observation defies one’s intuitive logic or does not conform to pre-
vious experience, while having at the same time access to the
rather abstract notion that an experience one is having might not
be real. What makes it even more difficult to perform this cogni-
tive step is the fact that what we see in a hallucination or dream is
usually expected unconsciously. Alternatively, it may be lack of ca-
pacity to interact with the environment in a coordinated and goal-
directed fashion that prevents us from questioning the reality of
our dream experiences. Cognitive executive impairment may sim-
ilarly amount to a deficit in one’s ability to translate instinctive im-
pulses into sustained action in accordance with hierarchical be-
havioural strategies, while such impulses continue to manifest
themselves in perception. Perception, whether in wakefulness or
dreaming, primarily obeys the pleasure principle, in Freud’s
terms, whereas adherence to the reality principle can be regarded
as higher cognitive performance involving the lateral prefrontal
cortex.
It may be impaired reality testing, partly in combination with
unconscious desires or fears (Asaad & Shapiro 1986), that converts
a hallucinatory predisposition into recurrent complex halluci-
nations. Lack of insight as a result of cognitive impairment may be
central in promoting the gradual development of simple visual
hallucinations into recurrent complex visual hallucinations (which
would explain the “double dissociation”), which is similar to how
simple noises in patients with hearing impairment can develop
over time into voices if there is concomitant psychological or cog-
nitive impairment (Gordon 1987; 1995; 1996). For verbal hallu-
cinations to become elaborate and personified in the course of
mental illness (Nayani & David 1996), lack of insight can be main-
tained at the cost of relatively little cognitive impairment (voices
can be heard from behind walls). In contrast, for visual hallucina-
tions to acquire prominence in mental illness, the patient pre-
sumably will have to be more profoundly impaired in reality test-
ing, which may partly explain the association between visual
hallucinations and organic psychosis that is recognised clinically.
Lack of insight as a result of cognitive impairment and atten-
tional pressures due to psychological problems play complemen-
tary roles in relation to the biological predisposition to hallucinate,
as illustrated by Charles Bonnet syndrome, in which major psy-
chopathology is absent and consciousness is unimpaired yet pe-
ripheral sensory impairment is prominent (Gold & Rabins 1989),
or by bereavement states, in which yearning for the deceased can
maintain complex visual hallucinations despite relatively intact
sensory and cognitive functions.
No explanation is given by Collerton et al. in the target article
as to precisely how executive dysfunction, frontal hyperactivity (as
opposed to hypoactivity), impaired arousal, or cholinergic deficits
that have been reported in clinical populations with complex vi-
sual hallucinations relate to their notion of “attentional impair-
ment”; and it is not argued convincingly why “binding” of “incor-
rect proto-objects” into “scene representations” should be a
common denominator of such impairments. Predictions regard-
ing circumstances and content of complex visual hallucinations
should be made using a model of attention and perception that is
based – independently from what is to be predicted – on physio-
logical and neuroanatomical insights, in order to prevent the im-
pression that what is presented as an explanatory model does not
go beyond an attempt to rephrase, in a hypothetical language, cor-
relations between hallucinations and cognitive or visual impair-
ments.
Furthermore, a distinction has to be made between sensory
processing and perception. In our view, disruption of sensory con-
straints that are normally imposed on thalamocortical gamma syn-
chronisation underlying conscious perception constitutes an es-
sential biological predisposition to hallucinations – and it is here
that we see the role of reticular thalamic nucleus dysfunction (not
the “thalamus” as such) – but the extent to which this predisposi-
tion is turned into hallucinations and even psychosis crucially de-
pends on personality problems, coping skills, and social stresses
faced by the individual (Behrendt & Young 2004), as well as the
individual’s cognitive capacity for reality testing.
Catatonia is the Rosetta Stone of psychosis
Brendan T. Carrolla and Tressa D. Carrollb
aDepartment of Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati, and Chillicothe VA
Medical Center – 116A, Chillicothe, OH 45601; bThe Neuroscience Alliance,
West Jefferson, OH 43162. btcarroll1@cs.com
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Abstract: Recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) represent a
form of psychosis. It may be useful to compare RCVH to another form of
psychosis, catatonia. Both include a long list of medical illnesses and have
been examined using several different hypotheses. Catatonia has a variety
of hypotheses, including neurocircuitry, neurochemistry, and an inte-
grated neuropsychiatric hypothesis. This hypothesis for catatonia supports
Collerton et al.’s Perception and Attention Deficit model (PAD) for
RCVH.
There have been several reviews of catatonia and the ascribed
causative illnesses. Two recent books on catatonia provide a vari-
ety of hypotheses for this form of psychosis (Caroff et al. 2004;
Fink & Taylor 2003). Specifically, there are genetic, neuroana-
tomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiologic hypotheses to ex-
plain why it occurs. The hypothesis of top-down modulation as ap-
plied to catatonia (TDMC) shares some similarities with the
Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model applied by Coller-
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ton et al. to recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) (cf.
Northoff 2002). Northoff ’s top-down modulation model (TDMC)
differs from the Collerton et al. top-down modulation hypothesis
as applied to visual hallucination (TDMVH) discussed in the tar-
get article. Collerton et al. assert that RCVH result from lack of
sensory input and/or cortical hyperexcitability. Like TDMC, PAD
is supported by brain imaging, electrophysiology, neurochemistry,
pharmacology, neuroanatomy, and a review of the phenomeno-
logical literature.
Studies of both catatonia and RCVH have included a review of
the literature of the phenomenology without limiting the defini-
tion to psychosis. Psychosis itself has several definitions: in one, it
is defined by impaired reality testing. That is, the patient does not
have insight into having hallucinations and believes that these
phenomena are genuine. Psychosis includes: hallucinations (of
any modality), delusions, bizarre and disorganized behavior, and
catatonia. The research on catatonia has focused on motor signs.
The perceptual and attentional deficit in catatonia is anosog-
nosia of the position of rest. In RCVH, the deficit is of the correct
proto-object. To apply the terminology of the TDMC model to
RCVH, the deficit would be termed dysagnosia of the visual proto-
object and/or anosognosia of vision. The neuropsychological con-
cept of anosognosia of the position of rest is used to explain the
phenomena of posturing and waxy flexibility. The patient does not
know his or her position of rest. Hence, the arm, when placed in
a particular position, tends to remain in that position (waxy flexi-
bility).
The neuropsychological concept of anosognosia of the proto-
object of rest is useful in RCVH. The patient does not know the
correct proto-object. Thus, when the patient views a scene, the in-
correct proto-object appears in the scene. The patient continues
to “see” the proto-object in multiple settings, and the proto-object
may return at times of reduced levels of consciousness. The view
of the proto-object of rest is important to address RCVH in schiz-
ophrenia and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
The work of Northoff (2002) has generated a model for catato-
nia that is analogous to Figure 3 of the target article, “The model
of scene perception.” Furthermore, Carroll et al. (2005) have doc-
umented the neural circuit in a figure that is analogous to Figure
7 in the Collerton et al. PAD model. In catatonia, we have identi-
fied the first complete neural circuit of a form of psychosis. Coller-
ton et al. have identified the second complete neural circuit of a
form of psychosis. It is important to point out that both hypothe-
ses identify circuits rather than sites.
The PAD model does not specifically address the role of the
proto-object in schizophrenia. In patients with schizophrenia, the
proto-object may arise from the delusional processes in this dis-
order. The erroneous proto-objects are formed from areas known
to be dysfunctional in schizophrenia, including the inferior tem-
poral cortex and lateral frontal cortex. It is probable that the
mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus is also deficient in schizo-
phrenia.
In PTSD, the phenomenology of RCVH has been described but
is not a DSM-IV criterion. It is seen in a minority of patients and
usually involves proto-objects that arise from the episode(s) of
trauma. For example, in a patient with combat-related PTSD, the
proto-object might be the image of someone the patient witnessed
in the traumatic event. Very often, these patients consciously
“know” that the image is not genuine but still “feel” that it is. The
erroneous proto-objects are formed from areas known to be dys-
functional in PTSD, including the inferior temporal cortex and,
specifically, the amygdala. Probably the uncinate fascicle is hard
wired between the amygdala and the lateral frontal cortex (Schore
1998). The RCVH may be precipitated by sensory triggers. These
may be real or perceived objects that the patient associates with
the trauma. It is seeing a trigger or perceiving it through another
modality that “triggers” the memory of the trauma.
The PAD model also identifies neurochemical etiologies for
RCVH. These include cholinergic, dopaminergic modulation;
however, the TDMC model proposes that glutamate may play a
role at the cortical level. Catatonia may result from low GABAer-
gic activity, low dopaminergic activity, and high glutaminergic ac-
tivity, or a combination of these (Carroll et al. 2005; Northoff
2002). The role of glutamate, the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate)
receptor, and possible excitotoxicity may prove to be important in
RCVH.
The study of catatonia has been advanced by the TDMC model.
Like RCVH, there are multiple etiologies and hypotheses of cata-
tonia. However, it is these integrated models that identify com-
plete neural circuits that will advance the study of the psychoses. 
Neural correlates of visual hallucinatory
phenomena: The role of attention
Miguel Castelo-Branco
IBILI – Faculdade de Medicina, Azinhaga de Santa Comba, 3000–354,
Coimbra, Portugal. mcbranco@ibili.uc.pt www.ibili.uc.pt
Abstract: The Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model of visual
hallucinations is as limited in generality as other models. It does, however,
raise an interesting hypothesis on the role of attentional biases among
proto-objects. The prediction that neither impaired attention nor im-
paired sensory activation alone will produce hallucinations should be ad-
dressed in future studies by analysing partial correlations between puta-
tive causes and hallucinatory effects.
Collerton et al.’s Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model
proposes an interesting pivotal role for attention processes in gen-
erating recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH). Neu-
roanatomical evidence should, however, be explored in more de-
tail. If the authors’ view is correct, then hallucination probability
should somehow depend on lesion laterality, because the neglect
literature has shown a right-hemisphere bias in attention deficits.
In this sense, the hypothesis is well supported by the observation
that 11 out of 12 of the patients reported by Bender et al. (1968)
had lesions in the right hemisphere. A right-sided massive bias in
association with visual hallucinations had also been noted by Teu-
ber et al. (1960, pp. 104–105). In this regard I believe that the au-
thors should also consider an important role for the parietal net-
work, which is involved in imagery and visual attention, in addition
to the contribution of prefrontal and ventral pathways.
Attention may indeed represent an important role in the phe-
nomenology of RCVH, but this does not imply that the proposed
dual necessity of attentional or perceptual disturbances for hallu-
cinations to occur is true. Accordingly, Lessel (1975) reported that
he had never detected any unsuspected brain lesion among his pa-
tients with hallucinations related to blindness. We were able to
document similar findings in macular degeneration patients, both
psychophysically and anatomically. The claim that attention is the
primary mechanism for biasing competition among proto-objects
is reminiscent of the literature concerning rivalry and multistabil-
ity (Castelo-Branco et al. 2000; 2002; Fries et al. 2005). Percep-
tual interpretation may change with constant retinal stimulation,
and this effect can also be modulated by attention. It would be in-
teresting to know whether the PAD model envisages pathological
perceptual multistability caused by attentional impairment.
The PAD model suggests that an incorrect proto-object in-
trudes on perception only when the correct object is not atten-
tionally bound. The authors state that the PAD model could be 
falsified if an active hallucination could coexist with active per-
ception and attention of a correct image. Polyopia may be dis-
carded as a falsification, although it could still be argued that see-
ing objects that are not present at a given location (even if they are
real at others) may be considered true hallucinations. Other visual
perseveration phenomena are, however, more problematic. As
early as 1968, Bender and colleagues reviewed palinopsia (“visual
perseveration in time”) and reported that it is often also associated
with visual perseveration in space, for example, illusory visual
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spread, and that such phenomena usually occur in field areas with
decreased acuity (Bender et al. 1968). Areas with low acuity are
unlikely to catch attention, and it is therefore again difficult to
grasp how attention can be a necessary condition for hallucina-
tions to occur. If attention deficits need to coexist with sensory im-
pairment for hallucinations to occur, then it is surprising that lit-
tle or no work is reported on coexistence of neglect syndromes
superimposed on age-related macular degeneration (AMD). Fur-
thermore, many counterexamples can be found in the context of
AMD for the postulate that attention accounts for the content of
the hallucination being consistent with expectations from the set-
ting in which it is seen. These violations of the prediction that the
image usually appears in a contextually correct location and with
the correct orientation do not dismiss the PAD model, but they
raise the possibility that it does not generalize to conditions such
as AMD. A good example of such exceptions is tesselopsia (per-
ception of brickwork-like geometrical patterns), which may also
occur in normal subjects under particular visual stimulation con-
ditions (Tass 1995; 1997) or even be caused by electrical stimula-
tion of the retina. In these cases the role of an attentional mecha-
nism is unlikely.
Concerning the meta-analysis, I do believe that future studies
should clarify and discard the possibility of random and system-
atic biases. The PAD model is based on the severe attentional/ob-
ject perception deficits in dementia with Lewy bodies. However,
because the available evidence is correlative, one should attempt
more solid quantification of perceptual and attentional deficits.
The data in the target article’s Figure 4 suggest that perceptual
and attentional factors share a lot of common variance. That is why
a partial correlation analysis would be so important to reveal the
true contribution of each factor and to assess whether the points
correlated with high incidence of RCVH have strong independent
correlations with both predictors.
Finally, concerning the role of certain neurotransmitters and
implications of the PAD model for prevention and therapy of
RCVH, the authors should take into account the fact that dopa-
mine neurotransmission is not only modulating high-level areas.
In fact, dopamine receptors are present even in all layers of the
retina, in the LGN and V1, as shown by the work of Qu et al.
(2000), Zhao et al. (2001; 2002), Bodis-Wollner (1990), and oth-
ers. It is also proposed that attending to a photograph of a hallu-
cinated person should extinguish the hallucination. This does not
work in cases due to AMD or in schizophrenia (in the auditory do-
main; see Dierks et al. 1999).
In summary, the model is interesting and valid, but it has to be
further refined: in particular, in defining whether the role of at-
tention is merely modulatory or, instead, at least partly causal.
A signal-detection-theory representation 
of normal and hallucinatory perception
Igor Dolgov and Michael K. McBeath
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Abstract: Collerton et al.’s Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model
argues that all recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) result from
maladaptive, deficient sensory and attentional processing. We outline a
constructivist-based representation of perception using signal detection
theory, in which hallucinations are modeled as false alarms when confir-
mational perceptual information is lacking. This representation allows for
some individuals to have RCVH due to a criterion shift associated with at-
tentional proficiency that results in an increased awareness of the envi-
ronment.
In the target article, Collerton, Perry, and McKeith (Collerton et
al.) rely on cognitive psychology models of normal scene percep-
tion as a foundation for their proposed Perception and Attention
Deficit (PAD) model of recurrent complex visual hallucinations
(RCVH). Such cognitive constructivist models propose that scene
perception normally utilizes the sensation or detection of signals
available in the environment that are modified by top-down pro-
cesses, such as memory, expectation, and attentional state (e.g.,
Rensink 2000a; 2000b). The commonness of illusions (e.g., Post et
al. 2003), hallucinations (e.g., Laroi & Van Der Linden 2005), and
other forms of misperception of veridical objects confirms the
characteristic noisiness of the perceptual construction process.
Signal detection theory (SDT) can be used to help disambiguate
types of perceptual error that lead to hallucinations (for example,
see Ishigaki & Tanno 1999). Specifically, SDT can separate an in-
crease in hallucinations caused by observer inability to discrimi-
nate between the presence and absence of objects, from an in-
crease in hallucinations caused by an increased willingness to
interpret ambiguous perceptual information. Applying the signal
detection theory, we suggest that instances of perception can be
classified into four categories: veridical perception (hits), veridical
non-perception (correct rejections), lack of awareness (misses),
and hallucinations (false alarms).
Collerton et al. provide an impressive array of evidence sup-
porting the PAD explanation, and they rightly point out that many
RCVH are associated with systematic neuropathological symp-
toms. They base much of their thesis on establishing such biolog-
ical bases, but singularly argue that all RCVH result from a sen-
sory/attentional deficit. A more global consideration of perceptual
error not only examines false alarms, but also considers perceptual
errors of omission in which healthy observers are unaware of
clearly visible stimuli. A signal-detection-theory characterization
allows for a criterion variable, which can bias the ratio of errors of
hallucination and errors of omission. This approach entails that
some individuals with increased instances of RCVH benefit from
an accompanying improvement of veridical percepts due to will-
ingness to err more on the side of false positives versus false neg-
atives. In such individuals, occurrences of RCVH may not be
pathological, but rather by-products of a shifted and in some re-
spects enhanced attentional mechanism (Aleman et al. 1999).
Figure 1 shows three signal-detection graphs illustrating a con-
structionist view of perception in which the presence of an object
in the real world can be thought of as a signal to perceive that ob-
ject. When no object is present, there is a “noise only” distribution
of how convincing the stimulus is that an object is present. The
distribution can be thought of as resulting from factors such as
misleading perceptual information, expectation, and varying at-
tentional state. When an object actually exists, the extra sensory/
perceptual information or signal is added to create a “signal 
noise” distribution. The noise only and signal  noise distributions
are plotted along an axis indicating the vividness of a percept or,
in other words, the convincingness that the experienced stimulus
is veridically based on a real object. The criterion line indicates the
observer’s threshold for interpreting the stimulus as a real object.
Consistent with Collerton et al.’s observation that attention and
other top-down cognitive processes mediate perception, we pro-
pose that the location of the criterion line depends on an individ-
ual’s specific attentional parameters, such as the acuity and range
of attention. The criterion line divides each of the two distribu-
tions into two regions. The region most strongly emphasized by
Collerton et al. is the portion from the noise only distribution that
lies above the criterion line. This region, traditionally thought of
as that of false alarms, represents the occurrence of hallucinations,
or the perception of objects when none actually exist. Another re-
gion that we would like to emphasize is the portion from the sig-
nal  noise distribution that lies below the criterion line. This re-
gion, traditionally thought of as that of misses, represents the
occurrence of lack of awareness of real objects, or insensitivity to
signals too weak or unexpected to promote construction of a per-
ceptual object.
Figure 1a illustrates a theoretical set of distributions for a nor-
mal observer in which there are both perceptual misses and hal-
Commentary/Collerton et al.: A novel Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucination
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6 761
lucinations. Here the observer has a criterion line that produces a
balance in which there are notably fewer hallucinations than
missed perceptions, presumably because of a higher cost for hal-
lucinating. Figure 1b shows a new set of distributions for a patho-
logic individual as described by Collerton et al. The noise only and
signal  noise distributions are placed closer together to reflect
that persons who suffer from pathologic perceptual disorders have
difficulty differentiating veridical reality from hallucinated reality.
Here, observers have an enlarged region of hallucinations as a re-
sult of perceptual deficiencies that effectively add to the convinc-
ingness of stimuli when no object is present. In this representa-
tion, the criterion and the distribution when real objects are
present is the same as that shown in Figure 1a for normal indi-
viduals, so the proportion of veridical perceptions (hits versus
misses) remains the same. There is simply less discriminability be-
tween the distributions, resulting in more hallucinations.
In Figure 1c we propose a possible alternative representation
that produces increased RCVH without requiring perceptual de-
ficiency, instead doing so by having a more liberal criterion for per-
ceiving objects than that of the normal person in Figure 1a. This
more liberal location of the criterion line reflects an observer with
an attentional mechanism capable of perceiving signals in the
more subtle range of available ambient stimuli. Although this cri-
terion shift increases the rate of hallucinations compared to a typ-
ical person, it is potentially advantageous in that the region of
misses or lack of awareness of real objects is made notably smaller,
resulting in a corresponding increase in perception of weakly in-
dicated objects. Thus, there is a new enhanced region of percep-
tion within the signal  noise distribution, lying between the nor-
mal and more liberal criterion lines (shown as shaded in Fig. 1).
The importance of clarifying this alternate model for increased
hallucinations is that it acknowledges the potential for a popula-
tion of individuals who experience more frequent RCVH than the
typical person, yet who are not only not perceptually deficient, but
rather individuals who might more accurately be described as per-
ceptually enhanced and more aware of subtle perceptual infor-
mation. A plausible explanation for such a shift in perception/
attention is based on research on the role of attention in visuo-spa-
tial working memory (Pringle et al. 2004). Specifically, attentional
processes determine which parts of the immediate environment
are stored explicitly or implicitly in memory. We posit that in an
individual with a liberal criterion, the explicit-to-implicit ratio is
biased toward formation of more explicit memories, thereby re-
sulting in conscious awareness of a larger proportion of the signals
in the surrounding environment, as well as enhanced or shifted
perception.
The PAD model of RCVH is well thought out and adequately
accounts for hallucinations in a pathologic population. However,
we suggest the model could be improved by acknowledging that
some RCVH may not be pathologic, but rather could be by-prod-
ucts of a more liberal criterion in interpreting weakly indicated
stimuli as veridical objects. Furthermore, this liberal criterion can
be adaptive1 in that it reduces perceptual errors of omission of real
objects, resulting in an enhanced perception and awareness of
subtle real objects and events in the environment.
NOTE
1. The cost of experiencing RCVH must be outweighed by the benefit
of an increased number of veridical percepts.
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Figure 1 (Dolgov & McBeath). Signal-detection-theory representation of normal and hallucinatory perception. (a) Normal/typical per-
son with low rate of RCVH (false alarms). (b) Person with more frequent RCVH, caused by a deficiency in ability to discriminate, con-
sistent with PAD. (c) Person with normal ability to discriminate but more frequent RCVH, caused by a criterion shift. Such an individ-
ual also has enhanced veridical perception (shaded region).
Perception is far from perfection: The role of
the brain and mind in constructing realities
Itiel E. Dror
School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ,
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Abstract: Dichotomizing perceptions, by those that have an objective re-
ality and those that do not, is rejected. Perceptions are suggested to fall
along a multidimensional continuum in which neither end is totally “pure.”
At the extreme ends, perceptions neither have an objective reality without
some subjectivity, nor, at the other end, even as hallucinations, are they to-
tally dissociated from reality.
Higher-level visual cognition is achieved through complex and dy-
namic interactions, both within the many processing components
of the visual system and between the visual system and other brain
areas and systems. Before considering the multiplicity of factors
that play a role in determining what we see and experience, it is
important to pull back and consider one’s basic conceptualization
and theoretical outlook. Such philosophical issues have (implicitly,
if not explicitly) implications for how we approach and conduct re-
search, and even for the very questions we ask and the type of an-
swers we seek (Dror & Dascal 1997; Dror & Thomas 2005).
A naïve view of visual cognition deems that it normally provides
perceptions and experiences that have an objective reality. Fail-
ures to see things correctly, such as in hallucinations, need to be
investigated and explained as system malfunctions. This frame-
work dichotomizes perceptions as either “normal” (i.e., having an
objective reality) or as “failures” (i.e., lacking an objective reality).
Other perceptual problems, such as illusions, misidentifications,
distortions, and misperceptions, may be considered as a subcate-
gory in which perceptions “fail” yet stem from an “objective real-
ity” rather than being totally dissociated from it.
The nature of perception. An alternative view is suggested in
which perceptions are seen to fall along a multidimensional con-
tinuum. Even at the far extremes of the continuum, perceptions
are not entirely “pure.” At the one extreme, perceptions never
have a full and total “objective reality,” and at the other extreme
end, hallucinations and delusions are not totally dissociated from
reality.
The underpinning of this framework is not its continuum na-
ture, but that perception is never totally objective to begin with.
The lack of objective reality across the plurality of perceptions re-
sults in a multidimensional continuum. If one adopts this view,
then rather then asking what is wrong or wondering why the sys-
tem is failing, one tries to understand what factors mediate per-
ception and how they interact. Perhaps the former outlook derives
from a more clinical approach and perspective whereby some peo-
ple are considered “normal” and hence perceive the “objective re-
ality,” whereas patients and clinical populations have “disorders”
because of system failures to have an “objective reality.”
Understanding that perception is far from perfection provides a
contextual framework for examining the visual cognitive system.
The mind and the brain are dynamic systems that play active roles
in how we perceive and construct realities. Our perceptions de-
pend on a whole range of factors, which I will try to illustrate.
Mental states. Mental states play a critical role in how percep-
tual information is processed. For example, our hopes, fears, and
expectations affect what we perceive. In a recent laboratory ex-
periment, emotional states were shown to affect whether two vi-
sual patterns were perceived as the same or as being different
(Dror et al. 2005). There are numerous phenomena that can fur-
ther illustrate how the mind plays an active role in how we per-
ceive and construct reality, such as motivation, wishful thinking,
cognitive dissonance, self-fulfilling prophecies, and confirmation
bias (e.g., Darley & Gross 1983; Festinger & Carlsmith 1959; Sny-
der et al. 1977).
Cognitive factors. Visual cognition is a set of complex and in-
teractive processes (e.g., Grill-Spector et al. 1998). No cognitive
system works on its very own. Each cognitive system is intertwined
and interacts with a range of other cognitive systems. For exam-
ple, how information is understood, processed, and collected de-
pends on how it compares against information already stored in
memory (e.g., Kosslyn et al. 1994). The influence of such pro-
cessing further depends on how it is represented, available re-
sources, goals of the system, context, and other factors (e.g., Eber-
hardt et al. 2004; Maier 1930; Reuter-Lorenz 2002; Smith & Dror
2001).
Perceptual mechanisms. Even the lower-level sensory mecha-
nisms, which initially perceive and encode the input to the system,
are not passive or isolated from a variety of factors. They try to
make (impose) sense and consistency on the world around us,
even when the input presents ambiguous or impossible informa-
tion (e.g., Dror et al. 1997). Among other things, the perceptual
mechanisms adjust and change sensitivity thresholds, segment
and chunk information in a variety of ways, and perceive colour
and lighting based on their own parameters settings (e.g., Land
1964; Prinzmetal 1995). Therefore, much of what we perceive,
even at the lower-level mechanisms, is dependent on the perceiver
rather than reflecting objective reality.
Bottom-up, top-down, and mental imagery. Perception and
cognition, at all their levels, depend on bottom-up, data-driven
processes and on top-down, conceptually driven processes (e.g.,
Humphreys et al. 1997). The top-down processes may be viewed
as the source of subjectivity, individualization of perception, and
distancing from the “objective reality.” However, even the sensory
mechanisms in a purely bottom-up mode do not reflect reality as
it “really” is.
Mental imagery is a range of phenomena where perception and
experience occur without direct perceptual input. Positron emis-
sion tomography (PET) and other studies have demonstrated that
the same brain substrates are used to process imagined and per-
ceived images, except that in imagery the input comes from other
cognitive systems (Kosslyn et al. 1993; 1997). Furthermore, visual
mental rotation, for example, shows that imagination follows the
laws of physics and rotations in the physical world (e.g., Smith &
Dror 2001). Hence, although all the processes involving imagery
do not have direct input from the external world, the input and the
way it is processed is not dissociated from normal perception.
Summary and conclusions. We are different people, with dif-
ferent experiences, different views, and different brains and sen-
sory mechanisms. This entails that we have different perceptions.
Most people share sufficient perceptual commonalities that allow
labelling and communication within everyday life activities. Nev-
ertheless, the perceptions across people are far from identical.
Furthermore, even if we did perceive the exact same thing, that
percept is not necessarily a true and accurate reflection of the “ob-
jective reality.”
Perceptions fall along a multidimensional continuum and are
subjective in nature. This individualization of perception derives
from the active nature of cognition and the wide range of factors
that affect what and how we perceive.
Two visual hallucinatory syndromes
Dominic H. ffytche
Institute of Psychiatry, De Crespigny Park, London SE5 8AF, United
Kingdom. d.ffytche@iop.kcl.ac.uk
Abstract: When viewed from a distance, visual hallucinations fall into one
of two symptom patterns, a dichotomy which poses a problem for theo-
retical models treating them as a single entity. Such models should be
broadened to allow for two distinct but overlapping syndromes – one likely
to relate to visual de-afferentation, the other to Perception and Attention
Deficit (PAD) cholinergic pathology.
Are complex visual hallucinations a single pathophysiological en-
tity? Collerton et al. would have us think so and have produced a
Commentary/Collerton et al.: A novel Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucination
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6 763
compelling neurocognitive model – Perception and Attention
Deficit (PAD) – with which to account for a range of their phe-
nomenological, pathological, and clinical features. Yet the success
of the model comes at an expense. For it to succeed, the authors
have been forced to make it something of a Procrustean bed,
stretching some parts of the visual hallucination evidence and am-
putating others. This is no more apparent than in their attempt to
deal with the hallucinations associated with eye disease, the third-
ranking pathological condition in their estimates of population-
wide morbid load, exceeded only by delirium and the combined
dementias.
As acknowledged by the authors, in eye disease (or, indeed, any
visual-pathway lesion), simple hallucinations far outnumber com-
plex ones, an observation which contrasts with core PAD disorders
such as Lewy body dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s
disease, in which complex hallucinations far outnumber simple
ones. For eye and visual-pathway disease, complex hallucinations
are only a small part of a much larger clinical picture, their im-
portance needing to be stretched to match core PAD disorders. In
fact, even after stretching, the match is an imperfect one. For ex-
ample, complex hallucinations such as figures in patients with eye
disease tend to be bizarre and unfamiliar, often wearing elaborate
costumes and hats (Santhouse et al. 2000). In contrast, the figures
hallucinated in Parkinson’s disease and the dementias tend to be
mundane and familiar (Fénelon et al. 2000). Yet, perhaps the most
serious objection to including eye-related hallucinations in the
PAD model is not the stretched importance of complex halluci-
nations but the amputation of their simple counterparts. All visual
hallucinations, whether simple or complex, relate to phasic in-
creases in activity within visual cortex, the difference between the
two categories being the location of the activity increase. For ex-
ample, activity increase in the human colour centre V4 will result
in the hallucination of a “simple” formless coloured blob, whereas
activity increase a few centimetres anterior to V4, in object-spe-
cialised cortex, will result in the hallucination of a “complex” ob-
ject (ffytche et al. 1998). An important weakness of the PAD
model is that it is forced to make an arbitrary distinction between
these different cortical loci and their related hallucinations, am-
putating from its remit cortical areas underlying the simple hallu-
cinations which typify those found in eye disease.
There are other features of visual hallucinations which require
amputation for eye and visual pathway disease to fit the PAD
model. In eye and visual-pathway disease, visual hallucinations,
whether simple or complex, tend to resolve over time, with 60%
of patients with visual hallucinations related to eye disease being
hallucination-free at 18 months (Holroyd & Rabins 1996) and al-
most all patients with visual hallucinations related to visual-path-
way infarcts being hallucination free within weeks (Kölmel 1985).
Such patients do not develop elaborate delusional explanations for
the experiences and typically gain insight into their hallucinatory
nature even if, initially, some believe them to be real. These visual
hallucinations are invariably silent and are not interspersed with
hallucinations in other sense modalities. This overall clinical pic-
ture is sufficiently characteristic that exceptions to it point to the
presence of other, non-ophthalmic causes for the hallucinations.
Contrast this with the clinical picture found in the dementias,
Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia. Here the visual hallucina-
tions tend to persist or progress with time (see, for example, Goetz
et al. 2001b in the context of Parkinson’s disease) and are typically
associated with insightless, delusional explanations. The visual
hallucinations in these conditions tend to be associated with other
sense modalities, either simultaneously (e.g., seeing and hearing
the hallucination) or on different occasions (e.g., visual hallucina-
tions interspersed with auditory hallucinations). Indeed, it is
something of a psychiatric axiom that visual hallucinations in
schizophrenia never occur without auditory hallucinations, either
as separate hallucination events or as simultaneous, multimodal-
ity hallucinations. The PAD model is forced to ignore these strik-
ing clinical differences to allow the visual hallucinations of one set
of conditions to sit comfortably with those of another.
Without stretching and amputation, what seems to emerge
from the visual hallucination evidence taken as a whole is two dis-
tinct, overlapping syndromes.1 One syndrome consists of pre-
dominantly simple hallucinations which resolve with time, occur
with insight and without delusions, and are purely visual. The sec-
ond consists of predominantly complex hallucinations which per-
sist over time, occur with delusions and without insight, and cross
sensory modalities. Setting aside those conditions in which the vi-
sual cortex is stimulated directly (e.g., migraine and epilepsy), to
a first approximation all clinical conditions in which visual hallu-
cinations occur are associated with one or other of these syn-
dromes: eye and visual-pathway disease to the first, core PAD con-
ditions to the second.
The existence of two distinctive syndromes poses a significant
challenge to PAD and other models that treat visual hallucinations
as a single pathophysiological entity. It seems unlikely that two
such very different symptom profiles could emerge from the same
disordered mechanism.
Perhaps the time for unitary models of visual hallucinations has
passed. If there are two syndromes of visual hallucinations rather
than one, we need to broaden our explanatory accounts to allow
for this dichotomy. One approach would be to include two distinct
but interacting pathophysiological mechanisms into our models,
each related to one of the two syndromes. Obvious candidates
would be visual de-afferentation as underlying the first syndrome
and PAD cholinergic dysfunction the second syndrome (ffytche
2004; 2005). If correct, such expanded, bipartite pathophysiolog-
ical models have important implications. In the clinic, they sug-
gest, unlike their unitary counterparts, that different types of vi-
sual hallucinations need different treatment strategies (ffytche
2004). In the laboratory, and perhaps more significantly, by pro-
viding a comprehensive account of the neural mechanisms of dis-
ordered conscious vision, such extended models take us a step
closer to a neural account of visual consciousness.
NOTES
1. These syndromes are unrelated to those associated with eye disease
described in Santhouse et al. (2000), which would be considered sub-syn-
dromes of the first, predominantly simple hallucination syndrome de-
scribed here.
Hallucinations and perceptual inference
Karl J. Friston
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London WC1N
3BG, United Kingdom. k.friston@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: This commentary takes a closer look at how “constructive mod-
els of subjective perception,” referred to by Collerton et al. (sect. 2), might
contribute to the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model. It fo-
cuses on the neuronal mechanisms that could mediate hallucinations, or
false inference – in particular, the role of cholinergic systems in encoding
uncertainty in the context of hierarchical Bayesian models of perceptual
inference (Friston 2002b; Yu & Dayan 2002).
Collerton et al. provide a compelling synthesis implicating cholin-
ergic dysfunction in the aetiology of recurrent complex visual hal-
lucinations (RCVH). Furthermore, they observe “that both sen-
sory release and top-down activation are necessary, but neither in
itself is sufficient to cause high rates of RCVH” (sect. 6.3, para. 3).
This fits very comfortably with models of perceptual inference
based on hierarchical Bayes, in which cholinergic mechanisms
may balance bottom-up sensory evidence and top-down priors by
encoding their relative uncertainty or precision. In short, cholin-
ergic dysfunction may result in a failure to properly integrate sen-
sory information and prior expectations. In what follows, I try to
explain how this might happen.
Perceptual inference is the same as statistical inference and
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rests on the probability density of the causes of sensory informa-
tion (i.e., the conditional probability). In classical inference, using,
say, t-tests, inference is based on two things: (1) an estimate of the
effect and (2) the standard error or uncertainty about that esti-
mate. The t-statistic is simply the ratio of these two quantities. The
basic idea here is that hallucinations can be regarded as false in-
ference that arises not because of impaired estimation (i.e., sen-
sation) but a failure to encode the uncertainty. In the t-test exam-
ple, this might mean the standard error was always too small,
leading to false inference based on pathologically large t-values.
How might this happen in the brain?
Current thinking in computational neuroscience and machine
learning points to hierarchical Bayes as the best candidate for un-
derstanding perception. I have introduced the notion of empirical
Bayes in this context: empirical Bayes using the conditional inde-
pendence among hierarchical levels to form empirical priors
based on the sensory data. This means (almost paradoxically) that
cortical hierarchies can construct their own priors, where each
level of the hierarchy is subject to constraints or priors from the
level above (top-down effects) when accounting for sensory evi-
dence from below (bottom-up effects). There are many issues that
attend this theoretical perspective (see Friston 2002b for review).
Here I focus on the putative role of cholinergic neurotransmission
in the genesis of hallucinations.
Mathematically, neuronal dynamics and synaptic efficacy are
considered to minimise something called the free energy (F, a con-
cept from statistical physics). The quantities that minimise the
free energy are the conditional density q(n) of the causes n of sen-
sory input (e.g., a high-level representation of a face) and some
hyperparameters l encoding the uncertainty or noise. These two
quantities correspond loosely to the numerator and denominator
of the t-statistic above and are updated in two iterated steps: the
E-step and the M-step. This is known as expectation maximisation
in statistics.
E q(n)  m
q
in F
M l  m
l
in F
For a hierarchical model, the E- and M-steps for the i-th level can
be implemented with the following descent scheme, for any gen-
erative or constructive causal model ni  gi(ni+1) under Gaussian
assumptions:
This can be implemented in a simple neuronal architecture of the
sort shown in Figure 1. Here the conditional density is repre-
sented in terms of its average or expectation nˆi and covariance i,
i.e., q(ni)  N(nˆi, i) where
which is an implicit function of the hyperparameters. In this
scheme, the quantities nˆi and prediction error i correspond to the
activity of two neuronal subpopulations, whereas the hyperparam-
eters li are encoded by the synaptic efficacy of lateral connec-
tions.1 Note that this scheme converges when nˆi cannot further re-
duce prediction error and 	i/	ni
T i  0. In Friston (2002b) I
discuss the potential role of cholinergic neurotransmission in me-
diating the M-step. A related theme, using a different perspective,
is discussed in Yu and Dayan (2002). What would happen if the
hyperparameters were encoded improperly with cholinergic dys-
function?
A failure to optimise the hyperparameters will produce an in-
appropriate balance between sensory and prior influences on the
conditional expectation of what caused any sensation. This is
shown schematically in Figure 2. Here, we assume the deficit pro-
duces hyperparameters that fail to encode uncertainty in the pri-
ors. This means too much weight is afforded to the prior expecta-
tion from supraordinate cortical levels, and false inference ensues.
Collerton et al. discuss a similar notion from the point of view of
a “failure to select the correct proto-object in the PAD model”
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Figure 1 (Friston). The top panel is a schematic showing two
neuronal subpopulations representing the conditional expectation
of sensory causes for a single cortical level and the influences they
are subject to. The bottom panel shows the implicit probability
densities encoded by these neuronal activities and synaptic effica-
cies after convergence. Note that the uncertainty or width of these
densities is determined by the hyperparameters. The conditional
density, upon which inference is based, is drawn in a solid line.
Figure 2 (Friston). A schematic showing one way in which hal-
lucinations could occur. In this example, the hyperparameter en-
coding prior uncertainty has been made too small li r l˜i, result-
ing in overconfidence in the priors and a false or hallucinatory
conditional expectation.
(sect. 7.4.2, para. 2) when cholinergic inhibition leads to incorrect
“pattern matching.”
The mechanistic understanding afforded by this computational
approach can usefully account for many observations made by
Collerton et al. For example, “Either impaired attention [i.e., prior
expectations] or impaired sensory activation [i.e., evidence] alone
will rarely produce hallucinations” (sect. 7.3, para. 1). It is their re-
lationship that defines a hallucination. In this sense, the integra-
tion, through the conditional density, is the key mechanism in per-
ception and this integration may depend on the integrity of
cholinergic mechanisms. The false learning associated with more
enduring changes mediated by the M-step may improperly pair
sensory contexts with high-level representations leading to “the
same image being triggered again and may account for the repeti-
tion of specific images” (sect. 7.5.1, last para.). In empirical Bayes
the priors are driven by prediction errors from the level below (see
Fig. 1). In the absence of sensory input, priors are not induced.
This may account for what the target article describes as “an oth-
erwise puzzling feature of hallucinations – that they disappear on
eye closure or on complete visual loss” (sect. 7.5.2, para. 2).
In terms of clinical neuroscience, there are remarkable overlaps
between the PAD model for hallucinations and the disconnection
hypothesis for schizophrenia, a disorder associated with halluci-
nations. In terms of functional anatomy, Collerton et al. note that
“Object-based attention depends primarily on the function of lat-
eral frontal cortex, and object perception depends primarily on
the ventral visual stream” (sect. 7.3, point 3). They later cite evi-
dence from functional imaging of patients who are prone to hal-
lucinations. In fact, the disconnection hypothesis was based on
early observations of abnormal coupling between left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and posterior temporal regions, as measured
with positron emission tomography in schizophrenics (see Friston
1998 for review).
The disconnection hypothesis posits abnormal functional inte-
gration (at the synaptic level) as the primary pathophysiological
mechanism in schizophrenia. The premise is that synaptic plastic-
ity is regulated abnormally during emotional and perceptual
learning. The abnormal regulation probably involves dopaminer-
gic dysfunction in emotional learning or operant conditioning (i.e.,
the formation of stimulus-response links) and cholinergic dys-
function in perceptual learning (i.e., the formation of stimulus-
stimulus associations). Exactly the same neurotransmitters are im-
plicated by Collerton et al. in RCVH: “pharmacological data so far
available indicate a primary role for cholinergic and secondary role
for dopaminergic dysfunction in the aetiology of RCVH” (sect.
3.2, last para.). However, they later note “that dopamine receptors
are not prevalent in visual processing areas (whereas muscarinic
cholinergic receptors are)” (sect. 7.4.2, para. 2). This is consistent
with the conclusion of a recent editorial on disconnection and cog-
nitive dysmetria in schizophrenia: “In short, normal interactions
between dopamine and the cellular or synaptic mechanisms re-
sponsible for plasticity are essential for emotional learning,
whereas the interaction between cholinergic neurotransmission
and associative plasticity is important for perceptual learning”
(Friston 2005). Although Collerton et al. state, “Eye disease and
schizophrenia pose greater challenges to our model” (sect. 7.6.2.2,
para. 5), there are encouraging and important points of contact be-
tween the PAD model and theoretical treatments of cerebral
pathology in schizophrenia.
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NOTE
1. In this summary I have assumed that the parameters of the genera-
tive model of how sensory inputs are caused have already been learned (in
the M-step). These parameters are encoded by the synaptic efficacy of for-
ward and backward connections linking levels.
Waking hallucinations could correspond 
to a mild form of dreaming sleep stage
hallucinatory activity
Claude Gottesmann
Département de Biologie, Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, 06108 Nice
Cedex 2, France. gottesma@unice.fr
Abstract: There are strong resemblances between the neurobiological
characteristics of hallucinations occurring in the particular case of schizo-
phrenia and the hallucinatory activity observed during the rapid-eye-
movement (dreaming) sleep stage: the same prefrontal dorsolateral deac-
tivation; forebrain disconnectivity and disinhibition; sensory deprivation;
and acetylcholine, monoamine, and glutamate modifications.
To explain the neurobiological deficiencies responsible for hallu-
cinations, the PAD model described by Collerton et al. first high-
lights attention impairments. These could be related to a pre-
frontal dorsolateral greater or lesser deactivation also observed in
schizophrenia (Bunney & Bunney 2000; Lewis 2000; Weinberger
et al. 1986). An analogy can be made with the rapid-eye-move-
ment (REM) dreaming sleep stage, a possible model of schizo-
phrenia (Gottesmann 2002; 2004a; 2004b). During this sleep
stage, hallucinatory activity also occurs, as evidenced in cats (Hen-
ley & Morrison 1974; Jouvet & Delorme 1965; Jouvet & Mounier
1960; Sastre & Jouvet 1979) and rats (Mirmiran 1983; Mouret &
Delorme 1967; Sanford et al. 2001) after experimental suppres-
sion of usual muscular atonia, and in normal subjects (Aserinsky
& Kleitman 1953) as well as, similarly, in the pathological so-called
REM Sleep Behavior Disorder (Mahowald & Schenck 2004),
which is the human form of REM sleep without atonia. Indeed, a
specific inactivation of the same dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Braun et al. 1997; Maquet et al. 1996) is observed in this sleep
stage. Moreover, whether a cause or a consequence, and during
REM sleep as opposed to waking, the frontal cortex seems to be
disconnected from other cortical areas, particularly perceptual ar-
eas, as the gamma rhythm becomes uncoupled over cortex areas
(Perez-Garci et al. 2001). Here, also, there is a strong resemblance
with processes occurring in schizophrenia, given that intracere-
bral disconnections have long been hypothesized to explain the
symptoms in this mental illness (Meyer-Lindenberg et al. 2001;
Peled et al. 2000; Young et al. 1998).
Therefore, it is of interest that the PAD model also associates
this prefrontal cognitive impairment with a decrease in perception
processes. This symptom was already described for hallucination
development by several authors. More particularly, Behrendt and
Young (2004) recently reported a thalamus unconstrained by the
usual sensory afferents. Here again, a parallel can be drawn with
REM sleep. Indeed, Dement (1958) first identified the increase
of arousal threshold by peripheral stimuli, which indicates that this
sleep stage corresponds to deep sleep; this was also shown by the
difficulty of arousal after central stimulation (Benoit & Bloch
1960). However, more precise experimental arguments have
strengthened the notion of perception deficit underlying halluci-
nations. The sensory de-afferentation hypothesis is strongly sup-
ported by the presynaptic inhibition observed during the REM
sleep stage in the thalamic relay nuclei of cats (Steriade 1970) and
rats (Gandolfo et al. 1980). This failure of sensory afferents dur-
ing REM sleep is further reinforced at the cortical level. Indeed,
while the associative visual areas that lead to the ventral visual
stream involved in the PAD model are activated during REM
sleep, the primary visual cortex, the target of sensory afferents, is
deactivated (Braun et al. 1998).
The neurochemical model of the PAD suggests that hallucina-
tion occurrence is based on a decrease of acetylcholine and an ex-
cess of dopamine functioning. In our REM sleep neurobiological
model of schizophrenia, it has to be emphasized that the cortical
release of acetylcholine is lower than during active waking (Mar-
rosu et al. 1995), which could explain a cognitive impairment, al-
though the acetylcholine level is higher in the basal forebrain
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(Vazquez & Baghdoyan 2001). Moreover, our laboratory has
shown a slight increase of dopamine and a significant decrease of
glutamate release in nucleus accumbens during REM sleep when
compared to waking (Léna et al. 2004; 2005). Both neurochemi-
cal variations, even possibly separated from each other, are known
to induce psychotic symptoms in normal subjects (Buffenstein et
al. 1999; Grace 1991; Heresco-Levy 2000; MacKay et al. 1982). In
addition, both dopamine agonists and glutamate antagonists in-
duce vivid dreaming (Reeves et al. 2001; Solms 2000), reinforcing
the proximity of underlying waking and REM sleep hallucination
mechanisms. Now, the major neurochemical difference between
waking and REM sleep is the silence of noradrenergic and sero-
tonergic neurons in the latter stage (Aston-Jones & Bloom 1981a;
Hobson et al. 1975; McGinty et al. 1974; Rasmussen et al. 1984).
Our hypothesis is that the decrease of noradrenaline and/or sero-
tonin is probably indirectly at the origin of the entire forebrain
neurochemical functional state, which is responsible for the psy-
chotic-like mentation of REM sleep. It is noteworthy that a simi-
lar deficit of noradrenaline (Friedman 1999; Linner et al. 2002)
and/or serotonin (Silver et al. 2000; Van Hes et al. 2003) has been
described in schizophrenia, characterized by a more general so-
called glutamate-trimonoamine imbalance (Pralong et al. 2002).
Here also, basic neurochemical data and clinical pharmacological
results observed in forebrain functioning are in agreement with
the PAD model.
The mechanism of possible dream intrusion into waking as an
inducing factor of hallucinations (Kelly 1998) as indicated in the
PAD model could be also related to a noradrenaline and possibly
serotonergic deficit. Indeed, these neurons mainly inhibit cortical
neurons (Foote et al. 1975; Frederickson et al. 1971; Krnjevic &
Phillis 1963; Nelson et al. 1973; Phillis et al. 1973; Reader et al.
1979; see also, more recently, Araneda & Andrade 1991; Manunta
& Edeline 1999), but they increase their signal-to-noise ratio (As-
ton-Jones & Bloom 1981b; Foote et al. 1975; McCormick 1992),
thereby enhancing their performances. Because these monoamin-
ergic neurons are silent during REM sleep, the resulting disinhi-
bition process probably impairs mental functioning. This disinhi-
bition is also reflected in the forebrain by the failure of prepulse
inhibition as shown by the N100 evoked component (Kisley et al.
2003). At outcome of REM sleep, noradrenergic neurons (at least)
begin to fire again a few seconds prior to awakening (Aston-Jones
& Bloom 1981a), reestablishing the waking modality of brain func-
tioning and probably favoring more or less rapid dream memory
elimination. Freud (1925/1955) called this forgetting of dreams
the mystic writing-pad process. When this physiological censor-
ship fails, there is “an over-welling of dream into reality,” as de-
scribed by the great French poet Gérard de Nerval (1808–1855)
(Marel & Marel 1967) when he drifted into madness. The fact that
the waking hallucinations, as recalled in the PAD model, mainly
involve unfamiliar images as opposed to memory contents, again
suggests a connection with dreaming generating processes, since
the dreamer often faces strangers.
It could be possible that the neurobiological support of waking
hallucinations carefully analyzed in the PAD model represents an
attenuated form of the common electrophysiological, tomo-
graphic, and neurochemical background of schizophrenia and
REM sleep hallucinatory activity (Gottesmann 2005).
The emergence of proto-objects in complex
visual hallucinations
Glenda Halliday
Prince of Wales Medical Research Institute and the University of New South
Wales, Randwick NSW 2031, Australia. G.Halliday@unsw.edu.au
Abstract: There is little to refute in Collerton et al.’s argument that re-
current complex visual hallucinations involve multiple physiological mech-
anisms, and the target article’s proposed PAD model implicitly incorpo-
rates this concept, advancing the field. The novel concept in this model is
the intrusion of hallucinatory proto-objects into relatively preserved
scenes. The weakness of the model is the lack of physiological detail for
this mechanism.
The concept, advanced by Collerton et al. in the target article, that
recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) have a common
underlying physiology regardless of the syndrome they occur in is
a tantalizing and testable construct. This construction of an inte-
grated and unified conceptual framework for the analysis of
RCVH is needed, as morbidity directly relates to their persistence
and increasing intensity. As reviewed, many models have been
proposed to explain the generation of RCVH, with few of these
models proving completely satisfactory. The Perception and At-
tention Deficit (PAD) model developed by Collerton et al. re-
quires four coexisting features: (1) impaired attentional binding
(abnormal lateral frontal activity); (2) poor sensory activation of a
correct proto-object (abnormal ventral visual stream activity); (3)
relatively intact scene representation (coactivation of frontal cor-
tex and the ventral visual stream system); and (4) bias perception
for intrusion of a hallucinatory proto-object (increased temporal
versus frontal activity). This PAD model is extremely similar to the
new integrative model proposed by Diederich et al. (2005).
Diederich and colleagues suggest that poor primary vision, re-
duced activation of primary visual cortex, aberrant activation of as-
sociative visual and frontal cortex, lack of suppression or sponta-
neous emergence of internally generated imagery through the
ponto-geniculo-occipital system, intrusion of rapid-eye-move-
ment dreaming imagery into wakefulness, errative changes of the
brainstem filtering capacities through fluctuating vigilance, and
medication-related overactivation of mesolimbic systems con-
tribute to recurrent visual hallucinations (Diederich et al. 2005).
The argument in both papers that multiple factors are required
for the phenomenon is very convincing, as hallucinations do not
occur with poor sensory activation and perception or impaired at-
tentional binding alone. The main difference between the models
is the dominant concept of the proto-object in PAD.
Of course, a model requires testing to prove its worth. Coller-
ton et al. suggest that the PAD model could be tested pychophys-
iologically for the coexistence of active hallucinatory versus cor-
rect perceptual proto-object images by combining perceptual
tasks and visual cortex imaging and contrasting hallucinations with
non-hallucinatory periods. However, it is not clear what the phys-
iological predictions would be for firm proof of principle versus
falsification. In fact, the major limitation of the PAD model is the
lack of sufficient detail for a viable testable common physiological
mechanism for the key phenomenon of the proto-object. At this
level, the authors admit that the properties of proto-objects are
not well defined and therefore hallucinations cannot yet be
mapped onto these undefined properties. At present, the PAD
model is cohesive for other ancillary aspects of hallucinations, and
the authors have physiological suggestions for testing these ancil-
lary predictions from their model. Examples include that recur-
rent complex visual hallucinations occur with impaired attention
and object perception in association with frontal and ventral visual
stream dysfunction, and that modification of cholinergic tone will
precipitate or diminish the hallucinations, with the corollary that
imaging cholinergic dysfunction associates with the phenomenon.
Does this give sufficient physiological detail to understand the
main phenomenon – the emergence of proto-objects? Not at this
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stage, and still only at a whole organ level, significantly limiting the
refinement of treatment options.
Two kinds of “memory images”: Experimental
models for hallucinations?
David Ingle
39 Pratt Street, Framingham, MA 01702. lake@gis.net
Abstract: Collerton et al. postulate that in a variety of different clinical
conditions, hallucinations are derived from object schema lodged in long-
term memory. I review two new experiments in which memory images can
be easily triggered in neurologically intact subjects. These examples of
making visible items in memory may provide experimental models for gen-
esis of hallucinations.
Collerton et al. have abstracted from a variety of clinical entities
some common traits of hallucinations and have proposed a plau-
sible theoretical framework to account for the circumstances in
which these images most often arise. Yet, at the core of their
model, the location and physiological nature of the schematic im-
ages that feed hallucinations remain uncertain.
Are hallucinations akin to the images evoked by electrical stim-
ulation of sites in the temporal lobe (Penfield & Perot 1963)? Or
are they derived from more widely distributed networks, includ-
ing the prefrontal cortex? Discovering how those visual images
arise from memory is especially difficult because hallucinations
arise unpredictably. Perhaps fMRI or pharmacological analyses of
hallucinations would be advanced by studying analogous phe-
nomena in a reliable and safely evoked manner in a laboratory set-
ting. I review here two novel “memory image” phenomena, which
might provide useful models for hallucinogenesis.
About 30 years ago I experienced remarkable intrusions of well-
formed images at bedtime: the vivid replay of neuron waveforms
that I had seen during hours of microelectrode recording earlier
that day. Recently, I asked several visual scientists for such anec-
dotes and netted six recollections similar to my own. Three per-
sons recalled seeing at night sharp images of patterns on computer
screens, used earlier that day for psychophysical tests of experi-
mental subjects. One man, driving home in the early morning,
nearly swerved his car to avoid colliding with such an apparition.
Naturalistic phenomena also appeared. One man, who had spent
the afternoon picking avocados, was treated to an array of green
blobs at night. Another saw images of swimming fish after a sport-
ing day, and another recalled images of tree branches picked up
while helping his tree-surgeon father.
This last individual is now a neuroanatomist and sometimes sees
dendritic trees at bedtime. I lately discovered that very similar
anecdotes were recounted by Hanawalt (1954), but the phenom-
enon appears not to have been systematically studied until re-
cently. These recurring images appear similar to the dream intru-
sions studied by Stickgold et al. (2000) in volunteers who played a
video game for several hours and witnessed the same specific im-
ages recurring at night. Another experiment form that lab (Mer-
abet et al. 2004) may provide a safe method of increasing recep-
tivity to those recurring images, as the blindfolding of volunteers
for only 48 hours led to a high incidence of hypnagogic imagery.
Next, I present data from my own experiments on a rare visual
phenomenon as an experimental analogue to the proto-objects
postulated by Collerton et al. to be the source of hallucinated
forms. About 1% of the academic population may experience vi-
sual persistences (VPs): vivid positive afterimages of single objects
lasting for 15 to 30 seconds after brief fixation and eye closure (In-
gle 2005). Although VPs are formed from just-seen objects or
drawings and are not derived from long-term memories, new un-
published experiments reveal that certain VPs can reliably trigger
memory images (MIs). This happened routinely when each of 5
subjects (including myself) formed a VP of an uppercase letter ro-
tated 45 degrees from the vertical. Within 2 or 3 seconds, the VP
of the sideways letter rights itself. One does not see the letter ro-
tate, but the upright orientation suddenly replaces the first image.
This intrusion from memory of the “canonical” orientation occurs
as well with numerals and small faces (photos or schematic draw-
ings).
A second example of substitution of an MI for a VP occurs when
sideways letters or faces are used to create VPs. After the brief de-
lay, the subject sees two images: the same sideways VP plus the
upright MI. Two persons, tested with letters, saw the upright MI
overlap with the original VP, whereas three others saw the MI set
just to the right of the original VP (Fig. 1). We then found that
these MIs are not all simply rotated versions of the VP. First, when
the letter (e.g., a sideways T) is made of dashed lines, the upright
T is seen with solid lines. Second, when the sideways letter is of a
less familiar color (purple or yellow-green) the upright letter ap-
pears black or grayish. Yet, a familiar ink color (red) is duplicated
in the upright MI. These phenomena invite further experiments
to determine how much viewing of a given color, line-texture, or
font may be necessary for that feature to appear in the MI.
Since the specialization of the fusiform region of temporal cor-
tex for upright faces is now established (Yovel & Kanwisher 2004),
I suggest than an analogous specialized representation for upright
letters exists for humans (who read regularly) and that this repre-
sentation readily intrudes upon the VP representation derived
from the tilted letter. Although fMRI experiments have found
some degree of localization for activations by single letters (e.g.,
Joseph et al. 2003), our experiments suggest that even better lo-
calization might be found by comparing responses of upright to
rotated letters. As reliable as letters, numerals, and faces have
been in triggering MIs, we have yet to see such effects using tilted
or rotated VPs of line drawings of common objects such as fish,
cars, bottles, cups, or horses. It seems likely that for these items
there are not enough neurons dedicated to the identification of
their canonical orientations.
Monoamines in RCVH: Implications 
from sleep, neurophysiologic, and 
clinical research
Roumen Kirov
Laboratory of Cognitive Neurodynamics, Institute of Physiology, Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 1113, Bulgaria. ru@bio.bas.bg
http://www. bio.bas.bg/~cneurodyn/
Abstract: The role of brain monoamines may be important for the neu-
robiology of the alterations of visual alertness in recurrent complex visual
hallucinations (RCVH). This is evidenced by sleep research, neurophysi-
ologic, and clinical data. Hence, the mechanisms of RCVH may not be
simply explained by acetylcholine underactivity only.
The novel Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model for
recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH), proposed by
Collerton et al. in the target article, examines a large body of data
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Figure 1 (Ingle). Fixation of a dashed sideward T leads to a vi-
sual persistence (VP) of the unfamiliar pattern. Within 2 or 3 sec-
onds, a memory image (MI) of an upright T appears on the same
index card.
concerning the occurrence of visual hallucinations in both non-
pathological conditions and a range of psychiatric and neurode-
generative disorders. By combining and developing previous
models of visual alertness and its alterations, the PAD model gives
an advantageous framework for understanding not only the nature
of RCVH, but also the processes underpinning visual conscious-
ness. However, in its attempt to provide a unique schema for
RCVH in normal and pathological conditions, the PAD model
may meet several limitations.
Most of these limitations come from research on the neurobio-
logical mechanisms of the highly varying conscious states across
the sleep-wake cycle. In particular, the transition from wake to
sleep, when hypnagogic hallucinations normally occur, is basically
characterized by a lowering of noradrenergic and serotonergic in-
fluences to the cortex rather than only by an acetylcholine under-
activity, as Collerton et al. propose. Furthermore, during the tran-
sition from sleep to wake, when hypnopompic hallucinations are
most frequent, there is a substantial enhancement of the activity
of each of the noradrenaline, serotonin, and acetylcholine neuro-
transmitter systems (Gottesmann 1999; 2004a; Hobson et al.
1975; 2000; Pace-Schott & Hobson 2002). The occurrence of vi-
sual hallucinatory-like experiences across sleep stages is most fre-
quently observed during rapid-eye-movement sleep (Fosse et al.
2001; 2004; Hobson et al. 2000), and this sleep stage is character-
ized by excessive acetylcholine overactivity (Gottesmann 1999;
Hobson et al. 1975; Pace-Schott & Hobson 2002). Therefore,
RCVH that are normally experienced at the borders of sleep may
not be simply explained by acetylcholine underactivity only, as
stated by Collerton et al. Rather, the role of either monoamines or
monoamine-acetylcholine ratio in these types of RCVH is to be
considered. Because the hypnagogic and hypnopompic are the
most common visual hallucinations in non-pathological condi-
tions, sleep research data and the neurochemical mechanisms of
sleep-wake cycling may certainly be accounted for in explaining
RCVH in psychiatric and neurodegenerative disorders.
Furthermore, Collerton et al. suggest that the attention deficit
is an important contributing factor for RCVH, with the acetyl-
choline underactivity being the main neurochemical mechanism.
However, many experimental (Aalto et al. 2005; Gao & Goldman-
Rakic 2003; Nieoullon 2002; O’Donnell 2003) and clinical data
concerning attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Castellanos
& Tannock 2002; Swanson et al. 1998) strongly point to the criti-
cal role of brain dopamine in the processes of attention. Also,
Parkinson’s disease (PD), where RCVH are frequently observed
(Burn & Troster 2004; Poewe 2003), is caused by degeneration of
dopaminergic neurons (Blandini et al. 2000; Eriksen et al. 2005;
Fedorow et al. 2005; Montague et al. 2004; Nieoullon 2002).
Moreover, there are clinical data documenting that the visual hal-
lucinations in PD can be induced by the dopaminergic therapy
(Burn & Troster 2004; Goetz et al. 2001b). Dopamine dysfunction
is also generally recognized to underpin the phenomenology of
schizophrenia (Hirvonen et al. 2005; Montague et al. 2004; Win-
terer & Weinberger 2004), which, as mentioned by Collerton et
al., is one of the conditions associated with RCVH. Dopamine has
an important role in controlling signal-to-noise ratio and top-down
processes (Aalto et al. 2005; Gao & Goldman-Rakic 2003; Mon-
tague et al. 2004; O’Donnell 2003; Winterer & Weinberger 2004),
both suggested in the PAD model to be impaired mainly as a re-
sult of acetylcholine underactivity. In addition, noradrenaline and
serotonin, along with acetylcholine, are also shown to be signifi-
cantly involved in modulating the signal-to-noise ratio (Gu 2002).
In the PAD model, the authors propose that hypo-functioning
of the lateral frontal cortex resulting from a cholinergic deficit is
another mechanism involved in RCVH. In this context, it is to be
noted that animal-driven (Gao & Goldman-Rakic 2003; Seamans
& Yang 2004; Zhou & Hablitz 1999) and human transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (Moll et al. 2000; 2003) data show that brain
dopamine exerts a strong effect on cortical excitability.
In conclusion, the role of brain monoamines, and the role of
dopamine in particular, appears very important for understanding
the neurobiology of visual alertness and its alterations in normal
and pathological conditions. Hence, the nature of RCVH could
hardly be explained by acetylcholine underactivity only.
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Mental images: Always present, never there
Fred W. Mast
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Abstract: Recent research on visual mental imagery plays an important
role for the study of visual hallucinations. Not only are mental images in-
volved in various cognitive processes, but they also share many processes
with visual perception. However, we rarely confuse mental images with
percepts, and recent neuroimaging studies shed light on the mechanisms
that are differently activated in imagery and perception.
Visual mental images are generated from memory and therefore
are of purely cognitive origin. Behavioral (e.g., Mast & Kosslyn
2002) and neuroimaging research (e.g., Ganis et al. 2004) suggests
that the mechanisms associated with mental imagery are – at least
to some extent – also involved in visual perception, and the func-
tional value of this overlap has been widely discussed (e.g., per-
ceptual anticipation theory; Kosslyn & Thompson 2003). Even
though imagery and perception overlap, only rarely do we actually
mistake images for percepts (an exception is the Perky-effect).
Why is this the case? Despite the fact that images are essentially
involved in a variety of cognitive processes, such as object recog-
nition, spatial reasoning, and problem solving, we hardly ever ex-
perience mental images as perceptually real. Why are we able to
reliably keep apart or separate when images are generated inter-
nally and when images are mediated via sensory stimulation? On
the one hand, the fact that several mechanisms are shared by im-
agery and perception makes it even harder to address this ques-
tion. On the other hand, research on mental imagery can provide
helpful guidance on where to look when studying the mechanisms
that account for the occurrence of recurrent complex visual hal-
lucinations (RCVH).
Instead of mental imagery, Collerton et al. focus almost exclu-
sively on attention. The question arises whether the mechanisms
that underlie attention have enough explanatory value for a better
understanding of RCVH. The major problem is that attention it-
self has no visual quality, even though it is often involved in visual
cognition and visual perception. Mental images are not only phe-
nomenologically related to RCVH, but they also share several
common visual properties, which reflect the underlying mecha-
nisms. The target article makes no reference to recent research on
mental imagery, which renders Collerton et al.’s model of RCVH
not only less compelling, but also incomplete. There are at least
three separate points that are noteworthy in this context.
First, the spatial properties of RCVH resemble those of mental
images. Collerton et al. point out that hallucinations are located in
the central part of the visual field and – unlike afterimages – they
do not move with eye movements. This description applies just as
well to visual mental images. We often need to inspect images in
order to retrieve more specific information from them. Neither
images nor hallucinations disappear or move when attended to.
Attention can be shifted over imagined or hallucinated objects.
Thus, mental images and visual hallucinations share widely the
same spatial properties.
Second, it has to be noted that the interplay between visual
mental imagery and visual perception is an essential component
of top-down processing. When objects are seen from a non-canon-
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ical perspective or when they appear partially occluded, visual
memories are used for the comparison between the input pattern
and an already existing representation in memory. Therefore, the
mechanisms engaged in object and scene recognition also rely on
mental imagery and are partly identical with those mechanisms
that enable us to voluntarily generate mental images (e.g., during
daydreaming). Even though the approach proposed by Collerton
et al. includes a top-down component, no reference is made to vi-
sual mental imagery.
Third, a growing amount of recent research revealed that the
neural machinery engaged in visual perception is – to some extent
– also drawn upon during visual mental imagery. In a recent study,
the overlap was more pronounced in parietal and frontal regions,
suggesting that at least some sensory processes are activated dif-
ferently (Ganis et al. 2004). In other studies, however, differences
between imagery and perception were found in parietal and pre-
frontal areas (Ishai et al. 2000). The discussion of these findings is
absolutely crucial for a better understanding of RCVH. A more
profound knowledge about the neural mechanisms that are en-
gaged differently in mental imagery and perception, is likely to
play a key role in the ability allowing for the continuous distinc-
tion between internally generated images and perceived images.
The findings from recent research on mental imagery offer a more
specific approach to investigate visual hallucinations than the fail-
ure of attentional binding, which is still a rather speculative ex-
planation for the occurrence of RCVH.
In sum, Collerton et al. leave out major findings on mental im-
agery, which have a great potential to be useful for a general model
of RCVH. There is no doubt that a model has the potential to re-
veal commonalities across diverse fields of enquiry, but it has to
be based on solid grounds, integrating the most important issues
relevant to the question.
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Now you see it, now you don’t : More data at
the cognitive level needed before the PAD
model can be accepted
Jason Morrisona and Anthony S. Davidb
aDepartment of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1A1,
Canada; bSection of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, and
GKT School of Medicine, Denmark Hill, London SE5 8AF, United Kingdom.
jason.morrison@mail.mcgill.ca a.david@iop.kcl.ac.uk
Abstract: Before a general cognitive model for recurrent complex visual
hallucinations (RCVH) is accepted, there must be more research into the
neuropsychological and cognitive characteristics of the various disorders
in which they occur. Currently available data are insufficient to distinguish
whether the similar phenomenology of RCVH across different disorders
is in fact produced by a single or by multiple cognitive mechanisms.
Collerton et al. have done a commendable job integrating a large
array of clinical and experimental evidence to describe a plausible
model for recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH). Al-
though many aspects of the model are congruent with the phe-
nomenology one sees clinically, there are a few significant ways in
which the model is incongruent.
The first difficulty is the claim that RCVH are generally appro-
priate to the scene in which they are observed. While the category
of image might be considered appropriate (e.g., people and ani-
mals rather than, say, demons and cornfields), often the other fea-
tures are not. For example, hallucinations are often reported as
being in inappropriate positions (people/animals on the wall or
ceiling, people floating outside the window, children under their
bed; Gauntlett-Gilbert & Kuipers 2003; Howard & Levy 1994),
inappropriate size (Lilliputian figures, “pixies” running along the
window; Holroyd et al. 2001; Howard & Levy 1994), or inappro-
priate context (people being harmed, birds flying in a hospital;
Lipowski 1990).
Even the two studies cited in Table 3 of the target article to sup-
port this claim, Asaad and Shapiro (1986) and Teunisse et al.
(1996), in fact do not do so. Teunisse et al. (1996) screened elderly
people with visual impairment and found that 63 of 505 had
RCVH. The authors list some of the hallucinations described and,
although the percentage of each type of hallucination is not listed,
few could be described as appropriate to context (e.g., “miniature
policemen guiding a midget villain”; “a dragon”; “an angel”; “an
unfamiliar person”; p. 795). They also judged only 22% of halluci-
nations as “fitting in well” with the environment. The Asaad and
Shapiro (1986) paper is a review of hallucinations in general and
lists common features of visual hallucinations in psychosis as “peo-
ple or animals or events taking place in front of them” without pro-
viding data or further detail (p. 1091). The unfamiliarity of hallu-
cinated images in RCVH has also been found in Parkinson’s
disease (Barnes & David 2001; Holroyd et al. 2001), delirium
(Lipowski 1990, pp. 86–87), and eye disease (ffytche & Howard
1999). Therefore, one can say that though the content of RCVH
tends to be of people and animals, they are more often unfamiliar
and just as often appear in inappropriate positions or contexts as
they do in appropriate ones. If the PAD model’s prediction is that
scene representation bias is responsible for the content of hallu-
cinations, one would expect the images to be at least more famil-
iar, if not appropriate to location and context.
Another vulnerability in the model is the prediction that prop-
erly perceived external objects should displace the incorrect
proto-object from attention and thus make the hallucination dis-
appear. Clinical experience suggests this is not true. Although
some patients may become absorbed in their hallucination and re-
tain it as the focus of attention (as the PAD model predicts), often
patients with RCVH actively hallucinate while they are being ex-
amined. For example, when looking at the examiner they will re-
port seeing hallucinated images behind the examiner or in their
peripheral vision. There is some indirect experimental evidence
to suggest this as well. Teunisse et al. (1996) asked their subjects
what acts would make the hallucinations stop. As one might ex-
pect, the most effective means was keeping eyes closed (38%). In-
terestingly, “looking/walking away,” “putting on a light,” and “con-
centrating on something else” were not effective (e.g.,  15%
effective). Certainly this needs to be tested in more detail experi-
mentally, but this finding would be a significant piece of evidence
against the cognitive mechanism that Collerton et al. propose as
generating RCVH.
The PAD model proposes a mechanistic cognitive theory to ac-
count for observations at the phenomenological level. Given the
above-mentioned problems in accounting for the phenomenology,
it would be important to have a more detailed look at how the var-
ious disorders with RCVH compare at the cognitive/neuropsy-
chological level. As the authors cite, there are currently limited
data in this area. Although the data in Figure 4 of the target arti-
cle suggest that cognitive measures of “attentional/executive im-
pairment” and “visual perceptual impairment” correspond to the
predictions of the PAD model, these categories are quite vague
and heavily biased to data from DLB (dementia with Lewy bod-
ies) patients. For example, although Collerton et al. mention that
“poor performance on tests of attention and visual perception
are . . . the norm in delirium” (sect. 7.4.1, para. 5), the cited ref-
erences actually evaluated only attention in any detail.
Greater precision at the cognitive level is important for the va-
lidity of the model because disorders that might seem similar at
the phenomenological level may in fact have different mecha-
nisms at the cognitive level. For example, consistent with findings
in auditory and visual hallucinations in schizophrenia, Barnes et
al. (2003) found that Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients with visual
hallucinations had intact visual imagery but poor object percep-
tion and deficits consistent with poor source and reality monitor-
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ing compared to controls and non-hallucinating PD patients. Poor
source monitoring and perceptual processing, combined with in-
tact internal image generating, may lead to visual hallucinations by
confusion between images that were imagined with those that
were actually seen. Collerton et al. point out that deficits in source
monitoring and misidentification of internal images are unlikely to
account for all RCVH, as many people with RCVH are aware that
they are hallucinating. This is an important observation which
serves to highlight the complexity of the processes involved and
perhaps the need for a more precise terminology.
In the above case, “reality monitoring” is intact but the online
appreciation of source may not be (i.e., is it a memory of an im-
age, or a newly generated one?) and, more crucially, the process
of attribution may be suspect. According to some models of real-
ity monitoring, decisions about veridicality follow automatically
from phenomenal characteristics. In short, if an image is vivid
enough, it will be accepted as real. Such an algorithm may work
well in most circumstances but could lead to “loss of insight” and
hence false beliefs (see David & Howard 1994) if fairly low-level
perceptual factors were enhanced (e.g., by neurotransmitter im-
balance) or if supervisory processes were weakened (by general
cognitive impairment). It may be that the underlying cognitive
mechanisms in schizophrenia and PD psychosis are different from
those in Charles Bonnet syndrome or sleep disorders because of
such modulating factors.
Complex hallucinations in waking suggest
mechanisms of dream construction
Edward F. Pace-Schott
Department of Psychiatry, Center for Sleep and Cognition, Harvard Medical
School, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, East Campus, Boston, MA
02215. epacesch@bidmc.harvard.edu
Abstract: Waking hallucinations suggest mechanisms of dream initiation
and maintenance. Visual association cortex activation, yielding poorly at-
tended-to, visually ambiguous dream environments, suggests conditions
favoring hallucinosis. Attentional and visual systems, coactivated during
sleep, may generate imagery that is inserted into virtual environments. In-
ternally consistent dreaming may evolve from successive, contextually
evoked images. Fluctuating arousal and context-evoked imagery may help
explain dream features.
Collerton et al. describe phenomenological and physiological dif-
ferences between recurrent complex visual hallucinations
(RCVH) and dream imagery. Nonetheless, highly complex visual
hallucinations (albeit usually non-repetitive) do occur in dreams,
and it is parsimonious to hypothesize some overlap in their mech-
anisms. Biological models of dreaming (e.g., Hobson et al. 2000)
propose neural substrates for a fully expressed dream experience
based, in part, upon recent positron emission tomography (PET)
studies showing widespread cortical deactivation during sleep
with selective reactivation of limbic areas during rapid eye move-
ment (REM) sleep (Braun et al. 1997; 1998; Maquet et al. 1996;
1997; Nofzinger et al. 1997; 2002). Such global reorganization of
brain activity differs from the more selective ventral stream and
attentional system abnormalities superimposed upon waking ac-
tivity in the PAD model of Collerton et al. However, when one
considers how dreaming might be initiated and maintained, par-
allels become apparent.
Without retinal input, the dreamer cannot perceive veridical vi-
sual contexts that evoke RCVH in waking, according to Collerton
et al. However, visual association cortices can be activated in REM
(Braun et al. 1998) and NREM (non-rapid eye movement) sleep
(Hofle et al. 1997; Kjaer et al. 2002). Ascending signals such as
PGO (ponto-geniculo-occipital) waves may activate visual cortex
during REM (Callaway et al. 1987) or the NREM-to-REM tran-
sition (Steriade 2000b). Visual cortex activation in NREM results
from phasic activational processes, “covert REM” (Nielsen 2000),
arising perhaps from activity in autonomic and limbic areas
(Nofzinger et al. 2002; Rolls et al. 2003).
During sleep, therefore, visual association cortices may support
ambiguous visual experiences – one prerequisite for RCVH in the
PAD model. Simultaneously, ascending brainstem reticular acti-
vation may engage midline attentional structures, such as non-
specific thalamic nuclei and basal forebrain (Dringenberg & Olm-
stead 2003), and medial prefrontal cortex (Nofzinger et al. 1997),
allowing some awareness of this fictive vision. Such partial aware-
ness is deficient compared to normal waking – the other require-
ment for RCVH in the PAD model. If sufficient activation of vi-
sual association and midline attentional systems is achieved in
sleep, a rudimentary visual context sufficient to evoke “proto-ob-
jects” may arise.
The dream might subsequently emerge by a “boot-strapping”
process involving successive, contextually evoked visual images.
Fictive “proto-representations” in other modalities (e.g., auditory)
may emerge from regional activations of subcortical (e.g., motor),
unimodal (e.g., somatosensory), heteromodal (e.g., memory), or
limbic (e.g., emotion) areas. An image may elicit congruent rep-
resentations in other modalities, achieving binding via long-range
synchrony of high-frequency electrical activity (Kahn et al. 1997;
Llinas & Ribary 1993). Specific memories may become woven
into the emerging dream as their cortical representations are ac-
tivated (Stickgold et al. 2001). Further aspects of dreaming can
now be suggested.
Brevity of NREM reports. In sleep, episodic and working mem-
ory are deficient (Fell et al. 2003; Fosse et al. 2003; Hobson et al.
2000; Pace-Schott et al. 1997). Without this mnemonic “glue” that
ensures continuity of our waking experience across attentional
lapses, a developing dream, sustained only by elicitation of suc-
cessive proto-representations, may be disrupted by any hiatus in
conscious awareness. Awareness may, in turn, require continued
ascending activation, preventing emergence of the endogenous
synchronous thalamocortical and corticocortical oscillations of
NREM sleep (Steriade 2000b). Sustained activation is present in
REM but may be discontinuous in NREM, leading to brief, rela-
tively unrelated NREM dream episodes. By contrast, the common
experience of resuming the same dream following brief arousal is
possible because further activation enables sufficient memory to
span a semi-waking hiatus. Such continuity may be unavailable
when the dream hiatus consists of deepened NREM sleep with
resumption of intrinsic oscillatory activity. Forebrain activation
may even become insufficient to support consciousness, resulting
in cessation of the dream experience.
Internal consistency. The remarkable internal consistency of
dream plots may arise because the evolving dream context itself
determines which proto-representations will next be evoked. Such
self-organization of dreams (Kahn & Hobson 1993), utilizing suc-
cessively evoked proto-representations, may also explain how co-
herent plots can emerge despite deficient episodic and working
memory (Fosse et al. 2003; Hobson et al. 2000).
Bizarreness. Prototypical forms of dream bizarreness – dis-
continuities, incongruities, and uncertainties (Hobson 1988) –
may arise from interaction between fluctuating arousal and con-
text-generated imagery. Lapses of attention may account for dis-
continuities such as abrupt scene shifts (Sutton et al. 1994).
Dream incongruities may similarly be explained by evocation of
contextually semi-congruent but illogical proto-representations.
Uncertain recall, to a degree that appears bizarre by waking stan-
dards, may be inherent in such ad hoc constructions, especially if
context-evoked proto-representations do not fully resolve into fic-
tive percepts before subsequent representations arise. The im-
portance of visual context in spanning attentional lapses is appar-
ent in object transformations – discontinuities that are explicable
by visual similarity between the original image and its transform
but not by their semantic relatedness (Rittenhouse et al. 1994).
Global dream cessation. Damage to inferior parietal hetero-
modal association areas (BA 39 and 40) can alone result in global
dream cessation (Doricchi & Violani 1992; Solms 1997), caused
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by, perhaps, the dreamer’s inability to perceive a virtual environ-
ment. Maintenance of a dream environment may rely preferen-
tially upon visuo-spatial processing subserved by these areas
(Mesulam 2000). Lateralization of visuo-spatial function may ac-
count for the greater likelihood of dream cessation following right
versus left inferior parietal damage (Solms 1997). Dependency on
fictive vision for dreaming may be analogous to cessation of RCVH
with total blindness and their dependence on dorsal stream in-
tegrity, as proposed by Collerton et al. However, dream cessation
following left parietal damage and non-visual dreaming following
bilateral extrastriate damage (Solms 1997) suggest that fictive
dream environments can be based, at least in part, upon other
modalities.
Dream visions and RCVH occur in globally differing brain
states and cannot be equated. For example, whereas cholinergic
deficits often underlie RCVH (Collerton et al. target article),
REM sleep shows cholinergic activity equal to, or greater than, in
waking within cholinergic projection neurons (Dringenberg &
Olmstead 2003) and their terminal fields in the thalamus (e.g.,
Williams et al. 1994), basal forebrain (e.g., Vazquez & Baghdoyan
2001), and cortex (e.g., Marrosu et al. 1995). Nonetheless, com-
parison of dreaming with waking pathologies can provide fresh in-
sights into the neural bases of both conditions (Pace-Schott 2005;
Schwartz & Maquet 2002).
Hallucinating objects versus hallucinating
subjects
Alexei V. Samsonovich
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
22030-4444. asamsono@gmu.edu
http://www.krasnow.gmu.edu/alexei/
Abstract: Collerton et al. propose that one and the same mechanism
(PAD) underlies recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) in vari-
ous disorders, including schizophrenia, dementia, and eye disease. The
present commentary offers an alternative account of RCVH and other re-
current complex hallucinations specific to schizophrenia and related dis-
orders only. The proposed account is consistent with the bias of schizo-
phrenic RCVH contents toward animate, socially active entities.
The variety of sensory hallucinatory phenomena is characterized
by a dichotomy that may be easy to notice and hard to understand.
Considering the visual modality separately, Collerton et al. in the
target article point at a double dissociation of recurrent complex vi-
sual hallucinations (RCVH) versus simple hallucinations including
dots, lines, flashes, amorphous shapes, and panoramic landscapes.
If a measure of visual complexity is indeed the best separator of the
two dissociated categories, then all RCVH are likely to originate
from one general mechanism that is distinct from mechanisms un-
derlying other types of hallucinations. Following this logic, Coller-
ton et al. introduce PAD as a general model of RCVH applicable
to all cases in which RCVH are observed, including dementias,
delirium, schizophrenia, eye disease, and others.
On the contrary, it may seem reasonable to account for RCVH
in schizophrenia and, for example, in eye disease based on differ-
ent mechanisms, if, instead of complexity, another cognitive di-
mension specific to schizophrenia underlies the dichotomy. In-
deed, most hallucinations in schizophrenic states involve various
forms of agents engaged in social interactions with the subject
(Frith et al. 1998; Mellors 1970; Silbersweig et al. 1995). This
happens regardless of the perceptual modality. For example, the
following types of auditory hallucinations are characteristic of
schizophrenia (Cahill & Frith 1996): voices arguing, voices com-
menting on one’s action, audible thoughts (voices repeat verbatim
or comment on subject’s thoughts), and voices that command the
subject. On the other hand, auditory hallucinations after deafness
may include noises and melodies along with singing or talking
voices that do not engage in social interactions (Hammeke et al.
1983). The situation is similar with RCVH in non-schizophrenic
cases reviewed by Collerton et al. (reviewed in support of PAD).
These include RCVH in visual impairment cases described by
Charles Bonnet: faces that never smile (Santhouse et al. 2000),
RCVH induced by electrical stimulation of the brain (Penfield &
Perot 1963), experienced after stroke, in Parkinson’s disease
(Manford & Andermann 1998), caused by drugs (Hoffmann 1983;
Huxley 1959), and so forth. Generally, all non-schizophrenic hal-
lucinations lack a certain degree of animacy and interactive social
activity that are typical for schizophrenic hallucinations.
Therefore: (1) Of the following two statements, (a) one and the
same mechanism is responsible for RCVH and recurrent complex
auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, and (b) one and the same
mechanism is responsible for RCVH in schizophrenia, in demen-
tia and in eye disease, (a) appears to be more credible than (b). (2)
The mechanism underlying recurrent complex hallucinations in
schizophrenia probably has to do with the concepts of agency, an-
imacy, social interactions, and more generally, the self and its rep-
resentation in the brain.
A theory based on the latter idea (2), and supported by analysis
of clinical and introspective data, was recently proposed by Sam-
sonovich and Nadel (2005). According to this theory, under nor-
mal conditions, discrete instances of the subject’s own self (labeled
I-Now, I-Previous, I-Next, etc.) and of the self of any currently
perceived external subject, together with all subjective experi-
ences attributed to those instances, are represented in working
memory as separate units (mental states) that are processed in par-
allel and interact with one another, obeying a set of hardwired
rules (self axioms). From this point of view, schizophrenia is a con-
dition in which identities and normal relations among mental
states determined by self axioms become lost or altered (Sam-
sonovich & Nadel 2005). As a result, malfunctioning mental states
become independent agents and start creating new memories
(delusions), engage in dialogues (voices), independently perform
imagery (thereby producing hallucinations), or take control of ac-
tions. From this point of view, the visual appearance of a socially
active RCVH is secondary with respect to its simulated subject,
which is a malfunctioning mental state.
Alternatively, one may assume that in schizophrenic RCVH the
step of creating a theory-of-mind (ToM) representation of an
imaginary character (i.e., “hallucinating a subject”) is secondary
with respect to developing a sensory hallucination of a face, a body
or a voice (“hallucinating an object”). In this case, it would be dif-
ficult to understand the nature of the bias toward animate, socially
active RCVH in schizophrenia: starting from this point of view,
one should expect an opposite bias, toward inanimate or socially
inert RCVH, given that ToM abilities are specifically impaired in
schizophrenia (Corcoran et al. 1995; 1997; Doody et al. 1998;
Frith & Corcoran 1996; Langdon et al. 1997; Sarfati & Hardy-
Baylé 1999). It is not clear why the well-known ToM deficit that
is characteristic of schizophrenia in general should be reversed in
hallucinatory cognitive activity, unless an opposite assumption is
made: that in schizophrenia and related disorders, hallucinating a
subject (i.e., having a “lost” or misattributed mental state in work-
ing memory) causally underlies the hallucination of the related ob-
ject (face, body, voice). Stated differently, both well-known attri-
butes of schizophrenia – the general ToM impairment and
ToM-biased hallucinations – may have one and the same common
origin: malfunctioning of the system of mental states (Sam-
sonovich & Nadel 2005).
The PAD model of Collerton et al. has at least several problems;
however, the present commentary is focused on one of them: PAD
does not account for the specificity of contents of RCVH in schizo-
phrenia and in fact suggests an opposite specificity, as explained
above. Although the combined attentional and visual perceptual im-
pairments interacting with internal scene representations could in
principle result in a particular schizophrenic RCVH, it is not clear
from the point of view of Collerton et al. why there should be a bias
toward elaboration rather than simplification of agency and social
activity of hallucinated entities. The above analysis suggests that the
Commentary/Collerton et al.: A novel Perception and Attention Deficit model for recurrent complex visual hallucination
772 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2005) 28:6
self concept (as it is introduced by Samsonovich & Nadel 2005)
could be the key to answering this question and understanding the
nature of the dichotomy observed among various types of halluci-
nations. Finally, incorporating the notion of an imaginary self into
the notion of a “proto-object” associated with a living entity may
help with further improvements of the PAD model.
The role of acetylcholine in hallucinatory
perception
John Raymond Smythies
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA
92037-0109. smythies@psy.ucsd.edu
Abstract: This commentary reviews and extends the target article’s treat-
ment of the topic of the role of acetylcholine in hallucinatory experience
in health and disease. Particular attention is paid to differentiating mus-
carinic and nicotinic effects in modulating the use of virtual reality mech-
anisms by the brain. Then, attention is drawn to the similarities between
these aspects of brain function and certain aspects of television digital
compression technology.
In the target article, Collerton et al. recognize that normal per-
ception is an amalgam of “down-up” information (exact inference
model or I program) derived from the retinal input (that reports
what really is out there) with an “up-down” contribution from
stored visual memories (naïve inference model or P program) as a
form of virtual reality (that reports what the brain computes
should most probably be out there). An imbalance between these
two is associated with repetitive complex hallucinations. The au-
thors then mention the computational model of Yu and Dayan
(2002), which modulates this balance. Collerton et al. put this as
follows: “Inhibition of cholinergic input gives a greater chance of
incorrect pattern matching . . . and allows the intrusion of an in-
correct representation” (sect. 7.4.2, para. 2). They suggest that
such hallucinations are associated with low cerebral cholinergic
activity. As evidence, they mention the hallucinogenic effects of
“anticholinergic drugs.”
However, the authors do not distinguish clearly between the
muscarinic and nicotinic effects of acetylcholine in this situation,
which is more complex that appears from their account. The Yu
and Dayan model actually states that acetylcholine promotes the
retinocortical pathway (essential for the I program) by a nicotinic
postsynaptic stimulation of cells in layer IV of the cortex, whereas
it inhibits corticocortical conductance (essential for the P pro-
gram) by a muscarinic activation of inhibitory presynaptic recep-
tors in cortical layers I/II. This cholinergic activity would promote
attention to the environment. The hallucinogenic effects of an-
timuscarinic agents must therefore depend on a double inhibitory
effect on the layer I/II muscarinic system.
In contrast, during a saccade, information from the retina is
largely suppressed to be replaced by virtual reality constructed by
the brain’s P processes (Kleiser et al. 2004). A saccade is initiated
by a nicotinic signal from the pedunculopontine nucleus (PPN)
that initiates the motor corollary of a local increase in I activity.
Yet, the saccade itself is associated with an increase in P activity.
It is not known how this is effected, but the following is a possible
mechanism. The PPN also has a massive glutamatergic projection
to the nucleus basalis. The latter contains many large inhibitory
GABAergic interneurons, as well as its cholinergic neurons. It is
not known to which of these the PPN projects, but if it is to the
former, the GABAergic interneurons, this would supply the nec-
essary mechanism. The projection of the PPN to the superior col-
liculus would initiate the saccade, and then its indirect projection
to the visual cortex via the nucleus basalis would diminish cholin-
ergic activity in that location. The projection from the PPN di-
rectly to area 17 mentioned by Collerton et al. is, however, not
cholinergic but entirely noradrenergic (Higo et al. 1996).
Most brain structures receive their cholinergic input from only
one source. Some, however (such as the intralaminar and medial
thalamic nuclei), receive their input from two sources. The supe-
rior colliculus belongs to the latter class, as it receives a second
cholinergic input from the parabigeminal nucleus, which is part of
a midbrain circuit that generates target location information (Cui
& Malpeli 2003). The input from the PPN goes to the intermedi-
ate layer of the superior colliculus, whereas the input from the
parabigeminal nucleus goes to its superficial layer. Here it acti-
vates excitatory presynaptic nicotinic receptors on glutamatergic
terminals of axons from retinal neurons that synapse on inhibitory
GABAergic interneurons. Thus, in this location, the action of
acetylcholine is to depress the upward flow of collicular activity
(Binns & Salt 2000). The significance of this apparently paradox-
ical effect is obscure. Incidentally, the only part of the brain that
receives no external cholinergic input is the striatum. Here, its
cholinergic cells are all involved in local circuits.
The fact that cortical P activity is enhanced during a saccade
leads one to speculate that one function of the saccades that char-
acterize REM sleep may be to promote the REM state, which is
composed of pure, free-wheeling P activity (dreams), rather than
merely to reflect eye movements directed at dream images, as is
supposed at present.
As I have pointed out elsewhere (Smythies 2005), there are in-
teresting parallels between the action of acetylcholine in regulat-
ing the P:I balance in the cortex and certain aspects of television
digital compression technology. Television engineers have discov-
ered that sending every detail of the scene to be televised over the
TV channels is very efficient but is also very expensive in terms of
computational (and hence financial) cost. This corresponds to our
I program. So the TV engineers have developed a second (P) pro-
gram that supplements and, in places, replaces the I program with
material that represents the system’s estimate of what should most
probably be “out there” based on its memory of the previous out-
comes of similar situations. This program is inefficient but cheap
in computational cost. This process can involve a third program
(the “P frame”) that records only the differences between succes-
sive frames. So the art is finding the best balance between the P
and I programs. The brain seems to follow the same logic. In cir-
cumstances when nothing much of interest is happening, the brain
can coast along with a P  I ratio. Then, if something of interest
occurs, a signal is sent to the nucleus basalis and acetylcholine is
released at targeted synapses in the cortex in the manner de-
scribed above so as to promote activity in areas activated by the
new stimulus. This involves changing the ratio to I  P locally or
globally. At the same time, the PPN sends a cholinergic (nicotinic)
signal to the superior colliculus that initiates a saccade directed to-
wards the computed source of the interesting new stimulus. This
is possibly followed by a glutaminergic signal from the PPN to in-
hibitory neurons in the nucleus basalis that orchestrates the in-
creased P  I ratio that accompanies the saccade itself.
Finally, the authors suggest mechanisms how acetylcholine
function could be disturbed in schizophrenia, leading to the hal-
lucinations characteristic of the disease. However, the symptoms
of schizophrenia, including the hallucinations, are more probably
due to the disturbances of synaptic plasticity, the loss of neuropil
and cortical connectivity recently discovered (see Smythies [2004]
for details).
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Visual hallucinations, attention, and neural
circuitry: Perspectives from schizophrenia
research
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Abstract: We tested Collerton et al.’s model of visual hallucinations by re-
examining a data set for correlations between visual hallucinations and
measures of attentional function in schizophrenia patients. These data did
not support their model. We suggest that cortical hyperexcitability plays an
important role in hallucinations, and propose an alternative model that links
evidence for cortical hyperexcitability with abnormal neural dynamics.
The study of hallucinations can shed light on many aspects of cog-
nitive and brain function in healthy individuals and in individuals
with neuropsychiatric disorders. Collerton et al. make a timely
contribution to this area of inquiry with their Perception and At-
tention Deficit (PAD) model of recurrent complex visual halluci-
nations (RCVH). Collerton et al. have done an admirable job in
distilling a unifying model of RCVH from the literatures on RCVH
and visual attention. However, research into the neural substrates
of schizophrenia has led to views of hallucinations that conflict
with the PAD model. Here we discuss the implications of findings
from our laboratory and others for the PAD model.
The necessity of attentional involvement in visual hallucina-
tions. A dysfunction in attentional modulation of visual processing
is an appealing hypothesis for RCVH. To test this hypothesis, we
conducted an exploratory analysis of a data set of ours in which we
found relationships between visual hallucinations and electro-
physiological measures of visual perception in chronic schizo-
phrenia patients (Spencer et al. 2004). Of the 20 patients in this
sample, 7 had some history of visual hallucinations. We looked for
relationships between visual hallucinations and attentional im-
pairment by calculating correlations between the visual hallucina-
tions scale of the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms
(Andreasen 1984), the attention scales of the Scale for the Assess-
ment of Negative Symptoms (social inattentiveness, inattentive-
ness during mental status testing, and global rating of attention)
(Andreasen 1983), and the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(poor attention) (Kay et al. 1987). None of these correlations ap-
proached significance (all r  0.2, P  0.42). Looking further, we
tested for relationships between performance measures (error
rate and reaction time effects) and visual hallucinations, but found
no correlations either (all r  0.33, P  0.20). Subgroup level t-
tests (hallucinators vs. non-hallucinators) yielded negative find-
ings also.
These results imply that attentional impairment is not neces-
sarily linked to RCVH. However, we note that the poor impulse
control scale of the PANSS did show a significant correlation with
visual hallucinations (r  0.46, P  0.05). This finding suggests a
possible involvement of deficient executive attention processes in
visual hallucinations, rather than the attentional template/biasing
processes proposed by Collerton et al.
The role of cortical excitability in hallucinations. We believe
that Collerton et al. do not lend enough weight to the relationship
between cortical excitability and RCVH, as there is substantial ev-
idence that cortical excitability is related to hallucinations in schiz-
ophrenia. The main evidence for increased cortical excitability in
schizophrenia comes from studies utilizing transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS). For example, Hoffman and colleagues (2003)
found that slow repetitive TMS, which decreases the excitability
of the underlying cortex, reduced the incidence and severity of
treatment-resistant auditory hallucinations (when applied to the
left temporo-parietal region). Cortical hyperexcitability in schizo-
phrenia would be consistent with the deficits in inhibitory neuro-
transmission that have been revealed by postmortem cellular
studies (Lewis et al. 2005). In addition, there is evidence that N-
methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) antagonist ketamine increases cor-
tical excitability (Di Lazzaro et al. 2003), which links the NMDA
receptor hypofunction model of schizophrenia (Tsai & Coyle
2002) with cortical excitability. Finally, there is a report that slow
repetitive TMS applied to the occipital lobe eliminated visual hal-
lucinations in a non-schizophrenic patient (Merabet et al. 2003).
Hence, we believe that there is in fact substantial evidence to sup-
port an important role for hyperexcitability of sensory cortex in
hallucinations.
Neural dynamics and hallucinations. From our own research
on visual perception and neural dynamics in schizophrenia, we
have proposed a different (but not exclusive) account of RCVH.
We recently reported that chronic schizophrenia patients show
abnormalities in visual gamma-band oscillations (Spencer et al.
2003; 2004). These abnormalities include a response-locked os-
cillation (RLO) recorded over the occipital lobe, which we hy-
pothesize reflects feature-binding processes in visual cortex. In
schizophrenia patients, the degree of phase-locking of the RLO
was positively correlated with their visual hallucination symptoms
(Spencer et al. 2004). In contrast, the N1 visual evoked potential
was reduced in amplitude for patients with visual hallucinations,
compared to patients without. We proposed that this dissociation
between a putatively endogenous process (increased RLO syn-
chronization) and an exogenous response to sensory stimulation
(decreased N1) reflected increased excitability in the visual cortex
of schizophrenics with visual hallucinations. A similar pattern of
increased endogenous activity and decreased responsiveness to
external stimulation in visual hallucinators was found by ffytche et
al. (1998).
If the neural substrate of a perceived object is an attractor state
in a neural network (such as oscillatory synchronization among
cells coding individual features of the object), then RCVH could
result from an increased propensity for such a dysfunctional net-
work to go into attractor states independently of other biasing in-
fluences, such as external input (sensory stimulation) or an atten-
tional bias signal from prefrontal cortex. The main distinction
between our account of hallucinations and the PAD model is that
we emphasize dysfunction of the relevant sensory cortex, which is
manifested by hyperexcitability. Although it is certainly plausible
that attention deficits could exacerbate hallucinations, the lack of
correlations between visual hallucinations and measures of atten-
tion suggests that attention is not a primary factor, at least in schiz-
ophrenia.
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Abstract: The etiology of visual hallucinations is largely undetermined in
schizophrenia. Collerton et al.’s PAD model partly concurs with what we
know about neurocognition in schizophrenia, but we need to specify the
types of perceptual and attentional abnormalities that are implicated in re-
current complex visual hallucinations (RCVH). Available data suggest that
abnormal attentional control and top-down processing play a larger role
than the ventral stream deficits.
Hallucinations are core features of schizophrenia. Although cog-
nitive and neuroanatomical origins of auditory hallucinations are
beginning to be elucidated (David 1999), the underlying etiology
of visual hallucinations remains undetermined. Therefore, Coller-
ton et al.’s PAD model of recurrent complex visual hallucinations
(RCVH), which generates testable hypotheses, is both timely and
valuable. The broad outline of this model concurs with what is
known about neurocognition in schizophrenia. Significant pro-
portions of schizophrenic patients hallucinate, show deficits in a
wide variety of attention tasks, and have prefrontal and temporal
abnormalities (Mitchell et al. 2001; Shenton et al. 2001). However,
to move beyond these surface similarities, we need to specify the
types of perceptual and attentional deficits that may result in
RCVH and test them empirically.
Attention is a multifaceted concept that can be parsed into dis-
tinct multiple systems, implemented by overlapping but separa-
ble neural circuits. Schizophrenic patients have problems in ori-
enting, deploying, focusing, shifting, and sustaining attention in
space. What aspects of attentional abnormalities in schizophrenia
might contribute to RCVH? The PAD model predicts that RCVH
are located at the focus of attention and unlikely to be experienced
at the periphery of the visual field. Schizophrenic patients have
difficulties in shifting spatial attention (Posner et al. 1988), and
this deficit is associated with positive symptoms such as halluci-
nations (Digirolamo & Posner 1996).
Specifically, they show deficits in shifting attention to the right
visual field (RVF) but not to the left visual field (LVF). This sug-
gests that they may neglect the RVF. Interestingly, schizophrenic
patients tend to experience visual hallucinations more in the LVF
(Bracha et al. 1985). A question arises here for the PAD model. If
subjects have difficulty shifting focal attention to RVF, they are
unlikely to “see things that are not there” in the RVF. Therefore,
visual search tasks or Posner’s covert orienting task (Posner 1980)
may yield a pattern of greater accuracy in the LVF, coupled with
greater incidences of RCVH in the LVF. In contrast, the same pa-
tients might make more perceptual errors in the RVF. However,
it is unclear whether such a relationship has been reliably ob-
served. Following this line of reasoning (i.e., RCVH appear where
attention goes), it might be possible to develop strategies for ex-
tinguishing RCVH by increasing external visual signals at the lo-
cation of the RCVH or by redirecting attention.
Control of attention is mediated partly by expectancies or top-
down processes. It has been observed that schizophrenic patients
give greater weight to top-down expectations on perception than
normal controls do (Aleman et al. 2003). This provides a clear test
of the PAD model. If top-down expectancies guided by stereo-
typical scene representation play a stronger role in hallucinators’
perception, then, when presented with a familiar scene, they
should detect context-congruent objects more quickly and at a
lower threshold than non-hallucinators. With unfamiliar scenes,
the weight of top-down processing may increase further in hallu-
cinators to make the novel input fit their “theory.” Top-down pro-
cessing may also increase if hallucinators are presented with visu-
ally degraded or ambiguous scenes (e.g., blurred, low intensity) to
make sense of the visual noise (e.g., seeing faces in the clouds or
in Rorschach inkblots). So, unfamiliar or ambiguous scenes may
trigger more top-down processing and lead to RCVH. This possi-
bility seems incongruent with the PAD model.
In addition to attentional deficits, the PAD model postulates the
existence of concurrent perceptual deficits within the ventral vi-
sual processing stream. Schizophrenia patients, indeed, exhibit a
variety of visual abnormalities. The majority of reported deficits,
however, are confined to the dorsal stream, such as motion per-
ception (Chen at al. 1999) and backward masking (Slaghuis &
Bakker 1995). For example, schizophrenia patients are impaired
in a visual backward masking task when required to detect target
locations, but not when asked to identify masked letters (Caden-
head et al. 1998). These findings are corroborated by visual
evoked potentials (VEP) studies that report abnormal P1 compo-
nent over dorsal visual areas, but normal P1 over ventral regions.
The N1 component (generated by early ventral stream structures)
is also normal in schizophrenia (Foxe et al. 2001; in press).
Lack of deficits in early ventral processing does not preclude
the existence of high-level abnormalities of semantic and object
categories. Indeed, evidence of temporal lobe abnormalities with
behavioral consequences in schizophrenia is rather striking
(Mitchell et al. 2001; Shenton et al. 2001). Although schizophrenic
patients show no deficits on simple object perception tasks, they
are impaired in higher-level ventral tasks, such as recognition of
atypical objects (Gabrovska et al. 2002). But the PAD model does
not make an explicit distinction between low- and high-level ven-
tral stream functions; it suggests the deficits are in the generation
of proto-objects, which arguably would involve low- to mid-level
ventral processes. The PAD model should identify the levels of
ventral stream processing involved in RCVH and provide con-
verging evidence for the ventral stream deficits in schizophrenia.
In our opinion, top-down processing seems to be the main driv-
ing force behind experiencing hallucinations. Ventral stream
deficits may not be necessary for RCVH, at least in schizophrenic
subjects, as suggested by the lack of strong evidence for ventral
abnormalities. However, perceptual deficits can facilitate genera-
tion of RCVH. Generally speaking, all visual defects can be con-
strued as increasing the noise at the expense of “veridical” visual
signals. Impoverished visual representations are more susceptible
to misinterpretation. Only when combined with abnormal top-
down attentional and semantic processes can the misinterpreta-
tion of visual input lead to RCVH. Namely, the role of perceptual
deficits in RCVH is to simply increase the noise, whereas the ac-
tual generation of RCVH lies within faulty higher-level processes.
This account of RCVH does not require localization of deficits
within the ventral stream, and it is consistent with the increased
frequency of RCVH in situations when the visual input is de-
graded by external factors (e.g., dim lighting). In schizophrenia,
widespread dorsal system deficits coupled with structural abnor-
malities of the primary visual area (Selemon et al. 1995) may be
enough to degrade early visual representation, thus making it vul-
nerable to faulty top-down processes.
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Abstract: Commentators agree that the Perception and Attention
Deficit (PAD) model is a promising model for accounting for re-
current complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) across several dis-
orders, though with varying detailed criticisms. Its central tenets
are not modified, but further consideration of generative models
of visual processing and the relationship of proto-objects and
memory systems allows the PAD model to deal with variations in
phenomenology. The commentaries suggest new ways to generate
evidence that will test the model.
R1. Introduction
We first developed the Perception and Attention Deficit
(PAD) model to understand the constraints in the visual sys-
tem that led many, but not all, of our patients with demen-
tia with Lewy bodies to experience visual hallucinations of
a particular character. It was with some trepidation that we
extended its coverage to recurrent complex visual halluci-
nations (RCVH) in other disorders, and subjected it to peer
commentary from colleagues whose expertise in their fields
far exceeds our own. We are extremely appreciative of their
constructive engagement, challenges, elaborations, devel-
opments, and occasional corrections.
We have organised the response to commentaries by the
key predictions of the PAD model from section 7.3 of the
target article. For ease of reference, Table R1 indicates
which commentators have focussed on which areas.
R2. Scope of the PAD model: Is there more than
one syndrome of repetitive complex visual
hallucinations?
In the target article, we set out to account for “repetitive in-
voluntary images of people, animals, or objects that are ex-
perienced as real during the waking state but for which
there is no objective reality” (sect. 2, para. 1). We agree with
Castelo-Branco that it does not apply to phenomena such
as polyopia or tesselopsia, although it does apply to palinop-
sia, given that this is simply a hallucination over a short
timescale. However, this leaves the question of whether the
PAD model applies to all hallucinations that fit the defini-
tion above. In answering this question, it is important to
bear in mind that the visual system is, in important ways,
probabilistic rather than deterministic (Friston 2002b).
There are never certainties to be found. Therefore, the
search is for factors that influence the probability of RCVH,
not ones that always (or never) cause them. Hence, contrary
examples to the PAD model will always be available. It is
the balance between consistent and inconsistent evidence
that is critical.
Samsonovich makes the point that whether RCVH
across disorders are considered the same or different de-
pends upon the basis for the comparison. In his example,
social agency groups the visual hallucinations of schizo-
phrenia with the auditory hallucinations of that disorder,
not with the visual hallucinations of other disorders.
ffytche similarly uses different bases for comparison to
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Table R1. Themes addressed by commentators
Scope of the Cognitive and sensory Factors influencing Physiological 
Commentator PAD model risk factors phenomenology constraints
Badcock & Maybery 
Behrendt  
Carroll & Carroll 
Castelo-Branco    
Dolgov & McBeath 
Dror 
ffytche  
Friston  
Gottesmann  
Halliday  
Ingle 
Kirov 
Mast 
Morrison & David   
Pace-Schott 
Samsonovich  
Smythies  
Spencer & McCarley  
Tadin et al. 
group together the simple and complex hallucinations in eye
disease. He argues for two separate visual hallucination syn-
dromes, with the complex visual hallucinations of eye disease
being distinct from those of other disorders, and suggests
that we had to do some Procrustean violence to the evidence
to make them appear similar. Without wishing to act as Ly-
comedes to his Theseus,1 we believe that there are sound
grounds for maintaining the original grouping together of all
RCVH, at least until more data become available.
To support his view, ffytche cites four differences be-
tween the hallucinations of eye disease and what he groups
as the PAD disorders. Compared to the PAD disorders, hal-
lucinations in eye disease tend to be associated with simple
hallucinations, to recover, to be more bizarre, and to not be
associated with other psychiatric symptoms.
One major problem with the suggestion that RCVH and
other visual hallucinations in eye disease stem from the
same cause, namely de-afferentation, is that rates of com-
plex hallucinations in eye disease are much lower than rates
of simple hallucinations (Table 1 of the target article). This
suggests that de-afferentation alone is an insufficient ex-
planation. In the target article’s section 3.1, we argued for
two hallucinatory syndromes based on the double dissocia-
tion between the rates of simple and complex hallucinations
in disorders of visual input and those with more distributed
pathology. Double dissociation is the classic, though not in-
fallible, neuropsychological argument for separable mental
phenomena, so perhaps the separation of simple from com-
plex hallucinations is not so Procrustean.
Because the people who do have complex hallucinations
tend to be more cognitively impaired and prone to fatigue
(Table 2 of the target article; but see Menon [2005] for
some contrary evidence), consistent with the PAD model,
our present inclination is to continue to group them within
this, though perhaps in a boundary zone with de-afferenta-
tion cases (Fig. R1). If this hypothesis is correct, the over-
lap group will have both simple and complex hallucinations,
as ffytche reports.
This leaves the other distinctions that ffytche highlights.
We have already suggested the progressive visual loss of eye
disease as the reason why visual hallucinations become less
common as time goes on in those disorders (target article,
sect. 7.5.2). We think distorted faces, bizarre figures, and
machines are conceptually variations on object representa-
tions (as are all other complex hallucinations), rather than
variations on simple hallucinations. We will propose later
how bizarreness might be accounted for within the PAD
framework.
Regarding the association with other symptoms, our pres-
ent position is that of parsimonious lumpers. Because we
believe that, across syndromes, the commonalities of RCVH,
as symptoms, outweigh their differences, our position is
that they do have a common cause until proven otherwise.
Hence, as we discuss in section 5.3, associated symptoms
reflect different causes. Circumstances will therefore de-
termine which grouping RCVH are best lumped with. To
clinicians in an eye clinic or in mental health services, they
may be most helpfully viewed as part of the spectrum of vi-
sual abnormalities following de-afferentation or as part of a
personally relevant psychosis, but to a researcher trying to
understand why they occur in only some people, the PAD
model may have more to offer.
As Morrison & David say, evidence from direct com-
parisons across disorders is needed.
R3. Cognitive and perceptual constraints that
increase the risk of RCVH
We predicted that the frequency of RCVH varies with the
frequency of the coexistence of attentional dysfunction and
object perception impairments.
Commentators Badcock & Maybery, Dolgov &
McBeath, Friston, Halliday, Morrison & David, and
Spencer & McCarley share our focus on attentional and
perceptual factors, though there is variation in the signifi-
cance attached to these.
R3.1. The role of attentional factors
Spencer & McCarley present data from a reanalysis of
their 2004 study on hallucinations in schizophrenia
(Spencer et al. 2004). They report a lack of relationship with
the presence of visual hallucinations (VH) and clinical rat-
ings of attentional function (except poor impulse control),
or with reaction time or error rates on a visual task that in-
volved responding or not responding to a stimulus that was,
or was not, a gestalt square. In contrast, there was a clear
relationship between occipital gamma band oscillations and
visual hallucinations. Spencer & McCarley conclude that
this argues against the application of the PAD model to
schizophrenia.
However, before attaching high weight to this evidence,
we would like to enter several caveats. First, we suggest that
attentional impairment alone will not be associated with
RCVH (sect. 7.4.1 of the target article). It is clear from Fig-
ure 1 in Spencer et al.’s (2004) paper that all of the people
with schizophrenia have impaired attentional performance.
In order to reject the PAD model, they would need to show
that poor perceptual performance in the context of this gen-
erally poor attentional performance did not distinguish be-
tween the hallucinators and non-hallucinators. Further-
more, Figure R2 shows the results from a small pilot study
of ours looking at visual and attentional performance in hal-
lucinating and non-hallucinating patients with dementia.
Impaired performance is seen only on some visual tasks –
those testing higher-order object recognition. Whether the
gestalt recognition of a square would be that type of task, or
whether it has more in common with simple visual recog-
nition tasks where there is less difference between halluci-
nating and non-hallucinating groups, is not clear to us.
Morrison & David and Tadin, Wong, Mebane,
Berkowitz, Trott & Park (Tadin et al.) ask for greater
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Figure R1. Relationship between the phenomenology of hallu-
cinations in PAD and de-afferentation disorders.
specificity in which particular aspects of attention are im-
paired. This perfectly reasonable request points out the
very variable present data. The studies that we featured in
the target article’s Figure 4 used well over 160 separate
measures, very few of them more than once. Additionally,
many patient groups with high levels of RCVH do poorly on
all attentional tasks. Thus, there is not the experimental ev-
idence to support any specific area of attentional impair-
ment, though we argue on theoretical grounds for impaired
dynamic binding. We agree that gathering more specific
data is a necessary task.
Morrison & David and Castelo-Branco also question
the attentional focus that we suggest is important for the
perception of the hallucination. As counter-evidence, Mor-
rison & David cite patient reports of seeing hallucinations
while doing other activities, and the lack of effect of at-
tending to other things on eradicating active hallucinations.
(Menon [2005] similarly reports that this is an infrequently
used strategy.) Castelo-Branco additionally queries why
hallucinations should be more frequent in areas of the vi-
sual field where vision is impaired.
Both of these possibilities need further exploration, par-
ticularly because the evidence is not consistent – most re-
ports suggest that hallucinations are seen in the centre of
the visual field regardless of aetiology (target article, sect.
4.1.2). However, neither is yet a fatal objection in our eyes.
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Figure R2. Data from a pilot study comparing hallucinating (N  7) and non-hallucinating (N  13) patients with dementia on a range
of attentional and visual perceptual tasks. Median scores and interquartile ranges are shown (Bowen, McKeith, Mosimann & Collerton,
unpublished data).
There is a well-established distinction between being ap-
parently aware of an object in the visual environment and
attending to it (see, e.g., Rensink 2002). The models of
scene perception that we draw upon (target article, sect.
7.1, Fig. 3) are based upon the extensive evidence of change
blindness and other phenomena that highlight this distinc-
tion. Since a key feature of the model is that hallucinations
are incorporated into the abstracted scene perception (sect.
7.3), it would actually run counter to our hypothesis if pa-
tients did not sometimes appear to be aware of them when
attending to something else. Data on attentional function
during hallucinations is needed to resolve this issue.
Turning to the patients’ lack of use of the coping mecha-
nism of attending to something else, we think that it is
equally plausible that they fail to do this because it is hard
to attend to something else when hallucinating – the oppo-
site of Morrison & David’s interpretation, but entirely in
keeping with the PAD model. Further evidence is needed.
R3.2. The role of object perception
Tadin et al. ask that we specify the level at which the pri-
mary impairment of the visual system lies. It seems proba-
ble that, given the highly interactive nature of visual pro-
cessing with significant forwards, backwards, and lateral
connectivity, there is no single locus of abnormality. How-
ever, we would locate functional impairments both up-
stream and downstream of image generating areas. If dys-
function extends into the image generating areas – for
example, central loss of colour vision – hallucinations will
reflect this. Loss of the ability to generate images would also
abolish hallucinations.
Morrison & David stress the thinness of the evidence
for object perception impairments compared to attentional
impairments in delirium in our citations. However, Mach et
al. (1996) showed specific impairments in Object Assembly
and Visual Reproduction in patients who were matched for
scores on the Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE),
suggesting that the evidence is not entirely lacking. We
agree that delirium has many potential advantages as a dis-
order to study, though there are some practical difficulties
with cooperation and consent. Looking at the existing liter-
ature, Inouye et al. (1993) showed in a proportional hazards
analysis that, out of 15 potential risk factors for the devel-
opment of delirium, the only significant ones were severe
illness (relative risk [RR] 3.5), high blood urea nitrogen/
creatinine ratio (a marker for dehydration, RR 2.0), and
cognitive (RR 2.8) and visual (RR 3.5) impairments. In the
absence of the PAD model, it would be difficult to explain
a priori why these two latter risks should stand out.
R3.3. The need for combined impairments
Castelo-Branco echoes our comments that attentional
and perceptual impairments co-vary in Figure 4 of the tar-
get article (sect. 7.4.1), and that direct rather than meta-
analytic tests would be preferable. Covariation of impair-
ments reflects the nature of dementing illnesses, in which
the severity of specific cognitive impairments correlates al-
most by definition. Rather than using analysis of covariance
to control for this, as he suggests, a more powerful test is to
look at the rates of RCVH in patients with either attentional
or perceptual impairments. Section 6.3 of the target article
indicates that the rates are low in both these groups.
The need for combined impairments is supported by
analogy with Badcock & Maybery’s HEAR model for au-
ditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. In slightly different
language, this also posits the need for a combination of at-
tentional binding (intentional inhibition) and sensory im-
pairments (context binding of auditory sensation). In con-
trast to the PAD model, it has directly supporting data
(Waters et al., in press). Badcock & Maybery suggest, and
we agree, that consistent attentional impairments coupled
with different modally specific perceptual impairments
could account for the propensity within some disorders
(e.g., schizophrenia, delirium, and dementia with Lewy
bodies) for hallucinations in more than one modality. Con-
sistent with this, all these disorders have pathology that is,
to varying degrees, distributed across several perceptual
systems. Functional imaging combined with tests of spe-
cific cognitive areas would allow this to be tested.
Friston uses empirical Bayesian modelling of visual per-
ception to demonstrate the need for interactive impair-
ments in top-down priors (proto-objects, as we have called
them) and bottom-up sensory processes to produce hallu-
cinatory perceptions. Though these models do not address
attention per se, since attention acts to increase top-down
activation of a specific prior, an attentional impairment will
cause lesser activation of the correct prior. Bayesian ap-
proaches also explicitly model the effects of context – the
scene representation – on perception. Given that the PAD
model couples lesser activation of the correct prior with
normal or, over time, excessive activation of a specific in-
correct prior, it can provide an account of how excessive
top-down weight may interact with sensory impairments, as
hypothesized by Tadin et al.
Staying with mathematical models, Dolgov & McBeath
use signal detection theory to show that hallucinatory per-
ceptions need not always be associated with relatively
poorer perception. This is a striking reminder of the multi-
plicity of ways in which a complex, dynamic set of systems
may produce an erroneous result and usefully broadens our
perspective to include not just deficit models. However,
this specific relationship is mainly likely when the noise 
and true distributions are highly overlapping (their Fig. 1).
Both erroneous “hits” and “misses” are improbable in nor-
mal sensory function; otherwise, we would not have func-
tional sensory systems. We therefore suspect that these dis-
tributions are usually highly separated. They do overlap
when perception is impaired, hence the association within
the PAD model of perceptual impairments and hallucina-
tions. In this case, higher rates of hallucinations may be a
trade-off to reduce agnosia. This is a fascinating possibility
that merits further investigation.
Such statistical models may provide the answer to
Behrendt’s wish for us to explain precisely how top-down
and bottom-up processes interact within PAD. Static words
and diagrams, no matter how eloquent or how carefully
drawn, cannot convey the realities of the intensely dynamic
systems of the brain. However, given the highly nonlinear
properties of these systems, clarifying their interaction is
not trivial. It is not clear that, for example, an increase in
the severity of object perceptual impairment for a given
severity of attentional impairment, or vice versa, will nec-
essarily lead to an increase in the frequency of hallucina-
tions in an individual case. The striking linear relationship
in the target article’s Figure 4 may simply reflect a group av-
erage rather than each individual case.
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Halliday draws attention to Diederich et al.’s (2005)
model for visual hallucinations in Parkinson’s disease. This
model envisages recurrent hallucinations resulting from a
disturbance in a conceptual space defined within Hobson’s
AIM (Activation, Input, and Modulation) model of con-
sciousness (Hobson et al. 2000). Hobson sees conscious ex-
perience as modulated by activation (speed of information
processing), input (the balance between external and inter-
nal stimuli), and modulation (the dynamic integration of
these over time). Diederich and co-authors suggest that
hallucinations are most likely when the balance of input is
disturbed, with activation and modulation acting as influ-
ences. Consistent with the PAD model, the key focus is on
the interactivity of the visual system, though the PAD
model gives a somewhat more elaborate account of the na-
ture of the impaired interactivity.
R3.4. Summary of cognitive and perceptual risk factors
In our estimation, the balance of the evidence continues to
point towards a dysfunctional interaction between top-
down and bottom-up visual processes as the genesis of vi-
sual hallucinations. Though the exact contribution of each
of these may vary from person to person, and there may be
occasions when either alone may produce hallucinations,
we would maintain that, in practice, such a dysfunction is
much more likely when there are impairments in both.
R4. The phenomenology of RCVH – What is
hallucinated, and where and when
We hypothesized that the phenomenology of RCVH pri-
marily reflects the nature of scene perception: in particular,
the role of scene-based expectations in influencing the at-
tentional focus (what), and environmental and temporal
cues in triggering a scene representation that biases pro-
cessing towards a hallucination (where and when).
Dror, Carroll & Carroll, Friston, and Smythies agree
that we are right to place the experience of hallucinations
within a dynamic system that actively seeks to reconcile top
down representations and bottom-up sensory input within
the context provided by the visual environment and its history.
R4.1. Bizarreness and relationship to the environment
Castelo-Branco, ffytche, Morrison & David, and Sam-
sonovich question our characterisations of RCVH as gen-
erally in keeping with the environment (though see Mer-
abet et al. 2004 for some examples in which there are very
clear links). Even accepting Morrison & David’s factual cor-
rection, the safest summary of the evidence is that some are
in keeping and some are not. Section 1 and Table 3 of the
target article show that there are sizable numbers of excep-
tions to all of the common features of hallucinations. We
used the consistencies with the environment to guide us in
developing the PAD model. Can the same framework also
account for bizarre hallucinations that apparently lack a re-
lationship? We believe that it can if it takes account of the
specific effects of eye disease on visual context and visual
input.
Empirical Bayesian models of visual processing, de-
scribed by Friston as most consistent with the PAD model,
see perception as the least erroneous match between the
actual state of visual inputs and a prediction of those visual
inputs deriving from an internal model of the visual envi-
ronment. In eye disease, visual input is necessarily dis-
torted. Hence, the least bad match may be an internally
generated visual environment, which, even though bizarre,
is still the best reconciliation with actual activity in occipi-
tal cortex. In contrast, visual abnormalities in dementia and
other illnesses stem from pathology in higher association
cortices. This suggests that occipital function is relatively
undisturbed and the least erroneous match will be prosaic.
One might add to this the role of the scene representation,
or contextual information in generative terms. If this is re-
duced in eye disease, as we suggested in the target article’s
section 4.1.2 to account for the relatively high prevalence
of panoramic hallucinations, this may also place less con-
straint on bizarre visual experiences. Thus, the PAD model
may not be falsified by variations in bizarreness.
R4.2. Individual differences
Behrendt, Carroll & Carroll, Dror, and Samsonovich
stress that phenomenology not only depends upon general
expectancies from the environment, but also needs to take
account of individual goals, desires, and wishes. Although
we did acknowledge this area within the PAD model (see
the extreme left box of Fig. 3 and sect. 7.4.1 in the target
article), our primary focus was on commonalities of experi-
ences. We are therefore grateful for their proposals.
Carroll & Carroll introduce the idea of the proto-ob-
ject of rest from catatonia, suggesting that one proto-object
may, over time, become the default perception when oth-
ers are not active. Behrendt argues eloquently for an un-
derstanding of the person’s central concerns and wishes,
and their potential link to the development of visual hallu-
cinations and further symptoms. Consistent with these
roles of top-down processes in the generation of personally
relevant hallucinations, ffytche et al. (2004) have reported
a fascinating case of a woman with alexia who knew the
meanings of text hallucinations which she could not read.
Samsonovich argues that the generation of visual hallu-
cinations in schizophrenia stems from the same roots as au-
ditory hallucinations in a failure of integration of represen-
tations of self and others in the mind. He suggests that
abnormalities in theory of mind in schizophrenia in con-
junction with the PAD model would suggest asocial rather
than all too personally relevant hallucinations. We are not
altogether convinced of this. It seems equally plausible that
aberrant theory of mind would lead people to imbue non-
socially relevant stimuli with social relevance, as the other
way around. Reasoning only from people with schizophre-
nia, or indeed any single hallucinatory syndrome, seems to
us risky. People with schizophrenia receive that diagnosis in
part because of their interpretations of their hallucinations.
To argue that these interpretations are causal may prove to
be circular. As with so many of these questions, we need
more evidence before we can choose between these alter-
natives.
We fully accept that individual factors are critical in un-
derstanding the personal experience of visual hallucina-
tions, though within these we place a high premium on the
person’s post hoc interpretations (Collerton & Dudley
2004). Gauntlett-Gilbert and Kuipers (2005) and Menon
(2005) have shown that distress is not so much due to the
phenomenology of the hallucination, but to what the hallu-
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cinator thinks will be the personal consequences of having
hallucinations – going mad, for example.
Mast draws attention to the similarities between inter-
nally generated images and visual hallucinations. Individual
differences in images may provide a route for investigating
variations in hallucinations. For example, patients with dis-
torted hallucinations might also have distortions in voli-
tional images.
R4.3. Relationship to memory systems
As Halliday and Ingle point out, one area that needs fur-
ther development is the proto-object. As this is conceptu-
alised, it is a potential rather than a real thing, correspond-
ing to potential brain states rather than actual ones.
Although interference experiments can clarify this in psy-
chological terms, this unreality has serious implications 
for the physiological testability that Halliday asks for. It
highlights the gap between psychological concepts and 
the limited temporal, spatial, and neurochemical and neu-
roanatomical resolution of the techniques that we presently
have.
However, we can speculate on which systems hold these
potentials. Several commentators produce evidence that
procedural rather than episodic memory systems are pri-
marily related to visual hallucinations. Ingle uses the qual-
ities of hypnagogic hallucinations, hallucinations induced
by blindfolding, and visual persistences to argue that these
are canonical representations. He points out that hypna-
gogic hallucinations are not diminished in people with se-
vere episodic memory impairments, suggesting these are
stored in procedural rather than declarative memory sys-
tems. This may answer Morrison & David’s query why
hallucinations are not always familiar if they are biased by
the environment. If the activated representation is proce-
dural, its familiarity will depend upon the level of abstrac-
tion that it is based on.
This distinguishes hallucinations from the episodic mem-
ories replayed by stimulation of the medial temporal lobes,
and supports Carroll & Carroll’s points that, in posttrau-
matic stress disorder, flashbacks are episodic memories,
and that patients may know that images are not genuine but
feel that they are. We have argued (sect. 6.5) that flashbacks
are not the same as hallucinations.
If hallucinatory images are generated from procedural
rather than episodic memories, this might argue against
models that see a causal link between lack of insight or
source misattribution. These are features of all procedural
memories, and, as Mast says, images are rarely confused
with percepts. Further grounds for caution come from the
consideration of bizarreness and insight in eye disease. If
we accept that hallucinations in eye disease are generally
bizarre, then there should be more likelihood of recogni-
tion of these as hallucinations from the start. In reality,
though, insight seems to develop gradually (Menon 2005).
R4.4. Hallucinations and the phenomenology of dreams
Gottesmann, Pace-Schott, and Smythies draw attention
to the overlap between the phenomenology of dreams and
visual hallucinations. For the reasons that we outline in sec-
tion 6.4 of the target article, we do not think that hallucina-
tions are simply waking dreams, even in an attenuated form
as Gottesmann suggests. We agree with Pace-Schott, how-
ever, that there is much to be learnt from the similarities
between the two in the constraints that they place on the vi-
sual system. His proposal of “boot strapping” self-organisa-
tion within dreams is very appealing and may provide a
means of further investigating individual variation in hallu-
cinations. It strikes us that, phenomenologically, the visual
experience of dreams is most like the hallucinations of eye
disease (bizarreness, full field), despite the different physi-
ology. As with eye disease, there is an impoverishment of
the visual environment in the case of dreams by eye closure
and low light. Dreams and visual hallucinations produced
by blindfolding (Ingle) may therefore allow a closer inves-
tigation of the effects of contextual scene representations
on hallucinatory content.
R4.5. Summary of phenomenology
The PAD model was developed to account for the phe-
nomenology of visual hallucinations at the group level, not
to predict the experiences of specific individuals. However,
it does provide a framework that can be extended to ac-
count for variations, as we have illustrated with bizarreness.
Still, before proceeding too far along this road, we do need
more evidence to support its core propositions, though
there is a degree of support from commentators for them.
R5. Physiological constraints that lead 
to complex visual hallucinations
The PAD model proposed that because object-based at-
tention depends primarily upon the function of lateral
frontal cortex, and because object perception depends pri-
marily upon the ventral visual stream, disorders associated
with high levels of RCVH will have a common end stage of
both lateral frontal cortex and ventral stream dysfunction.
This might be due to intrinsic or extrinsic pathology.
R5.1. Location of abnormalities in the visual network
Behrendt, Carroll & Carroll, Friston, Halliday, and
Smythies agree that disturbances in a distributed brain
network underlie the generation of visual hallucinations.
Although most commentators recognise that we have iden-
tified the correct ventral system, several suggest that the
primary causes of dysfunction lie elsewhere: Behrendt, in
the coordinating thalamic reticular system; Spencer &
McCarley, in hyper-excitability of sensory cortex; and
Smythies, in general abnormalities of synaptic connectivity.
However, as we argued in the target article, these may well
be secondary to abnormalities in our areas of interest or, as
Friston suggests, have their functional effect in these areas.
Nor are they necessarily exclusive. Careful imaging and
other studies will produce the data to distinguish between
these possibilities.
Halliday rightly points out the overlap between some of
the common physiological factors that we have identified,
and those of Diederich et al. (2005). However, with the
wider range of disorders that we have considered, we would
regard some that they proposed (abnormalities in the
ponto-geniculo-occipital system, fluctuating vigilance, in-
trusion of REM dreaming imagery, and overactivity of the
mesolimbic systems) as neither necessary nor sufficient – if
there are perceptual and attentional impairments and their
underpinning biological dysfunctions.
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R5.2. The role of cholinergic function
Friston and Smythies both agree that the role we assign
to cholinergic dysfunction in modulating the uncertainty in
top-down activity is predictable from models of normal
cholinergic function, with the proviso from Smythies that
this can be more closely specified as more is understood
about the contributions of muscarinic and nicotinic recep-
tors. We accept also that only a proportion of projections
from the laterodorsal tegmental nuclei are cholinergic,
though this does not greatly weaken the overall point that
cholinergic function is intimately connected with many as-
pects of the visual system.
To resolve the question of how broad-spectrum mus-
carinic antagonists induce visual hallucinations, we need
subtype selective drugs. Receptor knockout animals that
can be subjected to appropriate tests of visual processing
may also be useful. From the limited knowledge available
on the distribution and function of different muscarinic re-
ceptor subtypes in mammalian brain, M4 antagonist activ-
ity may be most relevant to the induction of hallucinations.
m4 receptor proteins are concentrated in visual cortex
(Tigges at al. 1997), and M4 (and M2) binding is increased
in the cingulate cortex of patients with dementia with Lewy
bodies and hallucinations (Teaktong et al. 2005). Addition-
ally, in vivo imaging of muscarinic receptors in schizophre-
nia has shown widespread reductions in availability, as we
summarised in section 7.6.2.2. M4 receptors also modulate
dopaminergic transmission (Tzavara et al. 2004), providing
a link with the secondary role that we assign to dopaminer-
gic function.
Smythies provides some fascinating new ideas on the
role of cholinergic function in balancing top-down and bot-
tom-up representation, particularly during saccades. Dur-
ing a saccade, information from the retina is suppressed in
favour of the top-down model of the visual environment
(Kleiser et al. 2004). Smythies goes on to argue that sac-
cades during REM sleep are not in response to visual im-
ages but may actually be responsible for them and for pro-
moting the dream state of “free wheeling.” If verified, this
concept could be highly relevant in visual hallucinations in
the waking state, although in dementia with Lewy bodies,
no relation between saccade execution and hallucinations
has been noted (Mosimann et al. 2005).
Gottesmann, Kirov, and Pace-Schott highlight that
cholinergic function is increased during REM sleep. This
poses some problems if hallucinations are equivalent to the
dreams experienced during REM sleep; particularly since
serotonergic and noradrenergic changes during sleep also
diverge from those seen in hallucinatory syndromes. How-
ever, as dreams are not invariably associated with REM
sleep (Solms 2000), and as we have suggested that hypno-
pompic and hypnagogic hallucinations occur in the transi-
tion between waking and non-REM sleep, this is less prob-
lematic for the PAD model. So long as transitions between
sleep and waking and changes in cholinergic function are
not fully synchronised, the hallucinator could experience
low cholinergic function while partially awake.
R5.3. Other neurochemical abnormalities
Kirov and Morrison & David support the argument in
sections 3.2 and 7.4.2 for an additional role for dopaminer-
gic hyperactivity based on pharmacology and the changes
seen during sleep. Despite their arguments, we see this as
having a role mainly in the context of cholinergic dysfunc-
tion; the difference in the effects of dopaminergic and
cholinergic manipulations on the induction and treatment
of hallucinations, and the neurochemical findings from pa-
tients with visual hallucinations, do not seem to us to admit
to another interpretation.
Consideration of the functional roles of dopaminergic
transmission can clarify why dopamine has only a contribu-
tory role. Dopamine has a functional role in attention but
contributes much less to visual object perception (Nieoul-
lon 2002). Therefore, it could be significant only if there
was another cause of impaired visual function. Additionally,
as Friston suggests, dopamine may also have a role in emo-
tional learning, perhaps accounting for why people with
schizophrenia develop distress in the context of their hallu-
cinations but people with eye disease develop insight.
R5.4. Dorsal function and the PAD model
The PAD model gave only passing mention to the role of
the dorsal, spatial visual stream, seeing this as normal. This
probably underplays its importance.
Pace-Schott’s assignment of dorsal function to the inte-
gration of hallucinatory objects produced by ventral dys-
function into a whole visual environment (the PAD hal-
lucinatory scene representation) is appealing and might
account for some of the differences in the subjective expe-
riences of dreams and hallucinations, and for the laterality
effects noted by Castelo-Branco. Tadin et al. additionally
suggest some intriguing methods for testing the relation-
ship within visual hemifields, although we caution that spa-
tial and object attention will need to be separately ad-
dressed. Tadin et al. argue as well for greater abnormality
in the dorsal, spatial stream of the visual system of people
with schizophrenia, citing normal N1 visual evoked poten-
tials (VEPs) in support. However, Spencer & McCarley
cite abnormal N1 VEPs to bolster their argument of sen-
sory cortex hyperactivity in the same disorder. Not being 
experts in this field, we will await a consensus on the ex-
perimental findings before being able to assess their impli-
cations for the PAD model.
R5.5. Summary of physiological constraints
Commentators have reinforced the centrality of choliner-
gic function for many disorders associated with RCVH.
However, it is clear that other neurochemical and func-
tional systems may also play modulatory or constraining
roles, although none appear necessary or sufficient in them-
selves.
R6. Future directions
One indication of a useful model is that it is testable. By that
standard, PAD has succeeded. Specific tests have been 
suggested by Badcock & Maybery (multimodal hallu-
cinations), Dolgov & McBeath (trade-offs in visual 
processing), Ingle (visual persistences), Mast (volitional
images), Morrison & David (delirium), Spencer & Mc-
Carley (attentional function), and Tadin et al. (visual
hemifields).
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R7. Conclusions
Winston Churchill (1947) famously described democracy
as the worst form of government – except for all those oth-
ers that had been tried from time to time. This remark
neatly makes the point that it is not just the imperfections
in a model that matter, but also how the model measures up
against the alternatives.
Our view is that the PAD model remains more potentially
predictive than the alternatives. There are still many ques-
tions that need new, reliable, unambiguous data in order to
be answered. However, no commentator has advanced an
alternative model that meets the requirements that we set
out in section 5 of the target article. If there can be a grand
unified theory of recurrent complex visual hallucinations,
we conclude that PAD, despite its many limitations, best fits
the present data. Many commentators have proposed spe-
cific tests of aspects of it. If we achieve nothing other than
to stimulate these tests and the development of a better
model, we will be satisfied.
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NOTES
1. For those unfamiliar with Greek mythology, it was Theseus
who slew the wicked Procrustes, and Lycomedes who, in some
versions of the tale, ultimately threw Theseus to his doom off a
cliff.
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